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• Professor of Law, University of Richmond. This report was prepared for the
consideration of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). The report
benefited significantly from discussions with the ACUS staff, officials from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the Department of Justice, Disability Rights Section,
the Federal Transit Administration, the Federal Highway Administration and the Federal
Communications Commission, representatives of various disability groups, attorneys
practicing disability law, staff of the American Association of Retired Persons and the ABA
Commission on Physical and Mental Disabilities, members of the ADNADR Working
Group of the Dispute Resolution Coalition on Aging and Disability, representatives of the
Better Business Bureau, staff members of various state and local anti-discrimination
agencies, and a number of dispute resolution professionals. I particularly want to thank
Professor Stephen B. Goldberg, who initially sparked my interest in mediation when I was
his research assistant at Northwestern University School of Law, for his insightful comments
on the report. The views expressed in the report are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect those of the members of the Conference or its committees except where
formal recommendations of the Conference are cited, or of anyone consulted in connection
with the report. Recommendation 95-7, based on this report, was adopted on June 16, 1995,
and published at 50 Fed. Reg. 43,115 (1995). Research assistance from Nicole Rovner
Beyer, Tenley Carroll, Penny Elaine Nimmo, Jeffrey Shapiro, Margaret Smither and TuQuynh Vu was invaluable in preparation of the report.
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INTRODUCTION

Congress passed the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") in 1990
and it became effective in 1992. 1 The statute prohibits discrimination
against individuals with disabilities by employers, state and local governments, and public accommodations. With more than two years experience
under the statute, an assessment of the effectiveness of the dispute
resolution procedures is appropriate. This Article begins with a brief
overview of the statute, including an analysis of the dispute resolution
procedure under each title. 2 The report then discusses the effectiveness of
existing dispute resolution procedures. 3 Finally the report makes recommendations for improving the dispute resolution procedures, including a
specific recommendation for adoption of a mediation program, 4 in order to
effectuate the purposes of the statute. 5
I.

THE

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

With the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress
extended protection against disability discrimination to large segments of
the population not previously protected. The preexisting Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 banned disability discrimination by the federal government,
government contractors, and recipients of federal funds. 6 The reach of that

I. President Bush signed the ADA, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327-378 (1990)
on July 26, 1990. Title I became effective July 26, 1992 for employers with 25 or more
employees and two years later for employers with 15 or more employees. S. REP. No. 116,
IOlst Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1989). Titles II and Ill became effective 18 months after
enactment. Id. at 3.
2. See infra Sections I and II.
3. See infra Section III.
4. See infra Sections IV and V.
5. As specifically set forth in the statute, the ADA's purpose is as follows:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the [f]ederal [g]overnment plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce
the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major
areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 1210l(b) (Supp. V 1993).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793-95 (1994).
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statute, however, left much disability discrimination untouched by federal
law. Congress detennined that additional federal legislation was necessary
to eliminate discrimination against the estimated 43 million Americans with
disabilities, discrimination which costs billions of dollars by fostering
unnecessary dependency and nonproductivity. 7 Much of the statutory
language in the ADA is based on the Rehabilitation Act and the regulations
issued pursuant to that Act.
Disability under the ADA is defined as "a physical or mental impainnent
that substantially limits one or more of [an individual's] major life activities
8
••••"
Major life activities are those that the average person can perfonn
with little or no difficulty. 9 Individuals who have a history of disability or
are perceived to have a disability, even if they do not, also meet the
statutory definition of disability. 10
The ADA contains five titles, the first four dealing with specific aspects
of discrimination and the fifth containing miscellaneous provisions. 11 Title
I covers employment discrimination, Title II covers discrimination in public
services, Title III covers discrimination in public accommodations and
services operated by private entities, and Title IV covers telecommunications services for individuals with hearing and speech impainnents.

7. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9)(Supp. V 1993); S. REP. No. 116, supra note 1, at 1618 (noting that discrimination is costly to society because disabled individuals must rely on
social welfare programs for economic survival rather than contributing to the economy
through productivity).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993). While the term physical or mental
impairment is not defined in the statute, the legislative history indicates that the term
includes:
( 1) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; neuromuscular; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular;
reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine;
or (2) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
S. Rep. No. 116, IOI st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989). The statute expressly eliminates certain
conditions from the definition of disability including homosexuality, bisexuality, compulsive
gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, disorders resulting from current illegal drug use,
"transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders
not resulting from physical impairments or other sexual behavior disorders .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 1221 l(b)(l) (Supp. V 1993).
9. These include walking, seeing, hearing, breathing, learning, working, caring for
oneself, and participating in community activities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1995).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(B)-(C) (Supp. V 1993).
11. 42U.S.C.§§ 12111-12117;42U.S.C.§§ 12131-12165;420.S.C.§§ 12101-12189
(Supp. V 1993).
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Notable among the provisions of Title V are section 506, which requires
the agencies primarily responsible for administration of the statute to
provide technical assistance to covered entities, individuals with rights
under the statute, and other federal agencies,1 2 and section 513, which
encourages the use of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") where
appropriate and authorized by law. 13

A.

Title I - Employment

Title I prohibits discrimination against "a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability . . . in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment." 14 This provision covers employers with fifteen or more
employees. 15
Three key concepts in the employment provisions are: (I) what
constitutes a disability; (2) who is a qualified individual with a disability;
and (3) what is discrimination.' 6 First, the determination of disability as
discussed above is the same for all titles of the ADA. Second, to bring a
claim of discrimination, an individual must establish that she is a qualified
individual with a disability, i.e., she can perform the essential functions of
the job with or without reasonable accommodation. 17
"Essential functions of the job" and "reasonable accommodation" are
both terms of art under the statute. The essential functions of the job are
those duties that are fundamental rather than marginal. 18 Reasonable
accommodations may include, but are not limited to, making facilities
accessible, job restructuring, modifying work schedules, reassigning the
employee to a vacant position, acquiring or modifying equipment or

12. 42 U.S.C. § 12206(c)(l) (Supp. V 1993).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. V 1993).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12ll2(a) (Supp. V 1993).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12lll(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. V 1993) (defining disability); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(8) (Supp. V 1993) (defining qualified individual with a disability); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112 (Supp. V 1993) (specifying unlawful discrimination).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12lll(8) (Supp. V 1993).
18. 29 C.F.R. § l 630.2(n) (1995). The determination of whether a function is essential
is based on the employer's judgment, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on
the function, the experience of the employees in the same or similar jobs, the terms of any
collective bargaining agreement, and the consequences of not requiring the employee to
perform the functions. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
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devices, or providing readers or interpreters. 19 The employer must make
the accommodation(s) necessary to allow a disabled employee or applicant
to perfonn the essential functions of a job, unless the accommodation(s)
would create undue hardship. 20 Undue hardship is established by demonstrating that making the accommodation(s) would require significant
difficulty or expense. 21
Discrimination barred by Title I includes: (1) intentional discrimination;
(2) use of standards, criteria, methods of administration, or tests that have
the effect of discrimination; (3) participating in a relationship that causes
employees or applicants to be subjected to discrimination; (4) discrimination based on an employee or applicant's relationship with an individual
with a disability; and (5) failure to reasonably accommodate a qualified
individual with a disability. 22 Title I provides several defenses to a claim
of discrimination. An employer may justify the use of job qualifications,
selection criteria, or tests that have a discriminatory impact by establishing
that they are job-related and consistent with business necessity. 23 In
addition, an employer may require that an individual not "pose a direct
threat to the health or safety" of others in the workplace. 24 As noted
above, an employer may refuse to reasonably accommodate a disabled
individual if the accommodation would impose undue hardship. Additionally, an employer may defend against an ADA claim by proving that an
individual is not disabled, not qualified for the position, or not discriminated against because of the disability. 25
Along with the other prohibitions on discrimination, the ADA directly
limits inquiries by a covered entity about disability and medical examinations. An employer may make inquiries about an applicant's ability to
perfonn the job, but not about the applicant's disability. 26 The employer
can require an applicant to take a medical exam only after an offer of
employment is made. 27 The offer may be conditioned on the results of the
exam only if all new employees in the same job category are subjected to
the exam, the medical infonnation is kept confidential, and any disqualifica-

19. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. V 1993).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (Supp. V 1993).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 l(lO)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
22. 42 u.s.c. § 12112(b)(l)-(7).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (Supp. V 1993).
24. 42 u.s.c. § 12113(b).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 1993) (barring discrimination against qualified
individuals with disabilities because of disability).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (Supp. V 1993).
27. Id.
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tion resulting from the exam is based on criteria that are job-related and
consistent with business necessity. 28 Employers may make inquiries of
employees about disabilities and require medical exams of employees only
if the inquiries and exams are "job-related and consistent with business
necessity. " 29

B.

ntle II - Public Entities

Title II of the ADA proscribes discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities by public entities. 30 In addition to the broad prohibition against discrimination, Title II specifies that qualified individuals with
disabilities cannot "be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity."31
Employment discrimination actions against public entities may be brought
under Title I or Title 11. 32
C.

Tiile Ill - Public Accommodations

Title III of the ADA bans discrimination by public accommodations if
their operations affect commerce. 33 The definition of public accommodation is quite broad, including restaurants, hotels, theaters, retail establishments, auditoriums, schools, museums, libraries, public transportation
stations, service establishments, social service agencies, and recreational

28. 42 U.S.C. §§ l2l l2(d)(3)(A)-(C) (Supp. V 1993).
29. 42 U.S.C. § l2l l2(d)(4) (Supp. V 1993).
30. Public entities include: (I) state and local governments; (2) departments, agencies,
special purpose districts or other "instrumentalities of a State or States or local government[ s] ;"and (3) passenger railroads. 42 U.S.C. §§ l213I(l)(A)-(C) (Supp. V 1993).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. V 1993). Title II also contains detailed requirements that
public transportation systems must meet to avoid violation of the discrimination prohibitions.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12150, §§ 12161-12165 (Supp. V 1993).
32. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 ( 1995); Petersen v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 818
F. Supp. 1276, 1278-79 (W.D. Wis. 1993) (finding that employment discrimination against
public entity may be brought under Title I or Title II).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7), 12182(a). The new construction and alterations provisions
of Title III, see infra note 41 and accompanying text, apply to commercial facilities as well
as places of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12183 (Supp. V 1993). Commercial
facilities are facilities intended for nonresidential use with operations that affect commerce.
42 U.S.C. § 12181(2) (Supp. V 1993). Additionally, Title III contains specific provisions
directed at public transportation supplied by private entities.
42 U.S.C.
§§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), 12181(10) (Supp. V 1993). See42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(2)(B)-(D);
12184 (Supp. V 1993) (barring discrimination on fixed route transportation systems, demand
responsive transportation systems and over-the-road bus systems, and specifying what
constitutes such discrimination).
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establishments.J 4 A public accommodation, which includes the owner,
lessor, lessee, or operator, cannot discriminate on the basis of an individual's disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.J 5 Title III not only
requires that an establishment be accessible, but also requires access to
services and facilities in an integrated setting.J 6 The ADA requires that
public accommodations modify practices and procedures to ensure access
for individuals with disabilities, unless the changes would fundamentally
alter the nature of the services or facilities.J 7 Also, a person with a
disability cannot be denied services because of the absence of "auxiliary
aids or services," including interpreters, readers, or equipment or devices
that would enable communication with those who are hearing or visually
impaired, unless use of such aids would fundamentally alter the nature of
the services or impose an undue burden.J 8
Public accommodations must remove architectural and communication
barriers where removal is "readily achievable."J 9 If removal of a barrier
is not readily achievable, access to the services or facility must be made
available through readily achievable alternative means. 40 In addition to the
barrier removal requirements, the statute specifies that new construction and

34. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (Supp. V 1993). Prohibited discrimination includes the use
of eligibility criteria that screen out individuals with disabilities from full and equal
enjoyment of goods, services, or facilities unless such criteria are necessary to the provision
of the goods, services, or facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1993).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(l)(B) (Supp. V 1993). This requirement would prevent a
public accommodation from isolating individuals with disabilities in separate accommodations. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.203(a)-(b) (1995).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1993).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii), 12102(1) (Supp. V 1993).
39. This is defined as "easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much
difficulty or expense." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(9), 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (Supp. V 1993). The
legislative history of these provisions suggests that accessibility of every part of every
facility is not necessarily required, but the ADA "contemplates a high degree of convenient
accessibility" of parking, routes to and from the facility, entrances, restrooms, water
fountains, public areas, work areas and service areas. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 1, at 69.
Readily achievable alterations would include, for example, small ramps, raised letter and
braille markings on signs and elevator controls, grab bars, flashing alarm lights, and lower
telephones. Id. at 66.
40. See42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v)(Supp. V 1993). Readily achievable alternative
means would include such change as curb service or assistance to retrieve items in an
inaccessible location where access is not readily achievable. S. REP. No. 116, supra note
I, at 66.
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substantial alterations to existing facilities must comply with distinct
specific guidelines for accessibility. 41
D.

ntle JV - Telecommunications

Title IV amends Title II of the Communications Act42 and is designed
to ensure the availability of communication by wire or radio for individuals
with speech or hearing impairment in a manner "functionally equivalent to
the ability of an individual who does not have a hearing impairment or
speech impairment .... "43 The Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") was authorized to use its enforcement authority under the
Communications Act to ensure that both interstate and intrastate communication services are available within three years of enactment of Title IV. 44
Pursuant to this authority the FCC has mandated that "each common carrier
providing telephone voice transmission services" provide telecommunications relay services for intrastate and interstate communications. 45 These
services must be provided at rates no greater than those paid for comparable voice communication services. 46
II.

ADA ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES
A.

Tiile I

Title I, banning employment discrimination, adopts the enforcement
mechanisms of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.47 Accordingly,
exhaustion of administrative remedies through the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is required as a prerequisite to filing suit
alleging a violation of Title I. First, a charge must be filed with the EEOC,
which investigates to determine whether "there is reasonable cause to

41. See 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(l) (stating newly constructed facilities must be readily
accessible in accordance with regulations issued under Title Ill); 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2)
(specifying that substantially altered facilities or portions of facilities must be readily
accessible to the maximum extent feasible). As noted earlier, see supra note 33, these
requirements apply to commercial facilities as well as public accommodations.
42. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (Supp. V 1993).
43. 47 U.S.C. § 225(a)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
44. 47 U.S.C. § 225(c) (Supp. V 1993).
45. 47 C.F.R. § 64.603 (1995).
46. 47 C.F.R. § 64.604(c)(3) (1995).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 12 l l 7(a); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9
(l 994).
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believe that the charge is true. " 48 If the EEOC finds cause, then the
agency is required to "endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion."49 The EEOC may file suit based on the charge, if conciliation efforts fail, 50 or alternatively, the EEOC may decline to do so,
notifying the complainant of its determination. 51 If the EEOC finds no
reasonable cause, it also notifies the complainant of its determination. 52
Regardless of the cause finding, the complainant has ninety days from
receipt of the EEOC's notice to file a judicial action. 53 In addition to its
enforcement authority, the EEOC has authority to issue regulations to carry
out Title I and has done so. 54
B.

ntle II

Title II, barring discrimination by public entities, adopts the procedures
of section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act for enforcement. 55 The legislative
history indicates Congress's intent that enforcement follow the model under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which applies to federal fund
recipients. 56 The Department of Justice is authorized to file suits for
enforcement of Title 11. 57 In addition, individuals with disabilities have a
private right of action under Title II and need not exhaust federal
administrative remedies as a prerequisite to suit. 58

48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994).
49. Id.
50. In the case of a governmental respondent, the Commission must refer the case to
the Attorney General for filing of a civil suit. Id.
51. Conciliation is a prerequisite to a suit filed by the Commission or Attorney General,
but a suit by the charging party is not barred by the Commission's failure to conciliate.
MACK A. PLAYER ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 667 (1990).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b),(f).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). The complainant may file suit after receipt of the notice
regardless of whether the Commission found reasonable cause or no reasonable cause. Id.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 12116; 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1-1630.16 (1995). Effective July 26, 1992,
the EEOC issued substantive regulations to carry out the ADA, accompanied by interpretive
guidance. 29 C.F .R. § 1630.1-1630.16 ( 1995).
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (Supp. V 1993); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
56. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 1Olst Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1990) (stating that administrative
enforcement should parallel section 504). Section 505 contains enforcement procedures for
both section 504 actions and section 501 actions. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a (l994)(containing
enforcement procedures for sections 501 and 504). Section 501 covers employees of the
federal government. See 29 U.S.C. § 791 (requiring affirmative action by federal agencies).
57. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 56, at 98.
58. Id.
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Although filing a complaint with the enforcement agency is not a
prerequisite to suit, an individual may file a complaint alleging a violation
of Title II. Investigation of complaints is handled by various agencies,
including the Department of Justice, as designated in the regulations. 59 All
complaints must be filed within 180 days from the date of the alleged
discrimination. 60 The regulations require the appropriate agency to
investigate the complaint and attempt informal resolution. 61 If no informal
resolution is reached, a Letter of Findings is issued to the complainant and
the public entity. When the agency finds that the entity is not in compliance with the statute, the agency attempts to negotiate an agreement for
voluntary compliance. 62 If no agreement is reached, the case is referred
to the Attorney General for "appropriate action."63
If the public entity is a federal fund recipient, which is probable, it is
also covered by section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 64 Termination and
suspension of funding are available remedies under section 504. 65 Prior

59. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.170 - 35.178, 35.190 ( 1995) (setting forth complaint
procedures under Title II and designating agencies for investigation of particular types of
complaints). The Department ofTransportation handles complaints relating to transportation,
including highways, public transportation, traffic management, automobile licensing and
inspection, and driver licensing. Id.§ 35.190(b)(8) (1995). The agency's authority as an
investigating agency under the regulations is identical to that of the other seven agencies
designated to handle specific types of complaints, and distinct from its regulatory and
enforcement responsibility under Title II, Part B dealing with public transportation by public
entities. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.190 ( 1995) (designating investigation agencies); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12141-12165 (Supp. V 1993) (establishing statutory nondiscrimination requirements for
public transportation).
60. 28 C.F.R. § 35.170(b) (1995).
61. 28 C.F.R. § 35.172 (1995). The appropriate agencies are the Department of
Agriculture for programs and services related to farming; the Department of Education for
programs and services related to education; the Department of Health and Human Services
for programs and services related to health care and social services; the Department of
Housing and Urban Development for programs and services related to housing; the Department of the Interior for programs and services related to lands and natural resources; the
Department of Justice for programs and services related to law enforcement, public safety,
and administration of justice; the Department of Labor for programs and services related to
the work force; and the Department of Transportation for programs and services related to
transportation. 28 C.F.R. § 35.190 (1995).
62. 28 C.F.R. § 35.173 (1995).
63. 28 C.F.R. § 35.174 (1995).
64. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994) (barring discrimination by programs receiving federal
financial assistance).
65. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2) (1994) (adopting remedies ofTitle VI of the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)(l)); MACKA. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 609
(I 988)(stating statutory remedy under section 504 is found in Title VI-withdrawal of
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to tennination or suspension of funding, the entity is entitled to a
hearing. 66
The Secretary of Transportation has the authority to issue regulations to
carry out Parts I and II of Subtitle B of Title II, which deal with public
transportation provided by public entities. 67 The Attorney General has the
authority to issue regulations to carry out the remainder of Title 11. 68 The
regulations must be consistent with those issued pursuant to section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. 69 Regulations under both subtitles have been
promulgated. 10

C.

Title Ill

Individuals subject to discrimination under Title III prohibiting
discrimination by public accommodations can sue for injunctive relief, but
not damages. 71 Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required.
Available injunctive relief includes orders to alter facilities, provide
auxiliary aids, modify policies, or provide services or goods by alternative
methods. 72
Title III authorizes the Attorney General to file a civil action when
discrimination raises an issue of "general public importance" or where there
is reasonable cause to believe that a person "is engaged in a pattern or
practice of discrimination."73 In cases brought by the Attorney General,

federal financial assistance).
66. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.5 (1995) (requiring each enforcement agency under the
Rehabilitation Act to establish an enforcement system which includes the enforcement and
hearing procedures adopted for Title VI); 34 C.F.R. § 100.8 (1995) (Department of
Education regulations under Title VI requiring hearing); 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.125, 27.127 ( 1995)
(Department of Transportation regulations requiring hearing under the Rehabilitation Act).
67. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12149, 12164 (Supp. V 1993). The regulations must be
consistent with accessibility guidelines promulgated by the Architectural and Transportation
Barriers Compliance Board in accordance with section 504 of Title V of the ADA. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 12149(b), 12163 (requiring consistency) and 42 U.S.C. § 12204 (requiring
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board to issue guidelines for
accessibility).
68. 42 u.s.c. § 12134.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b),(c).
70. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.101-35.190 (Department of Justice regulations implementing
Title II of ADA); 49 C.F.R. §§ 37.1-37.169, 38.1-38.179 (Department of Transportation
regulations implementing Titles II and III of ADA).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) (Supp. V 1993).
72. Id.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(l)(B).

1996]

DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER ADA

1019

compensatory damages and civil penalties are available. 74 The Attorney
General has investigation responsibility for alleged violations of Title III as
well as responsibility for periodic compliance reviews. 75 Finally, after
public hearing and in consultation with the Architectural and Transportation
Barriers Compliance Board, the Attorney General is authorized to certify
that state laws, local building codes, or other ordinances that establish
accessibility mandates meet the requirements of Title III. 76 The certification provides rebuttable evidence of compliance with the Act. 77
The Secretary of Transportation issued regulations for the transportation
provisions of Title 111. 78 The Attorney General issued regulations for the
remaining provisions of Title III. 79 Congress specified that the regulations
must be consistent with accessibility guidelines promulgated by the
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board in accordance
with Title V of the ADA. 80

D.

Title IV

The FCC issued regulations for implementation of Title IV, dealing with
telecommunications, to ensure compliance with the requirements of the
statute. 81 The Commission is authorized to certify state compliance
programs which meet the requirements for federal certification. 82
Complaints alleging violation of Title IV are filed with the FCC or with a

74. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(l)(A)(i). While the statutory language states that the
Attorney General "shall investigate" alleged violations ofTitle III, the Department of Justice
has taken the position that investigation of Title III cases is discretionary, while investigation
of Title II cases is mandatory. Meeting with representatives of the Department of Justice,
Public Access Section, March 28, 1994.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(l)(A)(ii).
77. Id.
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(a) (Supp. V 1993) (authorizing Secretary ofTransportation
to issue regulations); 49 C.F.R. §§ 37.1-37.179, 38.1-38.179 (regulations issued by Secretary).
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (authorizing Attorney General to issue regulations); 28
C.F.R. §§ 36.101-36.608 (regulations issued by Attorney General).
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(c) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring consistency); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12204 (requiring the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board to issue
guidelines for accessibility); 28 C.F.R. Part 36, Appendix (accessibility guidelines issued by
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board).
81. See 47 U.S.C. § 225(d) (Supp. V 1993) (authorizing FCC to issue regulations); 47
C.F.R. §§ 64.601-64.608 (regulations issued by FCC).
82. 47 U.S.C. § 225(f).
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certified state program if it involves intrastate services in such a state.B3
The Commission must resolve complaints of violations of Title IV by final
order within 180 days of filing.B 4 If a state does not resolve a complaint
within 180 days, jurisdiction over the complaint reverts to the FCC.B 5

E.

Title V

Title V contains a number of miscellaneous provisions. Section 513,
which deals with alternative dispute resolution, provides: "[w]here
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative
means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation,
facilitation, mediation, factfinding, mini-trials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this chapter."B6 Having reviewed
the basic anti-discrimination provisions of the statute, this Article's analysis
now moves to the current dispute resolution provisions.
III.

CURRENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE ADA

A.

Title I

The EEOC has an increasing backlog of cases which was only
exacerbated by enactment of the ADA.B 7 In the first two quarters of fiscal
1994, 8,669 ADA charges were filed, an increase of 38% from the previous
year.BB Parties who deal with the agency are increasingly frustrated at the
length of time that it takes to investigate complaints and issue determinations.B9 The immense caseload and the inability to achieve quick resolu-

83. 47 C.F.R. § 64.604(5) (1994).
84. 47 U.S.C. § 225(e) (Supp. V 1993).
85. 47 C.F.R. § 47.604(5) (1994).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. V 1993).
87. See EEOC, Civil Rights Commission Chiefs Make Case to Congress for Budget
Increases, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 57 d20 (Mar. 25, 1994); House Labor Subcommittee
Approves Bill Consolidating Federal EEO Authority, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 17 d6
(Jan. 27, 1994). By the end of the second quarter of fiscal 1994, the number of pending
cases was 85,212, an increase of21,547 cases over the previous year. EEOC Struggles with
Caseload, 45 LAB. L.J. 432 (1994). By late 1994, the backlog was over 90,000 cases. See
EEOC Chair to Address Agency Problems, 147 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 404, 405 (Nov. 28,
1994).
88. EEOC Struggles with Caseload, supra note 87, at 432. This increase occurred
before July 26, 1994, when the threshold for ADA coverage dropped from 25 employees to
15 employees, which is expected to generate significant additional ADA cases. Id.
89. See EEOC Official and Attorneys Discuss Challenges Posed by Record Charge
Rate, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 54 d16 (March 22, 1994); Letter to Frances M. Hart
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tions of cases frustrate agency personnel. 90 Despite the increasing backlog,
Congress recently voted to reduce the EEOC' s budget, which will further
exacerbate the problem. 91
The backlog problem is somewhat mitigated by the procedure that
permits a charging party92 to request the EEOC to issue a notice of right
to sue if 180 days have passed since the filing of a charge without
completion of the investigation. 93 An individual who desires to litigate
can wait the 180 days, request the notice, and file suit. This provision does
not aid less sophisticated individuals, those without lawyers, or those who
hope for agency action on the charge, however. 94 In addition, the
congressional goal of encouraging informal resolution of the charge through
the conciliation process is frustrated. 95

from Jeffrey A. Norris, Comments of Equal Employment Advisory Council in Response to
EEOC 's Request for Comments on Alternative Dispute Resolution 2 (Sept. 16, 1993).
90. See EEOC Official Discusses Record Charge Rate, 145 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 381
(Mar. 28, 1994); Latest EEOC Data Show Record Charges, Sharp Increase in Inventory of
Pending Cases, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 152, d5 (Aug. 10, 1993) (Although the agency
increased its resolution of charges in 1993, the number of charges awaiting resolution also
increased by almost 32% generating significant concern on the part of the agency).
91. CongressApproveslegislationCuttingEEOC Budget, 146 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
558 (Aug. 29, 1994). The EEOC received virtually no increase in funding or staffing when
ADA cases were added to its enforcement responsibilities, despite the fact that ADA cases
now constitute about 20% of the agency's caseload. David R. Sands, Charges of Bias on
the Job Rising Fast, THE WASH. TIMES at D5 (Apr. 2, 1994); EEOC Must Begin to Deal
With its Growing Workload, 143 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 495 (Aug. 16, 1993). The EEOC
has 559 fewer staff members than in 1980 despite the additional workload generated by the
ADA and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. EEOC, Civil Rights Commission Chiefs Make Case
to Congress For Budget Increases, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 57, d20 (Mar. 25, 1994).
92. The terms charging party and complainant are used interchangeably throughout the
report for individuals who file charges with the various agencies alleging violations of the
ADA. The party charged with the violation is referred to as the respondent.
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (stating if no civil action filed or conciliation
agreement reached within 180 days the Commission shall notify the charging party who can
file a law suit); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a) (1995) (stating that right to sue letter will be issued
upon request after 180 days or if investigation cannot be completed within 180 days).
94. These individuals do not take advantage of the opportunity to litigate either because
of lack of knowledge, lack of representation, or lack of resources.
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (requiring the Commission to attempt to eliminate
unlawful practices by conciliation); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24 (describing the conciliation
procedure). See also Departing EEOC General Counsel Sees Need/or New Direction at
Overwhelmed Agency, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 111 d3 (June 11, 1993) (Departing
General Counsel noted that backlog of charges and failure to fund agency to provide for
voluntary resolution of disputes as contemplated under Title VII have intensified problems
in administering Title VII).
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Because of the backlog, among other factors, the number of cases
litigated under the employment provisions of the ADA is extremely small
in relation to the number of charges filed. From the effective date of the
statute through December 31, 1994, the total number of ADA charges filed
was 39,927. 96 As of that date, the EEOC had filed 48 cases in court
alleging ADA violations. 97 In addition to EEOC lawsuits, suits have been
filed by employees or applicants. Of the 154 ADA cases published in
BNA's Americans with Disabilities Act Cases in 1993 and the first half of
1994, 58 were employment cases. 98 While the number of cases litigated
increased in 1994 and can be expected to increase further as more cases are
investigated and knowledge about the statute expands, these figures
illustrate the significance of the backlog, and demonstrate that the private
right of action for plaintiffs is not moving many cases from the investigation backlog to the courts. The overwhelming majority of ADA employment cases are simply awaiting investigatory action, and few of them will
ever be litigated by the agency regardless of the outcome of the investigation.
There is ongoing consideration of how to resolve the EEOC's tremendous backlog problem, including changes in the agency's structure,
priorities, funding, dispute resolution mechanisms and the use of ADR. 99

96. Telephone Conversation with Peggy Mastroianni, Director of ADA Policy, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (Jan. 23, 1995).
97. Id. In the first two years under the statute, the EEOC filed 23 cases, while the
number of charges filed was 29, 720, a litigation rate of less than one tenth of one percent.
EEOC Has 23 Pending ADA Complaints; Many Involve Charges ofAIDS Bias, 1994 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) 133d11 (July 14, 1994). The litigation rate increased slightly in the later
half of 1994.
98. ADA: Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990 Special Report, 146 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) No. 14, at 8 (Aug. 1, 1994). Fourteen of the 45 cases in 1993 were employment
cases and 44 of the 79 cases in the first half of 1994 were employment cases. id. Thus,
employment cases increased as a percentage of reported cases. Because the BNA data
included all cases, there may be some overlap between the 48 EEOC cases and the 58
employment cases in the BNA sample.
99. See EEOC Chair to Address Agency Problems, 147 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 404
(Nov. 28, 1994) (discussing new EEOC Chair's ideas to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the agency); Oversight Hearing on the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Before the Subcomm. on Select Education and Labor of the House Committee
on Education and Labor, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-7 (July 26, 1994) (hereinafter Oversight
Hearing) (discussing various proposals to improve the effectiveness of the EEOC). See also
Fact Finding Report Issued by the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 105, d34 at 97-118 (June 3, 1994) (hereinafter Dunlop
Commission Fact Finding Report) (discussing the current system of employment regulation,
litigation and dispute resolution, and considering alternative methods of handling
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This consideration is not limited to the ADA, but concerns all of the
statutory responsibilities of the agency.
With respect to the use of alternative dispute resolution, the EEOC
attempts to settle cases through negotiation whenever possible. 100 In cases
in which the EEOC finds reasonable cause, the statute expressly requires
the EEOC to conciliate prior to litigation. 101
In addition, the EEOC recently completed a pilot mediation program in
which 267 of a contemplated 300 meditations were conducted. 102 The
program included Title I ADA cases, among others, but was limited to
cases involving discharge, discipline, or alleged discrimination in terms and
conditions of employment. 103 The agency contracted with the Center for
Dispute Settlement to conduct mediation upon agreement of the parties. 104
The cases were assigned for sixty days to a mediator, who was unconnected with the agency. 105 Eighty-seven percent of the charging parties
agreed to mediation, but only forty-three percent of employers agreed. 106
Assessments of the pilot project indicated that employers were reluctant to
mediate discharge cases, perhaps because they saw no ground for
compromise. 10' Agreement was reached in 52% of the mediated cases. 108
The pilot project did not include reasonable accommodation cases under
the ADA. 109 Nevertheless, agency representatives and others have

employment-related disputes including alternative dispute resolution, a unified administrative agency, and a unified labor court). See also infra notes 124-39 and accompanying text
(discussing EEOC's most recent efforts to address the backlog).
100. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20. The EEOC considers its normal efforts to settle cases as a
form of ADR.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994).
102. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
Pilot Program 1-3 ( 1994) (hereinafter EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program); EEOC Official
Discusses Record Charge Rate, 145 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 381 (Mar. 28, 1994).
103. EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 102, at 2.
104. See id. at 1-2.
105. EEOC Official Discusses Record Charge Rate, supra note 102, at 381.
106. EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 102, at 3.
107. Information from representatives of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. The final report indicated that only 39% of respondents agreed to mediate in
the cases where the employee was terminated, but 70% agreed where the employee had
resigned and 48% agreed where the employee remained employed. See EEOC Report on
ADR Pilot Project, supra note 102, at 4.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2. The EEOC decided to exclude reasonable accommodation cases for several
reasons. The agency had a strong interest in reducing the backlog of discharge cases, the
largest category of cases at the EEOC. Also, the ADA was a new statute with no existing
precedent regarding remedies. Unlike discharge cases, the EEOC did not have experience
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suggested that reasonable accommodation cases are precisely the type of
cases that should be mediated. One of the benefits of mediation is that it
enables parties to resolve disputes and maintain continuing relationships.110 In reasonable accommodation cases, the parties can work out an
accommodation that enables the employee to retain employment, thus
preserving the relationship.
The parties to meditations in the pilot project reflected generally high
satisfaction levels-ninety-two percent believed that the mediation was fair
and eighty percent would try it again. 111 Reviews given by the agency's
supervisory personnel were mixed, with the negative assessments reflecting
both a concern that mediation would weaken the agency's law enforcement
image and a concern for the time taken by the program. 112 The mediation
process took far less time than a full investigation, 113 but those cases that
were not settled moved back into the investigation process, perhaps adding
to overall processing time. 114 The agency compared settlement agreements reached in mediation and those reached through the normal agency
resolution techniques, and found no major differences in the remedies

with reasonable accommodation issues under other statutes. While there are reasonable
accommodation requirements for religion under Title VII, see TWA Inc. v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63, 81 (1977), and for employees with disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act, most
of the statutory claims within EEOC's administrative responsibility have no such requirement. Furthermore, Congress indicated that it did not intend for the interpretation of Title
VII's reasonable accommodation requirement for religion to govern the ADA See H.R.
REP. No. 485, supra note 67, at 68; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 1, at 36. Given these
factors, there was concern about setting a standard for settlements in reasonable accommodation cases through outside mediation. Information from Peggy Mastroianni, Director of
Policy EEOC, Donna Swanson, EEOC and Edna Povich, Center for Dispute Settlement.
110. See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
111. EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 102, at 5. One fairness concern
was expressed by both parties. When either party appeared with unexpected representatives,
the good faith of that party was questioned. Id.
112. See id at 6-7.
113. The average time for completion of the mediation process was 67 days, id. at 4,
while the average processing time for cases outside the mediation project was 293 days in
1994. EEOC Struggles with Caseload, supra note 87.
114. Supervisors believed that the pilot project added time to the process. EEOC Report
on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 102, at 6. The report did not recite data that would
enable any definitive conclusion on the issue, however. Also, the time from filing to
resolution was far shorter for mediated cases, 67 days, than for cases settled outside the pilot
project, 247 days. Id. This difference may be attributable, in whole or in part, to the fact
that mediated cases were forwarded to mediation immediately upon agreement of the parties,
while the settlement negotiations outside the pilot project "proceeded in accordance with
docket order scheduling." Id. at 6.
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achieved except for slightly higher monetary benefits in the agency-settled
cases. 115 The outside evaluator of the project found that in situations
where the mediators believed that discrimination occurred, few settlements
were reached-a finding that warrants some concern. 116
In addition to the pilot project, the EEOC and the Department of Justice
funded training in both the ADA and the use of ADR for four hundred
individuals with disabilities who were associated with disability groups. 117
In the second phase, one hundred people received advanced training, which
included intensive training in ADA and ADR. Twenty-five of the
individuals were invited to Washington for a one week mediation training
session, at the end of which they were certified as trained mediators. 118
Some of these individuals have been involved in training mediators who
will be participating in the Department of Justice pilot mediation project
discussed below. 119 Others have conducted training in their communities
which has led to voluntary compliance by some businesses. 120
In July 1993, in order to develop a policy statement on ADR, the EEOC
requested comments from the public about the use of alternative dispute
resolution in "l) formal and informal adjudications, 2) rulemakings, 3)
enforcement actions, 4) contract administration, and 5) litigation brought by
or against the Commission." 121 The comments generally reflect support

115. See id. at 6.
116. See id. at 5. This raises a question about the value of mediation which will be
addressed later in this Article.
117. Information regarding these training sessions was obtained from representatives of
the EEOC, Department of Justice, Disability Rights Section, and the Disability Rights
Education and Defense Fund (DREDF). See also American Bar Association Commission
on Mental and Physical Disability Law and Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly,
Targeting Disability Needs: A Guide to the ADA Dispute Resolution Programs 9 (published
by The American Association of Retired Persons for the National Institute for Dispute
Resolution Dec. 1994) (hereinafter Targeting DisabilityNeeds) (describing training); Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Request for Comments on the Use of Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Negotiated Rulemaking Procedures, 58 Fed. Reg. 39023 (July 21,
1993) (describing training).
118. Information from Peggy Mastroianni, ADA Policy Director, EEOC.
119. The Community Board Program, Proposal to Demonstrate the Application of
Mediation to Achieve Voluntary Compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act: A
National Model(submitted to the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division May 7, 1993)
(hereinafter Community Board Proposal).
120. Press Releases from the Department of Justice on the Fourth Anniversary of the
ADA detailing voluntary compliance resulting, in part, from ADA training conducted by the
Department of Justice and the EEOC.
121. EEOC Request/or Comments on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1993 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) 134 d27 (July 15, 1993).
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for ADR, although many expressed reservations with respect to particular
uses of ADR or concerns relating to the way in which ADR might be
implemented. 122 While the EEOC staff considered ADR informally in
addition to soliciting comments from the public, the long delay in
appointing a Chair for the Commission and other commission members
postponed specific consideration and implementation of ADR projects. 123
In December 1994, the recently appointed Chair of the Commission,
Gilbert Casellas, announced formation of an ADR Task Force to study and
recommend to the Commission appropriate uses of ADR. 124 The task
force report led to adoption of four motions relating to ADR on April 25,
1995 } 25 The first motion directed the Chair to take actions necessary to
develop an ADR program with the following elements: 1) informed and
voluntary participation; 2) confidential deliberations in the ADR process;
and 3) use of neutral facilitators. 126 The Second Motion directed the
Office of Legal Counsel to draft a proposed policy statement on ADR by
May 30, 1995 for consideration by the Commission. 127 The policy

122. See, e.g., Comments on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Letter from Richard T.
Seymour to Frances M. Hart, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law (Sept.
20, 1993) (supporting ADR, but urging that some investigation precede use of ADR); Letter
from Jeffrey A. Norris to Frances M. Hart, Equal Opportunity Employment Advisory
Council (Sept. 16, 1993) (supporting ADR, but criticizing the EEOC's position that internal
ADR procedures must be continued after an employee files an EEOC charge); Women
Employed Institute, Comments in Response to EEOC Request for Comment on Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Negotiated Rulemaking Procedures (Sept. 20, 1993)
(supporting ADR, while urging training for EEOC staff in ADR and urging renewal of
initiation of large class action lawsuits with savings resulting from ADR) (all comments on
file with the author).
123. Information from representatives of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Conference Call with Nicholas Inzeo, Associate Legal Counsel for Legal
Services, J.C. Thurmond, and Sharon Rennert (Aug. 19, 1994). See EEOC Chair to Address
Agency Problems, 147 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 404, 405 (Nov. 28, 1994) (Commission
expected to consider expansion of ADR); EEOC Said to Have to Expand Role ofADR, 147
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 214, 215 (Oct. 17, 1994) (EEOC Commissioner Silberman supports
expandedADR); CasellasApprovedAsChairmanofEEOC, 147 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 174,
175 (Oct. 10, 1994) (Clinton administration took almost two years to make appointments to
EEOC).
124. Report and Recommendations of the Commission on the Future of WorkerManagement Relations, reprinted in 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 6, d55 (Jan. 10, 1995)
(hereinafter Dunlop Commission Final Report).
125. Kevin P. McGowan, EEOC Votes to Offer Voluntary Mediation as Option in Job
DiscriminationClaims, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 80 d3 (Apr. 26, 1995).
126. Motions Proposed by the ADR Task Force, Commission Meeting of the Task Force
on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Motion I (Apr. 25, 1995) (hereinafter Motions).
127. Id., Motion I.
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statement should reflect the "basic principles and conclusions of the ADR
Task Force Report: that ADR furthers the EEOC's dual mission of
vigorously enforcing federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination
and resolving employment disputes." 128 When the policy statement is
approved, the Chair will request proposals from EEOC district offices
desiring to participate in the ADR program and will select proposals for
implementation, giving priority to mediation proposals. 129 The target date
for implementation is fiscal year 1996. 130 The contemplated ADR program applies broadly to cases within the EEOC's jurisdiction, including
ADA cases, and includes monitoring and enforcement by the EEOC. 131
The fourth motion directed the Legal Counsel to prepare and submit a
proposed policy statement supporting employer efforts to develop voluntary
internal ADR programs, reiterating the Commission's opposition to
conditioning employment on agreement to mandatory binding arbitration of
discrimination disputes, and confirming the Commission's determination to
accept and process charges regardless of any employer-sponsored ADR
program. 132
Chairman Casellas has issued various directives pursuant to the
Commission's action. 133 He directed consultation with "internal and
external stakeholders" for assistance in developing and implementing the
programs. 134 Casellas requested that District Directors contact dispute
resolutions organizations, bar associations, colleges and universities, and
other organizations to determine the availability and cost of qualified
mediators, and particularly whether pro bono services are available. 135 He
solicited both plans for training agency personnel and outside mediators,
and development of educational materials about ADR for agency personnel,
charging parties, respondents and the general public. 136 Casellas is also
exploring the feasibility of hiring ADR coordinators in each district
office. 137 Thus, the EEOC is now moving rapidly to institute an ADR
program.

128. Id., Motion 2.
129. McGowan, supra note 125, Motion 3.
130. See Motions, supra note 126, Motion 3.
131. Id., Motion 4.
132. See McGowan, supra note 125.
133. Motions on Alternative Dispute Resolution Adopted by EEOC April 25, 1995, 1995
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 80 d28 (Apr. 26, 1995).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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In addition to the ADR recommendations, the EEOC adopted other
recommendations to improve the charge processing system in April
1995. 138 These recommendations include adopting a more flexible
approach to charge processing, which prioritizes charges based on the level
of investigation necessary; developing a National Enforcement Plan that
identifies priority issues and guides enforcement; eliminating detailed "no
cause" letters when discrimination is not found; encouraging settlement at
all stages of the process; and delegating litigation decisions in individual
disparate treatment cases under Title VII and the ADEA to the General
Counsel. 139 Like the ADR procedures, these changes are designed to
speed case processing and reduce the existing backlog.

B.

ntles II and Ill

1. Department of Justice
The Department of Justice, which has only seventy-five staff members
to handle its ADA enforcement responsibilities under Titles I, II and
III, 140 also is overwhelmed with cases. 141 As of September 1994, 2,902
complaints alleging violations of Title II had been filed, and for 1,326 of
the complaints, the Department of Justice was the investigating agency. 142
For the same time period, 2, 796 complaints alleging violations of Title III
had been filed, and the Department of Justice opened an investigation in
1,634 of those. 143 The Department of Justice has resolved 100 Title II

138. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Commissioners Adopt Task
Force Recommendations to Strengthen and Streamline Agency Charge Processing Systems,
News Release, (Apr. 21, 1995).
139. Id.
140. Meeting with representatives of the Department of Justice, Public Access Section
(Mar. 28, 1994). President Clinton's 1995 budget provides for twenty-one additional staff
members. Illustrative of the scopeofJustice'sresponsibilities is that there are approximately
30,000 government bodies covered by Title II alone. Effective March 1, 1995, the ADA
functions of the Department of Justice were reorganized and centralized into the Disability
Rights Section. Letter from John Wodatch, Chief, Public Access Section, Civil Rights
Division, Department of Justice (Feb. 22, 1995); Telephone conversation with Eve Hill,
Disability Rights Section, Department of Justice (Mar. 9, 1995).
141. As of April 1994, about 4000 complaints had been filed with the Department of
Justice. The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, Transcript #4899 (Apr. 4, 1994), Interview with
John Wodatch (available on Lexis). Fifteen lawsuits had been filed and 200 investigations
had concluded with voluntary settlements as of that time. Id.
142. Information from the Department of Justice, Public Access Section, Meeting (Sept.
27, 1994).
143. Id.
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cases infonnally, 22 cases through fonnal settlement agreements, and issued
33 letters of findings, four of which found noncompliance. 144 As of
September, 1994, the department had completed 300 investigations of Title
III cases and 177 cases were resolved with increased accessibility. 145
BNA' s Americans with Disabilities Act Cases reported 37 judicial decisions
in Title II cases and 25 in Title III cases through mid-1994. 146
While there is no specific time period for case processing under Titles
II and Ill, individuals are not required to exhaust administrative remedies
under these titles. 147 Thus, any delays in investigation due to the number
of cases do not preclude a complaining party from filing suit. Nevertheless,
when parties wait long periods of time for agency action, even where not
required to do so, the effectiveness of the statute is reduced. Respondents
are not relieved of the threat of litigation where cases are not meritorious,
nor is rapid resolution of meritorious cases accomplished. Furthermore
individuals who do not have the resources to undertake private actions are
injured by the delay.
With respect to ADR, the Department of Justice, like the EEOC,
attempts to settle cases informally through negotiation. In addition, the
Department of Justice has funded a pilot mediation project through a grant
to the Community Board Program in San Francisco. 148 The project
anticipates mediation of 200 Title III cases utilizing private mediators
trained in ADA mediation in five targeted cities. 149 The Community
Board Program will perform an analysis to detennine whether mediation is
an appropriate tool for resolution of cases under Title IIl. 150

144. Telephone Conversation with Eve Hill, Department of Justice, Public Accesss
Section (Sept. 28, 1994).
145. Id. The resolutions include formal and informal settlements, consent decrees, and
litigation.
146. ADA: Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Special Report, 146 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) No. 14, at 10 (Aug. 1, 1994).
147. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 56 at 98 (exhaustion not required under Title II);
42 U.S.C. § 12188 (specifying enforcement and remedies under Title III)); 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.501 (1995) (authorizing private suits under Title III).
148. See Community Board Proposal, supra note 119, at 4, 6; Targeting Disability
Needs, supra note 117, at 42.
149. See Community Board Proposal, supra note 119, at 2, 3, 4; Targeting Disability
Needs, supra note 117, at 42. Cases are referred to the mediators by the Department of
Justice upon agreement of the parties.
150. See Community Board Proposal, supra note 119, at 7-8. The analysis will focus
on successful resolution of cases mediated, the maintenance of the mediated agreements, and
qualitative assessments of both the process and outcomes based on information supplied by
Department of Justice personnel, mediation program directors, and mediation participants.
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Interim analysis of the project revealed some difficulties in execution.151 Referrals of cases are limited by the geographic area in which the
project is taking place. As a result of the geographic limit and the failure
of the parties in many of the referred cases to agree to mediation, few
meditations have occurred. The Department's initial practice was to close
the cases referred to mediation, indicating to the parties that the Department
would take no further action on the case. 152 This practice, which since
has been changed, may have contributed to the reluctance of respondents
to agree to mediation by appearing to remove the threat of government
action. 153 The contractor has been unable to educate potential parties about
the benefits of mediation because of limitations in the Privacy Act on
releasing their identities without agreement.
The Department of Justice recently awarded an additional grant for
an ADA education and pilot project for professional mediators. 154 The
goal of the grant program is:
to train a select number of professional mediators nationwide about Title III of the
ADA, refer Title III cases to these mediators for mediation, monitor the outcome
of mediation efforts, and evaluate and disseminate the evaluation of the project to
mediators and other interested parties nationwide, so that the project can be
effectively replicated in other areas of the country. 155

The Department of Justice decided to limit mediation under the grant to Title III cases
because it would be easier to evaluate a limited pilot. In addition, Title II cases frequently
are more complex, and often more expensive because they involve an entire government
entity as the defendant. Meeting with Department of Justice, Public Access Section (Sept.
27, 1994); Telephone conversation with Eve Hill, Attorney, DepartmentofJustice, Disability
Rights Section (March 9, 1995).
151. Data regarding the initial results of the mediation project were received from the
Department of Justice, Public Access Section, Meeting (Sept. 27, 1994).
152. Meeting with Department of Justice, Public Access, Disability Rights Section (Sept.
27, 1994). The Department did retain the ability to open the case for investigation if
mediation failed. Letter from John L. Wodatch (Feb. 22, 1995) (on file with author).
153. As a result of interim analysis of the program, the Department has decided to keep
cases open pending mediation and evaluate whether to pursue an investigation after
mediation has been completed. Letter from John L. Wodatch (Feb. 22, 1995). Some
complainants are also reluctant to mediate, preferring to have the Department handle the case
rather than becoming extensively involved in the process. Meeting with Department of
Justice, Public Access Section (Sept. 27, 1994).
154. See 59 Fed. Reg. 29160, 29165 (June 3, 1994) (request for proposal); Department
of Justice, Justice Department Awards JO Grants to Promote the Americans with Disabilities
Act 3 (Oct. 5, 1994) (hereinafter Press Release) (press release announcing the grant award
to the Key Bridge Foundation).
155. 59 Fed. Reg. at 29165. The Department of Justice has not ruled out mediation of
Title II cases under this grant, and may refer some Title II cases to mediation. Telephone
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The project will train 90 professional mediators on the ADA and develop
a procedure for referring ADA complaints to the mediators. 156 In
addition, a consumer guide to mediation services and a mediator's guide to
mediating ADA complaints will be produced. 157 The grantee anticipates
mediating 650 complaints. 158
The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has been
reorganized since the appointment of a new Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights. 159 Further plans regarding ADA enforcement and the use of
ADR await completion of a strategic plan for the Division. 160
2.

Department of Transportation

In addition to issuing regulations regarding transportation, 161 the
Department of Transportation handles Title II complaints involving
transportation. 162 Complaints regarding transit agencies are handled by
the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), while the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) handles complaints relating to roads and
highways. 163 The agency has limited staff to handle ADA complaints. 164
There are only five professional employees involved in compliance

conversation with Department of Justice attorney Eve Hill (Mar. 9, 1995).
156. Press Release, supra note 154, at 3.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Information from representatives of the Department of Justice, Public Access
Section, Meeting (Sept. 27, 1994); Letter from John L. Wodatch (Feb. 22, 1995).
160. Id. On April 6, 1995, Attorney General Janet Reno signed Order OBD 1160, to
promote broader use of ADR by the Department of Justice. Order OBD 1160. l (Apr. 6,
1995) at l. The order sets a goal of September 11, 1995 for completing dissemination of
ADR guidance. Id. at 2. In addition, the order requires ADR training for civil attorneys
and the creation of the position of Senior Counsel for Alternative Dispute Resolution. Id.
at I. Thus, like the EEOC, the Department of Justice appears to be moving toward greater
use of ADR.
161. In issuing the ADA regulations, see supra note 67, 78. The Department of
Transportation did not use negotiated rulemaking, but did involve interested groups in the
rulemaking process through an advisory commission. Federal Transit Administration,
Telephone Interview with Susan Schruth, Acting Director Office of Civil Rights, Sept. 22,
1994 (hereinafter Information from the FTA).
162. 28 C.F.R. § 35.l90(b)(8) (1995).
163. Information regarding the complaint procedures was received from the Federal
Transit Administration and Federal Highway Administration respectively. See also 28
C.F.R. §§ 35.170-35.178 (1995).
164. The Federal Transit Administration and the Federal Highway Administration are the
two agencies within the Department of Transportation with significant ADA responsibilities.
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activities at the FTA. 165 The FHWA received no additional staff to
handle ADA responsibilities and there are no employees working exclusively on ADA matters. 166 Since the effective date of the statute, the FTA has
received about 380 complaints under Title Il. 167 About 290 complaints
are still pending. 168 The FHWA has received about 180 complaints, the
investigations of which are currently pending in the field offices. 169
The FTA investigates complaints received and notifies the complainant
whether it finds a violation of the statute. 170 If a violation is found, the
FTA requires the transit agency to establish a remedial plan. If the agency
fails to do so, the FTA can refer the case to Justice for litigation or, where
the agency is a recipient of federal funds, seek to terminate a hearing from
an ALJ funding under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 171
In its compliance process, the FTA attempts to resolve disputes
informally. 172 The FTA has established a specific informal compliance
process for complementary paratransit service and key station accessibility.173
If the FTA has reasonable cause to believe that a transit agency is
not in compliance with these portions of the ADA, it will attempt to
negotiate a voluntary compliance agreement with the agency, which will
establish a plan for compliance. 174 The FTA then monitors compliance
with the plan until compliance with the statute is achieved, and for at least
two years thereafter. 175

165. Information from the FTA, supra note 161.
166. Information from Morris, infra note 176.
167. Information from the FTA, supra note 161.
168. Id. (as of September 1994).
169. Information from Morris, infra note 176 as of September 1994. This number does
not include complaints relating to driver licensing which also come under the jurisdiction
of the Federal Highway Administration. Id.
170. The FTA has taken the position that an isolated incident of noncompliance with the
regulations does not constitute discrimination. See 49 C.F.R. Part 37, App. D. This position
has resulted in some dissatisfaction among complainants. Information from the FT A.
171. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.125, 27.127 (1995).
172. Information from the FTA, supra note 16 l. When the FTA performs an on-site
review which is triggered by multiple complaints at one transit property, it will meet with
disability groups as well as the transit officials and attempt to achieve informal resolution
of compliance disputes.
173. See Federal Transit Administration, Office of Civil Rights, Informal Compliance
Process.
174. Id.
175. Id.

1996]

DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER ADA

1033

The FHWA handles complaints relating to roads and highways. 176 The
complaints are forwarded to the field offices for investigation, where
warranted. Complaints against subrecipients 177 are referred to recipients
for investigation since recipients are required to have a complaint procedure
by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 178 Where possible, complaints will be resolved informally by agreement with the entity charged
with a violation. 179 Where a recipient or subrecipient of federal funds is
involved, the FHWA has the ultimate sanction of funding termination for
noncompliance. 180 Prior to taking such action, however, the FHWA must
attempt to resolve the complaint through negotiation. 181 Complaints
against nonrecipients which are not resolved must be referred to the
Department of Justice for litigation where warranted. 182 The FHWA
anticipates that most valid complaints under the ADA will be resolved
informally, like complaints under other civil rights statutes have been
resolved. 183 The FHWA has provided training and information to state
and local highway administrations and Indian tribal governments regarding
the ADA, and anticipates additional training, including information about
ADR.1s4
C.

Title IV

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) received only six
complaints alleging violations of the ADA telecommunications provisions
as of September 1, 1994. 185 One complaint, which involves a petition for

176. Telephone Interview with Edward W. Morris, Jr., Director, Office of Civil Rights,
FHWA (Oct. 4, 1994) (hereinafter, Information from Morris).
177. Recipients refers to entities that receive federal funding directly. Subrecipients
receive such funding indirectly through a recipient. See 49 C.F.R. § 27.5 (1995)
178. Information from Morris, supra note 176.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Information from Morris, supra note 176.
184. Id.
185. Except where otherwise noted, all information regarding FCC complaints was
provided by Lynda Dubroof, Senior Staff Attorney, Federal Communications Commission,
Common Carrier Bureau. (hereinafter Dubroof). Four involved intrastate communication
and therefore, were forwarded to the appropriate state for resolution. Id. All were resolved
within 180 days. Id. One complaint involved interstate communication and that was
resolved by final order of the Commission. Id.
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decertification 186 of an entire state program, is still pending before the
agency, while others have been resolved. 187 The FCC has not yet
gathered data regarding complaints filed directly with the states and
resolved by the states, but plans to do so in the future. 188 The FCC is
open to using ADR procedures in ADA matters, but has not yet done
so. 189 The Commission has adopted an "Initial Policy Statement and
Order" encouraging the use of alternative dispute resolution 190 and has
used negotiated rulemaking with some success in other areas. 191 A staff
member in the agency's General Counsel's office is trained in ADR and
provides training for other FCC personnel as needed. 192

D.

Summary of Existing Dispute Resolution

Congress clearly contemplated judicial litigation as the primary
enforcement mechanism under the ADA. 193 In the more than two years
since the effective date of the statute, few cases have been litigated relative
to the number of complaints filed, however. 194 There are several explanations for this result. Under Title I exhaustion of administrative remedies
is required and, given the EEOC's backlog, most complaints remain in the
investigatory stage. While a complainant can request a right to sue letter
before completion of the investigation, many complainants clearly have not
done so, either because they do not know this possibility exists or because
they do not have the legal representation and resources to file suit. Many
Title II and III complainants also are apparently waiting for the investigating agency to act. 195 A further explanation for the limited number of
litigated cases may be the crowded trial dockets of the district courts,
delaying decisions in those cases that have been filed. In addition, the

186. See 47 U.S.C. § 225(f)( 4) (describing procedures for revocation and suspension of
certification).
187. Dubroof, supra note 185.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.18 (1994).
191. Dubroof, supra note 185.
192. Id.
193. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117 (Supp. V 1993) (Title I enforcement provisions), 12133
(Supp. V 1993) (Title II enforcement provisions), 12188 (Supp. V 1993) (Title III
enforcement provisions).
194. See supra notes 96-98, 141-46 and accompanying text.
195. Unlike the first three titles of the statute, Title IV has not generated a large number
of complaints and those filed have been resolved in a timely manner.
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enforcement agencies do not have the resources to litigate more than a
small number of ADA cases. 196
Congress certainly contemplated a high level of voluntary compliance
resulting from the litigation of a small number of cases by the agencies. 197
More time for assessment is necessary before determining whether that
result will be achieved. Some informal resolutions are occurring as
contemplated by the statute, but again, the number is not large in
comparison to the number of complaints filed.
With respect to the alternative dispute resolution methods encouraged by
the statute, their use thus far is limited. All agencies appear to be using
negotiations to settle cases and achieve compliance. Three pilot mediation
projects have been undertaken, one completed, one in process, and a third
just beginning. Further use of alternative dispute resolution may occur, but
consideration and implementation have been delayed by changes and
contemplated changes at the enforcement agencies.
Evaluation of the effectiveness of dispute resolution under the statute
must be made in light of these existing enforcement efforts.
IV.

ALTERNATIVES TO EXISTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS

In evaluating alternatives to existing dispute resolution methods, it is
useful to identify some elements of effective dispute resolution. With the
exception of Title IV cases, a primary problem with existing dispute
resolution mechanisms is the large backlog of cases at the investigative
stage. Any change in dispute resolution procedures should have, as one of
its goals, a reduction in the investigative delays. Another goal should be
effective enforcement of the statute. 198 In addition, a third goal is quicker
and more efficient resolution of disputes, which includes cost effectiveness
and preferably actual reduction in costs for the government and the parties.

196. Under Title III, the Attorney General is directed to litigate cases involving a pattern
and practice of discrimination or issues of general public importance. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12188(b)(l)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
197. The technical assistance provisions of the statute evidence Congress' belief in
voluntary compliance. See 42 U.S.C. § 12206 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); S. REP. No. 116,
supra note I, at 43. (requiring agencies to provide technical assistance and indicating an
expectation that EEOC will provide training and other technical assistance to employers
seeking to comply with statute).
198. See infra notes 256-59 and accompanying text (discussing values encompassed in
goal of effective enforcement, including justice, statutory intent, procedural fairness, and
finality and enforceability of result).
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While no one change may achieve all of these goals, any proposed change
in dispute resolution under the statute should be tested against them. 199
In enacting the ADA, Congress decided to rely on both private and
public enforcement. While the administrative agencies are authorized and
expected to file enforcement actions in some cases,2°0 private enforcement
was clearly contemplated as well. By limiting appropriations for ADA
enforcement, Congress has placed much of the enforcement burden on
individuals with disabilities. A litigation-based approach is costly for an
individual, particularly when the potential for monetary recovery is
limited. 201 Where the potential recovery is not large, many private

199. While the focus of this report is the administrative process, resolution of disputes
in the administrative process will assist in reducingjudicial backlogs by reducing the number
of cases filed in court. In recent years, employment discrimination cases have increased at
a rate several times faster than the remainder of the civil caseload in the federal courts. See
John J. Donohue, III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature ofEmployment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 985 (1991); Dunlop Commission Fact Finding
Report, supra note 99, at 103-04, n.29, Exhibits IV-3, IV-4. These figures predate the ADA
which added to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In 1994, the number of suits brought
by the EEOC under the ADA increased significantly. See EEOC Attorneys Filed 373
Lawsuits in 1994, 147 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 538, 539 (Dec. 26, 1994). Reducing the caseload of the federal courts is the goal of the Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, which has recommended, inter alia, limiting the right of
employment discrimination plaintiffs to file suit. See Major Changes in Federal Court
System Are Urged, 147 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 507, 508 (Dec. 19, 1994). The ADR
proposals infra address this problem indirectly, without limiting plaintiffs' right to a federal
forum for redress of discrimination complaints.
200. With respect to entities that receive federal funds and are thereby subject to section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act as well as the ADA, in addition to filing suit the government
may enforce the statute by suspending or terminating funding or threatening to do so. See
29 U.S.C. § 794a (adopting remedies of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I which include withdrawal of
funding). Most state and local governments and transit agencies fall into this category.
20 I. Under Title III, damages are not available in private actions, and punitive damages
are not available at all. 42 U.S.C. § 12188. Compensatory and punitive damages, where
appropriate, are available for intentional discrimination under Title I, along with back pay.
42 U.S.C. § 12117; 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2). In reasonable accommodation cases, however,
where the employer makes a good faith effort to find an accommodation, damages are not
available. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3). It is not clear whether compensatory damages are
available in actions under Title II. See Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360, 1373-74
n.29 (D. Neb. 1993) (noting confusion among circuit courts regarding availability of
damages under section 504 but finding based on section 504 precedent in 8th Circuit that
such damages are available in Title II action). Title II remedies are based on remedies under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and courts have disagreed on whether damages are
available under section 504. Id. See also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1020 n.24
( 1984) (recognizing confusion in circuit courts about the availability of damages under
section 504); Eastman v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 939 F.2d 204,
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attorneys are reluctant to accept cases for litigation. 202 Accordingly,
numerous individuals may be relying on the government agencies for
litigation assistance which will not be forthcoming. These facts raise the
question of whether there is a better enforcement model. In considering
this question, any proposed modofication must consider the fact that
enforcement for Titles II and III is patterned after, and in the Titles I and
IV is a part of, existing enforcement models. Accordingly, modification
may impact other statutory enforcement efforts, reduce efficiency resulting
from common enforcement methods, or treat individuals with disabilities
differently from other civil rights plaintiffs.
A.
1.

Administrative Litigation

The Fair Housing Act System

One possible change in ADA dispute resolution would be the creation of
an enforcement mechanism using internal administrative litigation, similar
to the current system for enforcement of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). 203
As a result of 1988 amendments, spurred by perceived ineffectiveness of
the prior enforcement system, the FHA contains a comprehensive
enforcement mechanism which gives the parties the option of administrative
or judicial litigation. 204 Complaints filed are investigated by the Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), who is required to engage in
conciliation efforts. 205 The Secretary determines whether there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the Act has occurred, issuing a
charge of discrimination in cases of reasonable cause and dismissing the
complaint where no reasonable cause is found. After a formal charge of

207-9 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding section 504 does not permit award of damages).
202. See Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary
Guidelinesand Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 467 (1992) (private attorneys reluctant
to take even strong cases on contingency basis because of high litigation costs unless
potential damages are significant).
203. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612-3614 (1994). The National Labor Relations Act provides
a similar enforcement mechanism, but without the election option available in the Fair
Housing Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 154, 160 (1994).
204. See Leland Ware, New Weapons for an Old Battle: The Enforcement Provisions of
the 1988 Amendments to the Fair Housing Act, 10, 11 (Administrative Conference of the
United States 1992), reprinted in 7 ADMIN. L.J. 59 (1993). Information about the Fair
Housing Act amendments was taken from the Ware study unless otherwise noted.
205. See id. at 15. The amendments continue to provide a role for handling of
complaints by state and local agencies with rights, procedures and remedies that are
substantially equivalent to those under the Fair Housing Act. Id.
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discrimination is issued, either party may elect to have the case adjudicated
in federal district court by the Attorney General. If no such election is
made, the case proceeds to hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) pursuant to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act.206
The parties to the administrative hearing are HUD, represented by the
Office of General Counsel, and the respondent. 207 The statute requires
that the proceedings be expeditious and that both discovery and the hearing
process be inexpensive. 208 The proceedings are less formal than a trial in
federal district court. Decisions of the ALJ are directly reviewable in the
Court of Appeals using the substantial evidence standard, and are
enforceable in the Court of Appeals as well. 209 Remedies available
include compensatory damages, injunctive and other equitable relief, and
civil penalties. 210
The Attorney General retains the authority to bring civil actions in
pattern and practice cases and cases which raise general issues of public
importance, authority parallel to that in Title III ADA cases. Furthermore,
the amendments do not affect an individual's private right of action, which
can be filed in federal district court without exhausting administrative
remedies. 211
Evaluations of the enforcement procedures are mixed, although the
consensus seems to be that the procedures are an improvement over
preexisting enforcement efforts. 212 A primary concern with the FHA
206. Id. at 17.
207. The complaining party may intervene and be represented by counsel.
208. Available discovery methods include interrogatories, depositions, requests for
production of documents and requests for admissions, and sanctions are provided for failure
to cooperate in discovery. See Ware, supra note 204. Discovery is conducted on an
expedited basis. Id.
209. Id. at 18. In addition, the Secretary has discretion to review the ALJ's decision,
although the applicable regulations indicate that such review will be undertaken in
extraordinary cases only. Id.
210. Id.
21 l. See Ware, supra note 204, at 19. Punitive damages and attorneys fees and costs
are available in private actions. Id. A private action cannot be initiated if an administrative
proceeding is pending, however. Id.
212. See Ware, supra note 204, at 30-31 (amendments improved enforcement but HUD
needs to encourage more use ofadministrative adjudication to increase enforcement); United
States Commission on Civil Rights, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The
EnforcementReport, 221-25 (1994) (hereinafter CRC EnforcementReport)(finding administrative adjudication reasonably effective but recommending some enforcement changes);
JOHN P. REI.MAN, FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT UNDER PRESIDENT BUSH: AN
ASSESSMENT AT MID-TERM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE in LOST
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process is the backlog of complaints at the investigation stage. 213 While
there is a time deadline for investigation of complaints, the time deadline
frequently is not met. 214 The FHA caseload is about 6,000 per year, 215
much smaller than the EEOC's caseload in Title I cases although larger
than that under Titles II and III. The percentage of cause findings is also
small, only 3% in 1992, while the percentage of no cause findings is
20%.216
In about 60% of FHA cause cases, at least one party elects litigation in
the federal district court. 217 Desire for a jury trial, the availability of
punitive damages in court, or the attorneys' greater familiarity with the

0PPORTIJNITIES: THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD OF TIIE BUSH ADMINISTRATION MID-TERM
105-06, 117-18 (Susan M. Liss & William L. Taylor, eds., 1991) (hereinafter RELMAN I)
(although significant problems remain, enforcement has improved under amended procedures); JOHN P. RELMAN, FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT: THE BUSH RECORD AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEW AoMINISTRA TION in NEW 0PPORTIJNITIES: CIVIL RIGHTS
AT A CROSSROADS 92-94 (Susan M. Liss & William L. Taylor eds., 1993) (hereinafter
RELMAN II) (amendments started more effective enforcement but HUD has not processed
and prosecuted complaints effectively in the last two years of the Bush administration);
Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 71 (Testimony of John P. Reiman, Washington
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs) (HUD has had limited success in
enforcement but the amendments, including administrative litigation are still a major
improvement over prior efforts); Telephone Interview with Judge Alan Heifetz, Chief
Administrative Law Judge, Department of Housing and Urban Development (July 21, 1994)
[hereinafter Information from Judge Heifetz] (Judge Heifetz' analysis is reported infra)
(enforcement has improved under amendments).
213. See Ware, supra note 204, at 28-30 (detailing extensive investigatory delays);
RELMAN I, supra note 212, at 108 (noting continuing inability to complete timely investigations resulting in large backlog); RELMAN II, supra note 212, at 88; CRC Enforcement
Report, supra note 212, at 223 (noting large backlogs in many HUD offices).
214. Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 71-3 (Testimony of John P. Reiman,
Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs) RELMAN II, supra note
212, at 88 (in 1990, HUD failed to meet its deadline in 64% of its cases); Ware, supra note
204, at 28 (in most cases investigation deadlines are not met).
215. Information from Judge Heifetz, supra note 212 (from 1989-1994 over 30,000 cases
filed with HUD); RELMAN II, supra note 212, at 88 (4,457 cases in 1990).
216. OversightHearing, supra note 99, at 76 (Testimony of John P. Reiman, Washington
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs) A large number of cases have
been administratively closed, leading to criticism of HUD's enforcement. See RELMAN II,
supra note 212, at 88 (between March 1989 and July 1992 HUD administratively closed
44% of its cases). Administrative closure occurs where the complaint is withdrawn, the
complainant cannot be located, or HUD has no jurisdiction. Id. The EEOC has been
similarly criticized. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 4 (Testimony of Alfred W.
Blumrosen) (criticizing the EEOC for the large number of administrative closures).
217. See CRC Enforcement Report, supra note 212 at 57 (through November 1993,
parties in 309 of 514 cases elected a judicial forum).
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district courts are possible explanations. 218 Cases tried before the ALJs
are resolved relatively quickly, however, with seven to seven and one half
months from charge to ALJ decision. 219 While punitive damages are
available in district court and some large awards have been granted by the
courts, damage awards of the ALJs are relatively comparable to those in
Department of Justice actions in federal courts. 220 Larger damage awards
have been obtained in private actions than in Department of Justice actions
in the federal courts or in ALJ decisions. 221

2. Analysis of Administrative Litigation
Use of ALJs provides certain advantages. A corps of ALJs dedicated to
ADA cases has the potential to develop a level of expertise in the subject
matter that federal judges may be unable to develop because of the wide
range of cases that are within their jurisdiction. 222 A consistent interpre-

218. Information from Judge Heifetz, supra note 212. There has been no systematic
study of the reasons for this election. See Enforcement Report, supra note 212, at 232
(recommending such a study). This election has placed a heavy burden on limited resources
of the Housing Section of the Justice Department, which has been forced to obtain assistance
from local U. S. attorneys. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 80 (Testimony of John
P. Reiman, Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs); RELMAN
I, supra note 212, at 97 (number of election cases has increased reducing Justice's ability
to litigate pattern and practice case).
219. Information from Judge Heifetz, supra note 212. See Oversight Hearing, supra
note 99, at 80 (Testimony of John P. Reiman, Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights and Urban Affairs) (ALJ adjudication has provided speedy relief); RELMAN II, supra
note 212, at 88 (cases have been tried and decided within the statutory time limits).
220. OversightHearing,supranote 99, at 77 (Testimony of John P. Reiman, Washington
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs) (although awards not comparable
in early years of the ALJ system, the ALJ awards have risen steadily in recent years); CRC
Enforcement Report, supra note 212, at 61-64 (noting the difficulty of making such
comparisons because of the number of variables but concluding generally that damages in
the two forums are comparable excluding punitive damages). Information from Judge
Heifetz, supra note 212 (damage awards relatively comparable).
221. See RELMAN II, supra note 212, at 88, 91 (ALJ damage awards are low compared
to private damage awards with the exception of two cases decided by Judge Heifetz and
although damage awards in cases tried in federal court by Justice are improving, they
compare unfavorably to those in privately litigated cases).
222. Information from Judge Heifetz, supra note 212. The advantage of expertise might
be offset by the cost to establish and administer the ALJ system and concerns about
impartiality when ALJs are hearing cases that arise from the agency in which they work.
See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Unified Corps ofAl.ls: A Proposal to Test the Idea at the Federal
Level, 65 JUDICATURE 266, 274 (1981) (recommending a pilot program to test the idea of
unified group of ALJs hearing various federal administrative cases) (hereinafter Lubbers,
Unified Corps}. Under the ADA, ifthe ALJs heard cases under various titles, the concern
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tive body of law might develop more quickly than in the diverse federal
courts. 223 In a system that provides for optional administrative litigation,
however, two bodies of law are developing, one in the courts and one in
the administrative body, and they may or may not be consistent. Moreover,
the administrative determinations may have less precedential import, 224
hindering the goal of development of the law, which is particularly
important for a relatively new statute.
If the experience of HUD ALJs is a guide, speedier resolution might
result from an ALJ system. 225 HUD ALJs have successfully used the

about agency bias might be minimized, but a structure would have to be created to employ
ALJs handling cases from various agencies. Such a system has been utilized, pursuant to
recommendation of the Administrative Conference of the United States, by the Federal Bank
Regulatory Agencies. See Recommendation 87-12: Adjudication Practices and Procedures
ofthe Federal Bank RegulatoryAgencies, in Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendations and Reports, Vol. I, at 70 (1987); Michael P. Malloy, Adjudication
Practices and Procedures of the Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies, in Administrative
Conference of the United States, Recommendations and Reports, Vol. 2, 1216 (1987). For
further discussion regarding use of common ALJs to decide cases from various agencies, see
Lubbers, Unified Corps, supra (proposing a pilot program to test the use a use of a unified
corps of ALJS); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Agency Adjudications: Trying to See the Forest
and the Trees, 31 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 383 (1984) (discussing the proposal for a unified
corps of ALJs in the context of the history and practice of administrative adjudication);
Victor W. Palmer & Edwin S. Bernstein, Establishing Federal Administrative Law Judges
as An Independent Corps: The Heflin Bill, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 673 (1984) (analyzing
and supporting legislation to establish a unified corps of ALJs); Michel Levant, A Unified
Corps ofAdministrativeLaw Judges-The Transition from A Concept to an Eventual Reality,
6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 705 (1984); Norman Zankel, A Unified Corps of Federal
AdministrativeLaw Judges is Not Needed, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 723 (1984) (analyzing
and opposing legislation to establish a common corps of ALJs).
223. Information from Judge Heifetz, supra note 212. See Lubbers, Unified Corps,
supra note 222, at 274 (noting that a unified corps of ALJs could dilute expertise); Zankel,
supra note 222, at 736 (citing the efficiency of separate groups of ALJS who can develop
expertise in the subject area from which their cases are drawn). ALJs working in the same
subject area have the opportunity to consult with one another and discuss difficult issues of
law in a collegial atmosphere, which should improve consistency and quality of
decisionmaking. Information from Judge Heifetz, supra note 212. If the corps of ALJs is
large, however, because of the volume of cases, consistency may not result. See Jerry L.
Mashaw, Organizing Adjudication: Reflections on the Prospect for Artisans in the Age of
Robots, 39 UCLA L. REV. I 055, I 059-60 ( 1992) (discussing the high level of inconsistency
among Social Security Administration ALJ decisions). Inconsistency is also more likely to
be a problem when the cases are largely fact-based. Id.
224. Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil
Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482, 562 (1987).
225. See Ware, supra note 204, at 28 (noting HUD ALJ proceedings are expeditious).
An ALJ system does not guarantee quicker decisions, however. The Social Security hearing
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concept of settlement judges to assist in resolving cases when agreed to by
the parties, a process which might be useful in ADA cases also. 226
The FHA enforcement model might be applied to ADA cases under any
or all of the four titles. The FHA model, with its election of enforcement
mechanisms, is more appropriate than the model of the National Labor
Relations Act, which limits charging parties to the administrative forum and
denies them any litigation forum if the General Counsel determines that the
complaint has no merit. 227 Since Congress clearly contemplated private
enforcement of the ADA and the private right of action preexists any
administrative litigation forum, any change eliminating that right seems
politically unlikely. Moreover, since other civil rights groups are not
limited to an administrative forum, it seems inappropriate to limit
individuals with disabilities. Also, in cases where punitive and compensatory damages are available, such as intentional discrimination cases under
Title I, the constitutionality of restriction of litigation to the administrative
forum is questionable. 228 Additionally, the low rate of cause findings by
the EEOC makes that agency more analogous to HUD than to the NLRB. 229

process is marked by long delays and there are concerns about delays in decisionmaking by
NLRB ALJs as well. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 180 (Testimony of Janice
Goodman, Vice-President, National Employment Lawyers Association) (stating that attorneys
who appear regularly before the NLRB confirm that ALJ proceedings are neither faster nor
necessarily more efficient than judicial proceedings).
226. Information from Judge Heifetz, supra note 212. The use of settlement judges is
a form of ADR in which an ALJ other than the one assigned to try a case meets with the
parties to help them resolve the dispute. Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation 88-5: Agency Use of Settlement Judges in Recommendations and Reports
21-28 ( 1988); Daniel Joseph & Michelle L. Gilbert, Breaking the Settlement Ice: The Use
of Settlement Judges in Administrative Proceedings, in Administrative Conference of the
United States, Recommendations and Reports 282, 292 (1988); Morell E. Mullins,
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission: Settlement Judges and Simplified Proceedings, 5 ADMIN. L. J. 555, 560-61 (1991).
The settlement judge may increase the prospects of settlement by previewing the case, i.e.
pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of each party's position, based on his or her
judicial expertise. Id.; Joseph & Gilbert, supra at 296-97.
227. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1994) (setting forth administrative hearing procedure under
the NLRA); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967) (NLRB General Counsel has
unreviewable discretion to decline to litigate unfair labor practice charges). But see Oversight
Hearing, supra note 99, at 172-74 (Testimony of Lawrence Z. Lorber) (recommending an
NLRB-type system for discrimination claims).
228. See Ware, supra note 204, at 13-14 (discussing constitutional issues raised by
eliminating the right to jury trial in action for damages). The concern for constitutionality
led to the compromise of an optional administrative litigation in the FHA. Id.
229. HUD found cause in 3% of its cases and no cause in 20% in 1992. See supra note
185. In fiscal 1992, the EEOC found cause in 2.4% of cases, while finding no reasonable
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At this point in time, there is little reason to consider altering the dispute
resolution mechanism under Title IV. The number of complaints has been
extremely low and they are handled efficiently through the existing
complaint resolution mechanism of the FCC. While the FCC's administration of the statute has not proceeded without criticism, the primary focus
of the criticism has not been dispute resolution. 230 Provision of an
alternative administrative enforcement mechanism for cases under Titles I,
II and III merits further consideration, however. 231
In considering administrative litigation, one question that arises is
whether a common corps of ALJs should be used for cases arising under
the three titles. Use of separate groups for cases under each title would
increase the administrative costs, 232 but permit more agency supervision
over the ALJs. 233 Given the overlap in types of cases and in certain

cause in about 61%. See EEOC's Performance in Handling Caseload Criticized by Witnesses at House Hearing, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 143 d3 (July 28, 1993). Other data
indicate that between 1989 and 1993, in cases where the EEOC made a cause finding, 95%
were "no cause" while only 5% were "cause." See Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 13
n.6 (Testimony of Alfred W. Blumrosen, Thomas A. Cowan Professor of Law, Rutgers
University). These figures include all cases, and since the ADA became effective in July
1992, the number of ADA cases included in the total is presumably small. In 1990, the
NLRB found cause in approximately 43.9% of cases filed against employers and 25.4% of
cases filed against unions. Dunlop Commission Fact Finding Report, supra note 99, at pp.
81, 83. While the low rate of cause findings may indicate that many nonmeritorious charges
are filed with the EEOC, critics of the agency point to the number of "no cause" cases
successfully litigated by the charging parties through private counsel. Oversight Hearing,
supra note 99, at 13 n.6 (Testimony of Alfred W. Blumrosen, Thomas A Cowan Professor
of Law, Rutgers University).
230. See Karen Peltz Strauss, THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION: CIVIL RIGHTS
OF PERSONS WHO ARE DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING in NEW OPPORTUNITIES, supra note
212, note at 146-48 (criticizing the FCC's administration of Title IV in several respects).
231. In cases where both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act apply, a hearing before
an ALJ is required in any event prior to termination of federal funding under the
Rehabilitation Act. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.125, 27.127 (1994) (requiring hearing before
terminating federal funding and detailing the hearing procedures).
232. Use of a combined group of ALJs would save on administrative costs. See Palmer
& Bernstein, supra note 222, at 686, 702 (consolidation of administration would reduce
administrative costs by eliminating duplication).
233. Whether agency supervision is an advantage or a disadvantage is a matter for
debate. See Malcolm C. Rich, The Central Panel System and the Decisionmaking
Independence of AdministrativeLaw Judges: Lessons for a Proposed Federal Program, 6
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 643, 646-49 ( 1984) (agency supervision may improve administrative
effectiveness in implementing policies, but also may reduce public confidence in the
administrative system because of pro-agency bias or appearance of such bias); Palmer &
Bernstein, supra note 222, at 693-703 (agency supervision may result in pressure on ALJs

1044

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:1007

issues, a common group of ALJs is a sensible approach. 234 Title II cases
will frequently involve common issues with Title I and Title III cases, such
as employment discrimination or access to buildings and programs. 235
Moreover, knowledge about various disabilities and their effects, and
accommodations that can be made to enable individuals with such
disabilities to participate fully in society transcends all the titles. Development of expertise in these areas is one advantage of an ALJ system.
Establishment of an ALJ system would add significant administration
costs to the enforcement process. 236 ALJs would have to be hired and an
administrative structure would be required to support the system. 237 Costs
would also increase if more cases were litigated as a result of the
administrative litigation option. 238 These additional costs might be offset
in part by a reduction in costs for judicial enforcement. 239 Costs to the
parties might be less in an administrative litigation process as a result of the
reduced formality of the process. 240 This would benefit the parties, but

to decide cases in favor of the agency, but a common corps of ALJs may reduce efficiency
as agencies lose control over their docket); Zankel, supra note 222, at 733-35, 742 (judicial
independence problems are limited and can be addressed by means other than a consolidated
corps).
234. The ALJ pool used by the federal bank regulatory agencies could serve as a model.
See Recommendation 87-12, supra note 222, at 71, 73 (recommending use ofa pool of ALJs
to handle all bank regulatory agencies formal adjudications).
235. To the extent that there is a group of cases that is relatively unique, it is
transportation cases under Titles II and III.
236. Because the number of ADA cases potentially subject to administrative litigation
greatly exceeds those under the FHA, a larger corps of ALJs would be necessary. As of
1984, the cost to maintain an administrative law judge was $125,000 per year for salary and
support. Levant, supra note 222, at 712. The cost is certainly significantly larger ten years
later. See ihfra note 237 for current salary figures.
237. The annual salary for administrative law judges ranges from 65% to 100% of the
pay for level IV of the Executive Schedule, which is $115,000. 5 U.S.C. §§ 5332, 5372
( 1994 ). Overhead costs such as office space and hearing rooms would be necessary, as well
as travel costs for the judges from their home base to the hearing locations. The primary
costs of an ALJ system are the "payroll, physical facilities and travel." Palmer & Bernstein,
supra note 222, at 702.
238. Litigation of additional cases is not necessarily a negative, however, as it may
improve enforcement of the statute.
239. The agency's cost of litigation would increase in an administrative system because
the agency must pay for the system or, in the case of common ALJs, a part of the system.
While the ADA increased the workload of the federal courts, no additional federal judges
were added solely as a result of the ADA.
240. See Silver, supra note 224, at 562. As Silver notes, however, costs of litigation are
still substantial. Id.
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would reduce agency costs only slightly, certainly not enough to offset the
costs of establishing the system.
The HUD model requires administrative litigation by the HUD General
Counsel or judicial litigation by the Department of Justice when there is
reasonable cause to believe a violation has occurred. Neither the EEOC nor
the Department of Justice is required to litigate a case whenever reasonable
cause is found; the agencies can leave the case to private litigation. If the
HUD model were followed, additional agency resources would have to be
committed to litigation in all cause cases. Such a change would benefit
individuals with strong cases that have low dollar value, for those
individuals might be unable to find private counsel. Additionally, agency
litigation may lead to enforcement in cases where the individual would not
pursue the case with private counsel, improving enforcement. 241
Litigation of all reasonable cause cases would use agency resources for
individual cases that might be better spent on impact litigation involving
pattern and practice cases, however. 242 The value of a system with
several litigation options is the provision of alternatives to parties with
different preferences regarding dispute resolution. The wider the range of
alternatives available, the more likely that parties will be satisfied.
Nevertheless, these alternatives come at a cost, both to the parties and to
the government, in a time of shrinking resources and increased pressure to
reduce government spending.
The significant resource infusion necessary to create an ALJ system
might be better used in other ways, such as reducing the backlog of cases
awaiting investigation, 243 increasing the judicial litigation of impact cases,
and/or funding an alternative dispute resolution system. Another possible
use of such resources would be tax credits to encourage voluntary
compliance.
One additional difficulty with altering the ADA's enforcement procedure
is that the ADA adopts the enforcement procedures of other statutes. This

241. If individuals were required to litigate in the administrative forum without agency
assistance, the addition of the administrative forum would not increase enforcement activity
but might reduce litigation costs slightly and resolve cases more quickly.
242. For a criticism of agency use of resources for individual cases to the detriment of
systemic cases, see Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 5 (Testimony of Alfred W.
Blumrosen, Thomas A. Cowan Professor of Law, Rutgers University). Litigation of
systemic cases may benefit more people with fewer resources. Id. For legal and financial
reasons, the private bar may be less likely to litigate systemic cases, at least without agency
support. Id.
243. Addition of an administrative litigation option would have no impact on the
substantial backlog of cases at the investigation stage.
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is particularly problematic with respect to Title I. Creation of an ALJ
option for Title I cases would require separation of those cases from
employment discrimination cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 244 Such separation
is not impossible, but it conflicts with the view, strongly held by many, that
parity in civil rights claims involving different groups is desirable.
Moreover, using the existing system for enforcement achieves some
efficiency by using personnel previously trained in employment discrimination cases. 24 s
Testing the adoption of an administrative litigation option against the
goals of any change in dispute resolution procedure recited earlier leads to
the conclusion that the benefits may not justify the allocation of resources
necessary for the system. The change would not impact the investigation
backlog. It would impact effective enforcement of the statute only if more
valid cases are litigated due to the change, thus reducing discrimination.
The change should provide an option for resolution which is quicker and
perhaps less expensive for the parties. The cost to the government would
be significant, however. As will be demonstrated in the remainder of the

244. See 42 U.S.C. § I 2117 (adopting the procedures of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
for Title I of the ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1994) (ADEA enforcement procedures).
245. There is currently widespread concern over the enforcement problems in
em.ployment discrimination cases as a whole, and congressional oversight hearings are
ongoing. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 99. Some critics of the existing enforcement
scheme have recommended an ALJ system for employment discrimination cases. See
Oversight Hearings, supra note 99, at 22-6 (Testimony of Alfred W. Blumrosen, Thomas
A. Cowan Professor of Law, Rutgers University) (recommending an ALJ system for
employment discrimination cases). For a view opposed to an ALJ system for the EEOC,
see Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 179-184 (Testimony of Janice Goodman, VicePresident, National Employment Lawyers Association). The Dunlop Commission also is
considering related issues, particularly whether there should be a specialized tribunal for
workplace disputes and whether more integrated agency administration is appropriate.
Dunlop Commission Fact Finding Report, supra note 99, at 113-14. Consideration of such
changes is beyond the scope of this study, but given the current structure of the ADA, any
enforcement change under Title VII will directly affect Title I enforcement. Accordingly,
the issues addressed here are directly impacted by consideration of changes in employment
discrimination enforcement as a whole.
When Title VII was enacted, an enforcement model based on the NLRB system was
initially contemplated but Congress rejected the model for enforcement through the federal
courts. Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 42 (Testimony of David L. Rose). Efforts to
amend the statute to provide for EEOC internal enforcement authority were rejected in 1972.
Id. at 43. Among the reasons for rejection were concerns on the part of employers that the
agency would exhibit pro-plaintiff bias. See H.R. REP. 88-914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., at 293
(1964).
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report, a more effective use of these resources would be increased
government litigation, combined with mediation which will be more
effective with a realistic threat of litigation.
B.

Early Intervention Programs

Another possible change in the dispute resolution mechanisms under the
ADA is implementation of an early intervention program similar to the
system used by the EEOC during the Carter administration. 246 Analysis
of that program and several other early intervention programs will assist in
determining whether such a system would be useful for ADA cases.
1.

The Rapid Charge Processing System

In the late 1970s, the EEOC implemented the rapid charge process
(RCP), which required Commission staff to conduct a limited preliminary
investigation of charges filed and then schedule a fact finding conference
with both parties. 247 The EEOC representative served as a moderator/advisor, with the goal of encouraging settlement. The settlement, if
reached, was embodied in an agreement signed by the parties and the
EEOC. If no settlement was reached, the evidence from the investigation
and the conference was used to make a determination of cause. If the
evidence was insufficient for such a determination, the case was returned
to the investigation process. A General Accounting Office report found
that the system improved charge processing, and was effective. 248 The
report also criticized the EEOC both for obtaining settlements in cases
without a reasonable basis to believe the charge was meritorious and for
accepting settlements with little substance. 249

246. This system, as constructed at the EEOC in the late 1970s, incorporates alternative
dispute resolution. This article consdiers early intervention programs as those which assess
charges at the time of filing or shortly thereafter, taking the action deemed appropriate based
on that assessment. An early intervention program may or may not incorporate ADR.
247. The system is described in EEOC Request for Comments, supra note 117, at 39023.
In addition to using the system itself, the EEOC encouraged state and local agencies which
had work-sharing agreements with the EEOC to use similar procedures, and many did so.
Project on Equal Education Rights, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund & SRI
International, The Settlement Solution: Assessing Mediation as A Tool in the Enforcement
of Civil Rights 7-8 (1980) [hereinafter PEER Study).
248. Id.
249. Silver, supra note 224, at 543, citing Comptroller General, Further Improvements
Needed in EEOC Enforcement Activities 11-19 (1981) (assessing the rapid charge process).
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Washington Field Office Program

The rapid charge processing system was abandoned with the change in
administrations, but recently a pilot program in the EEOC's Washington
Office has revived some of the features of the system. 250 The system,
entitled "Washington Field Office Charge Assessment, Planning and
Resolution System," operates through initial assessment of the merits of a
charge at the intake step of the procedure. 251 Cases with no evidence of
discrimination are investigated only through a letter to the Respondent
requesting its position and supporting documentation. If the evidence of
the Respondent accords with the charging party's evidence, the case is
closed with a no cause determination after an interview with the charging
party.
In cases that appear stronger on intake, the agency makes early
settlement efforts. Very strong cases are discussed bi-monthly with the
legal department in order to develop the evidence necessary for a cause
determination. Settlement efforts are made in those cases as well.
Evaluation of the system established that upon implementation of the
system, average processing time for cases decreased and cause findings
increased. The settlement rate varied, decreasing in 1994. 252 Evidence
regarding the impact on protected groups was mixed. With respect to ADA
cases, more were rated meritorious than their percentage in the system
would suggest, but nationally, "merit resolutions" 253 of ADA cases
handled by the EEOC exceed merit resolutions of all cases.
Director Reilly's assessment of the program is positive, but she
recommends more structure in the settlement program. She also suggests
that, absent settlement, cases assessed as low merit should be dismissed
quickly with a right to sue letter indicating "insufficient evidence" or
"cessation of administrative process" rather than no cause. Such a system
would allow the agency to concentrate investigative resources on cases

250. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 84-5 (Testimony of Susan Buckingham
Reilly, Washington Field Office Director, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission)
(describing program).
251. Id. The charge is coded at that time and the code, which reflects the assessment
of the merits, indicates the method of additional processing. Id.
252. Processing time also increased in 1994, but not to the level that preceded
implementation of the system. Oversight Hearing, supra note 99. The assessment of the
Field Office Director is that processing time increased because of staff turnover and
concentration on some of the oldest cases. Id.
253. Merit resolutions include settlements, determinations of cause, and withdrawals of
cases where the charging party receives benefits. Id.
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more likely to be meritorious, while not precluding plaintiffs in other cases
from filing suit.
3.

Office of Civil Rights Program

The Office of Civil Rights for the Department of Education, which is
responsible for enforcing Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 254 also
has utilized an early intervention program. The Office of Civil Rights
complaint processing system includes a voluntary procedure known as early
complaint resolution (ECR) which enables the recipient offederal funds and
the complainant to attempt to resolve their dispute. 255 An agency investigator serves as a mediator in the process, which occurs prior to investigation and regardless of whether there is a civil rights violation. Unlike the
EEOC's Rapid Charge Processing system, the Office of Civil Rights
process is separate from the investigation. If ECR is unsuccessful, the case
is assigned to a different investigator and nothing in the process becomes
part of the investigation. Additionally, any settlement agreement reached
requires the complainant to withdraw the complaint. The Office of Civil
Rights is not a party to any agreement and does not endorse it.
4. Analysis of Early Intervention Programs
These early intervention programs promise, and in some cases deliver,
a reduction in the backlog of cases. 256 Cases are disposed of more
quickly, which is of value to all parties. Nevertheless, efficiency is not the
only goal of dispute resolution. Other values include justice and statutory
intent, procedural fairness, and finality and enforceability of the result. 257
Early intervention methods which promote settlement through mediationlike processes have been criticized both because they do not serve the

254. Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race, color and national origin by
recipients of federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). The Department of Education's
responsibilities are limited to discrimination in education. Silver, supra note 224, at 487.
The discussion of the procedure for the Office of Civil Rights is taken from Silver's article.
255. Id. at 502.
256. Settlement rates at OCR, EEOC and the state agencies studied ranged from 64%
to 19.5% with most at the higher end of the range. PEER Study, supra note 247, at 47-49.
257. Silver, supra note 224, at 519. Professor Silver has evaluated EEOC's RCP system
and OCR's ECR procedure in light of these values. Id. at 519. In assessingjustice, she
includes norm articulation and substantive fairness along with statutory intent. See id. at
521-26 (analyzing whether the processes serve goal of justice). These goals enumerated by
Silver combine to make up what this report has referred to as effective enforcement of the
statute. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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purpose of articulating nonns and developing coherent policy and because
they focus on ad hoc individual justice, perhaps at the expense of systemic
issues. 258 Use of such methods will bring about change for more complainants through settlement of individual cases, but without knowing the
merits of the cases, it is difficult to know whether the results effect
justice. 259 If the use of early intervention settlements diverts agency
attention from systemic problems, then overall results in tenns of achieving
enforcement objectives may be negative. 260 A third criticism is that such
programs may cause respondents who have not discriminated to offer
concessions to complainants to resolve the dispute. 261 Because the ADA
is a relatively new statute, development of norms of statutory interpretation
is particularly important. Early intervention may diminish the opportunities
for development of the law by effectuating settlements. If the settlements
fairly resolve the issues between the parties, however, it is difficult to argue
that they should be forced to litigate for purposes of developing the law.
Where the early intervention and settlement occurs without investigation,
as in the Office of Civil Rights procedure, assessment of whether the
settlement is appropriate in light of the goal of eliminating discrimination
is problematic. 262 Furthennore, the agency's lack of involvement in
approving or participating in the settlement leaves the weaker party in
settlement negotiations, most often the charging party, more vulnerable to
sacrificing legitimate positions for little compensation. 263
EEOC's
procedure, which is a part of the investigation process, is better in this
regard.

258. Silver, supra note 224, at 540. Because these programs incorporate mediative
processes, the same criticisms are made of mediation. See further discussion of these issues
and evaluation of the mediation alternative infra.
259. Silver, supra note 224, at 540.
260. Id. The PEER Study found that "preparing a case for mediation tends to discard
either the opportunity to identify class or systemic issues or the opportunity to pursue them
when known." PEER Study, supra note 24 7, at 128. Where mediation was used, the intake
interviewer commonly convinced the complainant to eliminate class allegations and focus
on individual complaints to facilitate mediation. Id. at 127. In addition, it is difficult to
mediate class cases because the agencies do not have the means to identify and notify class
members. Id. As a result, respondents have little incentive to agree to a class settlement
since the class members will not be bound. Id. Furthermore, there is little incentive for the
agency to raise class issues that might jeopardize settlement. Id. at 128.
261. Silver, supra note 224, at 542-43.
262. Id. at 544.
263. Id. at 556 (discussing the impact of the inequality of bargaining power on the
complainant).
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Procedural fairness is related to the issue of substantive fairness.
Procedural fairness requires the parties to have information about the
process. 264 An additional concern, however, is the possible imbalance of
power in settlement negotiations. 265 This may in part be mitigated by
providing as much information as possible regarding rights and remedies
to the parties, but may be exacerbated by either the presence of counsel for
one party and not the other, 266 or by an agency representative who gets
credit for settlement. 267
An additional question about the viability of the early intervention
procedures is whether they will result in enforceable agreements. A
settlement agreement fashioned by the parties may be more likely to
generate compliance than a judicial decision imposed on the parties. 268
While a written settlement agreement would provide a basis for a common
law contract enforcement action, this may not be a satisfactory enforcement
option for a charging party, the party most likely to be asserting noncompliance. 269 Agency enforcement is preferable, but courts disagreed as to
whether the EEOC could enforce agreements reached through Rapid Charge
Processing. 270 Instead of attempting to enforce settlement agreements, the
Office of Civil Rights requires filing of a new complaint, with the time
limit for filing calculated from the breach rather than the date of the
underlying discrimination. 271 Accordingly, Silver concluded that the early
complaint procedures suffered from the lack of conclusive enforceability.
In addition to the benefits noted above, the early complaint resolution
procedures provided certain other advantages over litigation. Whereas
litigation is a winner take all proposition, the early resolution procedures

264. Id.
265. See id. (discussing the impact of inequality in bargaining power).
266. See id. (noting that both providing information and the presence or absence of
counsel may impact bargaining power). Most likely, the complainant will be without
counsel. Id. at 557.
267. If the agency representative is internally rewarded for settlements, the incentive may
be to press for settlement regardless of the merits of the case and the fairness of the
settlement for the parties. See Silver, supra note 224, at 556 (discussing the impact of
mediator credit for settlement on the process).
268. Silver, supra note 224, at 575.
269. Id. at 575. As Silver notes, the common law action will require significant
investment ofresources, legal assistance, and time, the absence of which prompted charging
party reliance on the agency initially. Id.
270. See id. at 576-78 and cases cited therein (discussing cases deciding whether EEOC
could enforce settlements reached through Rapid Charge Processing).
271. Id. at 579-80.
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provided an opportunity for each of the parties to achieve some benefit. 272
In addition, the complaint resolution procedures gave the parties substantial
control over the process and the outcome. 273 Furthermore, the mediative
process may be more conducive to preserving relationships than litigation
and the nonconfrontational nature of the process may facilitate settlement
at an early stage in the dispute. 274 In sum, these early intervention
programs provide both advantages and disadvantages which must be
balanced in determining whether their use advances the statutory goals.
Because the programs incorporate forms of alternative dispute resolution,
they will be considered further in the next section.
Like the EEOC's Rapid Charge Process and the Office of Civil Rights
Early Complaint Resolution Program, the early assessment program
undertaken by the Washington Field Office offers some promise of
reducing the backlog and speeding case processing. The Department of
Justice already operates in similar fashion under Title III as it declines to
investigate certain cases. All Title II cases are investigated by the
appropriate agency, however. The drawback of such a system, which
assesses and tracks cases very early in the investigation process, is its
potential to ignore valid discrimination claims where the plaintiff is less
articulate or less able to identify the evidence of discrimination for the
investigator or intake officer. 275 Also where a statute is relatively new,
with little time for judicial development of the law, it is important not to
screen out at an early stage cases that would develop the law or test
innovative theories of legal interpretation. Accordingly, where an early
assessment system is adopted, training of the investigators and intake

272. Silver, supra note 224 at 584-85.
273. Id. at 585-86.
274. Id. at 587-88.
275. In some cases, the complainant simply may not have access to the evidence
necessary to establish the violation, such as evidence of differential treatment. Applicants
for jobs are in particularly difficult positions to obtain such data. The Washington Field
Office program appropriately declines to code code such cases as "no evidence" cases.
Oversight Hearing, supra note 99, at 84 (Testimony of Susan Buckingham Reilly,
Washington Field Office Director, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
A second problem is the potential for undue influence on agency personnel in
prioritizing cases. Concern has been voiced in recent years over close relationships between
personnel of regulatory agencies and the entities being regulated. See Edna Earle Vass
Johnson, Agency "Capture": The "Revolving Door" BetweenRegulatedlndustriesand Their
Regulating Agencies, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 95 (1983) (discussing these concerns). Without
suggesting any Jack of integrity on the part of government officials, at any point in
governmental processes where discretion must be exercised, the possibility of pressure from
the regulated entity exists. Id. at 96, 98, 119.
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officers to ask appropriate questions and develop evidence in support of
alternative legal theories is essential. 276 Given such training, however, the
system offers an appropriate way to prioritize cases to allocate limited
resources most effectively. In addition to early intervention programs,
other uses of alternative dispute resolution should be analyzed for their
dispute resolution potential.
C.

1.

Alternative Dispute Resolution

The Role of ADR in ADA Cases

Given the statutory encouragement of ADR, 211 it is appropriate to
consider whether the agencies are currently using ADR effectively and
whether additional use of ADR might contribute to enforcement efforts.
Despite the statute's support of ADR, one might question whether ADR has
a role to play in ADA disputes, particularly given the nature of the public
rights involved. 278 In addition to the dispute resolution function, courts
also play a role in establishing norms-a process of giving "meaning to our
public values."279 Critics of ADR argue that it limits this function of the
courts. 280 While this is a persuasive reason to maintain litigation as a

276. The questions asked at the investigatory and intake stages need to be developed with
the advice of agency lawyers.
277. 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. V 1993).
278. Some commentators have argued that ADR is inappropriate in cases involving
significant public rights. See HENRY J. BROWN & ARlHUR L. MARRIOTI, ADR PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE 396 ( 1993) (arguing that cases involving fundamental human and civil rights
should be litigated); Irving R. Kaufman, Reform/or A System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute
Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. l, 30 (1990) (noting that the risk
of undermining public values by evading litigation is greater in cases serving remedial and
social functions such as civil rights cases). See also Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson,
Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration
from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993) (arguing that the
public justice values underlying discrimination statutes are best preserved by de novo review
of arbitral determinations of law in discrimination cases).
279. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. l, 30 (1979).
See also Daniel Misteravich, The limits of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Preserving the
Judicial Function, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 37, 39-40 (1992) (arguing that courts
perform not only function of dispute resolution but also function of creating rules which
assert public values).
280. See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (stating
purpose of adjudication is to give force to public values and purpose is not served by
settlement); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REV. 668, 671-72 (1986) (suggesting that in creating ADR systems we must
preserve role of courts in establishing law particularly in cases involving significant public
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primary enforcement strategy, it does not justify preclusion of ADR in
ADA cases. A large number of ADA cases are backlogged at the
investigation stage with potential to be backlogged at the litigation stage in
the future. ADR offers some promise of quicker, inexpensive disposition
of cases with greater satisfaction on the part of litigants. As persuasively
noted by the Pound Conference Report:
[t]he ultimate goal is to make it possible for our system to provide justice for all.
Constitutional guarantees of human rights ring hollow if there is no forum
available in fact for their vindication. Statutory rights become empty promises if
adjudication is too long delayed to make them meaningful or the value of a claim
is consumed by the expense of asserting it. 281

Agency efforts at alternative dispute resolution thus far have concentrated
on settlement negotiation and mediation. Both offer potential for effective
resolution of ADA disputes. 282 Given the large number of complaints,
settlement - accomplished with or without mediation - is essential for
effective enforcement of the statute. 283 Nevertheless, as noted, caution
must be used in adopting ADR techniques because of the need for judicial
development of the law. In selecting cases for litigation and settlement,
agencies must balance the interests of establishing the law and achieving
benefits for victims of discrimination. This can be done through development of enforcement policies by the agencies and ensuring that decisions

rights and duties); Kaufman, supra note 278, at 30 (recognizing argument that settlements
do not enforce public norms like trials). As suggested by Kaufman, resolutions through
ADR have no greater impact on this function than settlements reached through other
mechanisms. Id. at 29-30.
281. National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future 300 ( 1979),
quoted in Kaufman, supra note 278, at 38. The mediation proposal herein will not unduly
interfere with the law development function. See infra notes 319-21 and accompanying text
(further discussing the impact of the mediation proposal on law development).
282. Sander and Goldberg suggest a rule of presumptive mediation-i.e. that mediation
should be the first ADR method of choice to promote settlement since it offers such
potential for resolving disputes. Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the
Forum to the Fuss: A User Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, IO NEG. J. 49,
59 (1994). According to Sander and Goldberg, mediation has the greatest potential for
overcoming obstacles to settlement except for differing views of facts and law and a
plaintiffs belief that he or she may obtain a jackpot recovery. Id. They further suggest that
a skilled mediator often can achieve settlement without resolving disputes over factual and
legal questions. Id.
283. "Settlements are the lifeblood of equal opportunity law." Oversight Hearing, supra
note 99, at 12 (Testimony of Alfred W. Blumrosen, Thomas A Cowan Professor of Law,
Rutgers University).
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regarding settlement and litigation are made in accordance with established
priorities. 284 These concerns must be salient in establishing mediation
policies.
The pilot mediation projects and the Department of Justice grant for
mediator training are steps in the right direction. Mediation is appropriate
for ADA cases for a number of reasons. 285 Mediation offers the promise
of settlement with assistance of a neutral party trained to help the parties
resolve their disputes. The advantages of mediation are many. It is a low
cost alternative to litigation, with potential for resolving the dispute more
quickly. 286 Thus, it has the potential to reduce agency backlogs of
complaints if it is utilized during or prior to the investigative process. 287
Mediation has the ability to focus on the underlying interests of the parties
and to accommodate those interests in a resolution agreeable to the

284. Such policies and the decisions pursuant thereto should use available agency
expertise. For example, currently when ADA cases in which cause has been found by the
regional office are presented to the EEOC Commissioners for decisions regarding litigation,
the Office of Legal Counsel, which contains significant ADA expertise, has no input into
the recommendation. Conversation with EEOC Commissioner Rosalie Gaul! Silberman.
See Kaufman, supra note 278, at 31 (suggesting that courts using ADR establish rules to
exempt cases from arbitration that involve complex or novel legal issues to insure that the
judicial role of law development be preserved); Misteravich, supra note 279, at 41-44
(arguing that "hard cases,"those with no legal solution from precedent, statute or other legal
standard, be reserved for the courts, citing JOHN BELL, POLICY ARGUMENTS IN JUDICIAL
DECISIONS 25 (1983)).
285. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act provides the necessary authority for use
of voluntary mediation. 5 U.S.C. § 572 (1994) (authorizing government agencies to use
ADR). In addition, companion bills have been introduced in Congress to encourage mediation of ADA Title I cases along with other discrimination cases, see 1993 H.R. 2016, I 03d
Cong. I st Sess.; 1994 S. 2327, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. These bills contemplate mediation after
reasonable cause has been found by the EEOC and after issuance of a right to sue letter to
the charging party. Id.
286. Speedy resolution benefits both the parties and the agency. Mediation can reduce
staff time required for each case. See PEER Study, supra note 24 7, at 105-06.
287. Empirical evidence regarding the efficiency of mediation is mixed. See Kenneth
Kresse! & Dean G. Pruitt, Conclusion: A Research Perspective on the Mediation of Social
Conflict, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY
INTERVENTION, at 398-99 ( 1989). Kresse I and Pruitt note that there is "little evidence that
mediation has had any appreciable effect in reducing court backlogs." Id. at 398. The
PEER Study found that the EEOC substantially decreased its backlog during the time period
in which RCP was used, but noted that a number of other reforms contributed to the
reduction. See PEER Study, supra note 247, at I 00-04. The PEER Study concluded that
mediation was not a major factor in reduction of the backlog, but did contribute to expedited
processing of new charges. Id. at I 02.

1056

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:1007

parties. 288 Compliance with a negotiated resolution of the dispute is more
likely because the solution was designed and agreed to by the parties. 289
Mediation may be effective in preserving relationships between the
parties that might be destroyed or at least severely damaged by the
adversary process. 290 Mediation increases the control of the parties over
the dispute resolution process, which many students of mediation believe

288. See Stephen B. Goldberg, Meditations of A Mediator, 2 NEG. J. 345, 348 (1986)
(mediation can focus on underlying interests rather than legal issues and find ways to satisfy
those interests); Craig McEwen, Note on Mediation Research, in STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG,
FRANKE.A. SANDER, & NANCY H. ROGERS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 155, 156 (2d ed. 1992)
(noting that mediation can produce outcomes reflecting the parties' needs).
289. See Kresse) & Pruitt, supra note 287, at 396-97; Janice F. Roehl & Royer F. Cook,
Mediation in Interpersonal Disputes, in MEDIATION RESEARCH, supra note 287, at 34-35
(empirical data show high rates of compliance with mediated agreements in many types of
cases); JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION 36 (1984) (because parties in
mediation create their agreement, parties are invested in its success and therefore are more
likely to comply); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation-A Preferred Method of Dispute
Resolution, 16 PEPP. L. REv. SS, S12 (1989) (indicating that mediated agreements are more
durable because created by parties); Craig McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims
Mediation in Maine: An EmpiricalAssessment,33 ME. L. REV. 237, 261 (1981) (showing
by empirical study of small claims cases that compliance with mediated settlements is higher
than compliance with adjudicated decisions).
290. See FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 289, at 10-11 (mediation reduces hostility and
therefore likelihood that battle will continue beyond mediation process, while litigation
focuses hostilities and hardens positions); Feinberg, supra note 289, at S 11. Mediation may
also promote "cooperative problem-solving behavior that would make future disputes easier
to resolve." Stephen B. Goldberg & Jeanne M. Brett, Disputants' Perspectives on the
Differences Between Mediation and Arbitration, 6 NEG. J. 249, 253 (1990). See Feinberg,
supra note 289, at SJ 1 (noting that mediation encourages cooperative behavior for the
future). These attributes will be important in certain types of ADA disputes where an
ongoing relationship is involved. Examples would include employment cases where
employment will continue after resolution of the dispute, public accommodation cases
involving regular customers, e.g., a doctor/patient relationship, and public entity cases
involving regular consumers of government services. An example of the latter would be a
dispute between a transportation agency and a group of commuters with disabilities. Where
disability rights advocates are involved in a dispute, use of mediation may improve the
ability of the defendant and the disability community to resolve later disputes.
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increases self-esteem and competence. 291 In addition, most studies of
mediation reflect high satisfaction levels on the part of participants. 292
Despite these advantages, mediation of ADA disputes raises concerns as
well. As noted above, resolution of disputes through mediation may result
in diminished ability to identify and resolve systemic discrimination
problems. 293 The primary function of agencies utilizing ADR may change
from law enforcement to conflict resolution. 294 Additionally, less powerful parties may be disadvantaged by the less formal procedures. 295 If

291. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 289, at 11. Many advocates of mediation see the
primary benefit of the process as self-determination. Id. at 35; Robert A. Baruch Bush,
Efficiency and Protection or Empowerment and Recognition?: The Mediator's Role and
Ethical Standards inMediation,41 FLA. L. REV. 253, 266-73 (1989) (arguing that mediation
is unique in encouraging empowerment and self-determination).
292. See Kaufman, supra note 278, at 22-23 (citing statistical data confirming participant
satisfaction with ADR); Kresse) & Pruitt, supra note 287, at 395-96 (party satisfaction rates
in mediation are usually 75% or greater even for those who do not reach agreement);
Goldberg & Brett, supra note 290, at 250-52 (finding higher participant satisfaction rates
with mediation than arbitration); McEwen & Maiman, supra note 289, at 254-60 (finding
higher participant satisfaction rates with mediation than with litigation). Among factors
influencing participant satisfaction are the level of control and privacy, see Kresse I & Pruitt,
supra note 287, at 396, the belief that the mediator understood the dispute, the lack of
formality, and the belief that important facts were heard. Goldberg & Brett, supra note 290,
at 251-52. Data suggest that satisfaction level is not dependent on outcome. Id.; Kaufman,
supra note 278, at 23.
293. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text (noting that focus on mediating
individual cases may divert attention from systematic discrimination).
294. See PEER Study, supra note 247, at 9-10 (noting that mediation shifts agency's
focus from law enforcement to dispute resolution).
295. See Richard Delgado, et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WISC. L. REV. 1359, 1398-99 (1985)
(discussing various ways in which informal processes may disadvantage less powerful
parties); Richard Abel, lnformalism: A Tactica/Equivalentto Law, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
3 75, 383 ( 1985) (arguing that informalizing legal proceedings would disadvantage the poor
and perpetuate inequality); William Simon, Legal lnformalityand RedistributivePo/itics, 19
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 384, 386, 388 (1985) (arguing that both informal and formal systems
can harm the disadvantaged depending on the circumstances). Additionally, there is some
evidence that mediation is more likely to result in agreement when the parties are of
relatively equal power. Kresse! & Pruitt, supra note 287, at 404-05. A study of 600 small
claims court cases in New Mexico evaluated outcomes of cases assigned randomly to mediation and adjudication. The results revealed that women fared better in mediation than in
adjudication, although their subjective evaluation of mediation was more negative than their
evaluation of adjudication. Minorities, who were predominantly Hispanic, fared worse in
mediation than in adjudication. The minority disputants fared worse in mediation than
whites also, although the differences disappeared when both mediators were mediators of
color. Minority disputants were more enthusiastic about mediation than white disputants,
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individuals with disabilities are disadvantaged in mediation, relative to
litigation, then mediation is inconsistent with the goals of the statute. 296
Related to the power issue is the need to ensure that the individual's
disability does not preclude effective participation in mediation, which
requires more direct involvement by the parties than litigation, where the
parties' representatives play a more active role. 297
Any mediation
procedure adopted needs to take into account these concerns.

2. Analysis of Other Mediation Systems in Civil Rights Cases
In determining whether to utilize mediation under the statute, it is useful
to consider other efforts to use mediation in the discrimination context.
The discussion above relating to early complaint resolution procedures
evaluated the advantages and disadvantages of the EEOC's Rapid Charge
Processing system and the Office of Civil Rights' Early Complaint
Resolution procedure, both of which involved mediation. In addition, local
civil rights agencies in Chicago and Washington, D. C. have utilized
mediation in discrimination cases. While there has been no systematic
evaluation such as the PEER study, some data is available regarding these
mediation programs.
The District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority
Business Development successfully mediates about one hundred cases per

however, despite the objective monetary disadvantage. Presentation of Michele S. G.
Hermann, What Happens When Mediation is Institutionalized to the Parties, Practitioners
and Host Institutions?, Program of AALS Section on Dispute Resolution (Jan. 1994). One
explanation of these differences may be that the parties are more interested in process than
outcome. Id., Comments of Robert Baruch Bush.
This disadvantage, if true, may contradict one of the perceived advantages of
mediation, that it empowers the parties. See McEwen, supra note 288, at 156 ("No
compelling evidence exists to resolve the debate between those who argue that mediation
empowers disputants and those who argue that it harms disadvantaged parties."). It is
possible that both are true. A party may be empowered (or feel empowered) by the process,
yet objectively receive less relief than he or she would have received in litigation. As
McEwen notes, definitions of empowerment may vary as well. Id. In one view
empowerment may come only from legal advocacy, while in another it may come from
more direct involvement in the dispute and its resolution. Id.
296. In determining disadvantage, however, the empowerment potential of mediation
should be considered and valued. In addition, in determining the benefits of litigation and
settlement, the emotional cost of lengthy litigation should not be undervalued. Id.
297. See Targeting Disability Needs, supra note 117, at 35-37 (discussing issues
regarding the capacity of persons with cognitive impairments to participate in dispute
resolution and techniques that might facilitate their participation).
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year. 298 Mediation is offered to complainants at the time the charge is
filed. 299 When the program began in 1990, only about one third of
respondents agreed to mediation, but that number has been increasing and
the agency is beginning to see repeat customers among respondents and
respondents' counsel. The settlement rate in mediation has been forty to
fifty percent. There is one staff mediator, who not only is involved in
meditations, but also recruits and trains volunteer mediators, who come
primarily from other local mediation programs. The staff mediator is also
responsible for educating respondents and potential respondents about the
program. If a case is not resolved in mediation, it is transferred to the
investigative unit. The mediation is confidential and nothing which occurs
in mediation becomes part of the investigative file. The agency has a form
for the settlement agreement which is used in all cases. In addition, the
agency reviews all agreements to be sure that they are balanced and
enforceable before closing the case. 300
The Chicago Commission on Human Relations (the Commission) uses
mandatory conciliation301 for all cases in which it has found substantial
evidence of a violation. 302 The mediators, attorneys with a background

298. Data regarding the D.C. Department of Human Rights and Minority Business
Affairs, received from La Verne Fletcher, Acting Supervisor, Mediation. Successful
mediation consists of resolving the dispute with an agreement between the parties. The
agency handles cases alleging discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodation
and education. The number of cases filed per year varies from 400 to 700. Id. Disability
discrimination is covered by the law and the agency has mediated some disability
discrimination cases, but separate data on those cases is not available.
299. Almost all complainants agree to mediate, which may be a result of the fact that
mediation occurs within a few weeks of filing while investigations take twelve to fifteen
months to complete. Id. If complainant agrees to mediate, the respondent is then served
with the complaint and given the option to mediate.
300. To date, the agency has not had any complaints about failure to honor settlement
agreements. If such a complaint were raised, however, the agency would attempt to resolve
the dispute, and if unable to do so, would either reopen the case or use the office of the
corporation counsel to enforce the agreement.
30 I. If the complainant fails to attend the conciliation conference without good cause,
the complaint may be dismissed and/or the complainant may be ordered to pay the
conciliator's fees. Amendments to Rules and Regulations Governing the Chicago Human
Rights Ordinance, Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance, and the Chicago Commission on Human
Relations Enabling Ordinance, section 230. l OO(b) (Amended January 27, 1993) (hereinafter
Amended Rules). If the Respondent fails to attend, a default judgment may be entered
against the Respondent. Id. In addition, the failure to attend will be considered in
determining the amount of attorney's fees awarded ifthe complainant prevails at hearing.
Id. Respondent also may be ordered to pay the conciliator's fees. Id.
302. Information regarding the procedure was obtained from Miriam I. Pickus, Deputy
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in discrimination law and training in mediation, are paid by the Commission,303 and no fee is charged to the parties for mediation. Approximately
fifty percent of the cases mediated settled at this stage,3 04 and seventyseven percent of the disability cases conciliated settled. 305 If no settlement
is reached at the conciliation conference, the case is scheduled for an
administrative hearing.
In disability cases, the Commission also uses a procedure known as a
disability evidentiary conference. 306 The conference, which serves both
factfinding and settlement purposes, is employed when the Commission
determines, based on a preliminary investigation, that the respondent's
facilities are not fully accessible to the complainant. 307 At the evidentiary
conference the conciliator attempts to resolve the dispute, but if no
settlement is reached the conciliator submits to the Commission's
compliance staff a recommendation on whether the staff should find
substantial evidence of a violation. 308

Commissioner of the Chicago Commission on Human Relations and from the Rules and
Regulations Governing the Chicago Human Rights Ordinance, the Chicago Fair Housing
Ordinance, and the Chicago Commission on Human Relations Enabling Ordinance (hereinafter Chicago Rules). The Commission has jurisdiction over discrimination in employment,
public accommodation, and housing in the City of Chicago, including discrimination based
on disability.
303. Compensation for the attorneys is below the market rate, but the Commission has
had no difficulty in obtaining attorney/mediators.
304. These statistics are for the twelve month period preceding September 1994.
305. The actual numbers of disability cases are small, however. Letter from Miriam
Pickus (Sept. 13, 1994). From 1991 to 1993, the Commission found substantial evidence in
36 disability cases involving employment and public accommodation. Id. Twenty-eight
were settled, with four cases stiJJ pending as of September 1994. Id. For all disability cases
for the time period from 1991 through 1993, the Commission closed 72 employment cases,
41 by settlement agreement, a settlement rate of 57%. Id. Fifty-three public accommodation cases were closed, 35 by settlement agreement, a settlement rate of 66%. Id. These
settlements include those reached at a conciliation conference, cited above, as well as
settlementsduring investigation, either through a Disability Evidentiary Conference, see infra
notes 306-08 and accompanying text, or without such a conference. Id.
306. See Chicago Rules, supra note 302, at Subpart 525. Like the conciliation
conference, the Disability Evidentiary Conference is mandatory and failure to appear subjects
the parties to the same penalties. Id. at § 525.125.
307. Id. Prior to the conference, the respondent is required to submit an affidavit with
evidence of undue hardship. Id. Like the ADA, proof of undue hardship eliminates the
accommodation obligation under the Chicago Ordinance. Id. at § 520.100. The complainant
files a responsive affidavit. Chicago Rules, supra note 302, at § 520.100.
308. Id. at § 525.115. For settlement statistics which include settlements reached at
Disability Evidentiary Conferences, see supra note 305. If the staff finds substantial
evidence, it may waive the normal conciliation conference and proceed directly to an
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In accessibility cases, the Commission can use the city's Office for
People with Disabilities to perform a site survey and determine what
changes would make the facility accessible. These technical experts even
prepare blueprints for the design change, which saves money for the
business and facilitates settlement of accessibility disputes.
Under the Chicago Rules, settlements are written, signed by the parties
and the conciliator, and presented to the agency's compliance staff for
approval. 309 Approval, which results in an order approving the settlement
and dismissing the complaint, is granted if the settlement is knowing and
The
voluntary, unambiguous, and consistent with the ordinance. 310
Commission retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement and the parties
must acknowledge in the agreement the Commission's jurisdiction to seek
judicial enforcement. 311
These two procedures, Chicago and the District of Columbia, have some
common elements and some significant differences, but both have been
relatively successful in settling cases. The District of Columbia's voluntary
procedure, offered early in the investigation process has employed
significant educational efforts to increase participation. Complainants are
encouraged to participate by the promise of rapid processing through
mediation. Respondents' participation rate has increased through educationChicago's
al efforts and successful participation in the procedure.
mandatory procedure has a high rate of settlement for mandatory mediation,
but that may be attributable to the fact that it is employed after a finding
of substantial evidence or for the Disability Evidentiary Conference, after
a finding of a technical violation.
Both procedures are cost free to the parties, except for their representation, should they choose to use it. Both procedures provide for agency
approval and enforcement of settlement agreements to ensure consistency
with the statutory mandate. Because no systematic study of the meditations
has been done, there is no evidence regarding whether complainants are
disadvantaged by the process in any way.

administrative hearing. Chicago Rules, supra note 302, at § 525.120.
309. The description of settlement procedures, including enforcement procedures is taken
from Chicago Rules, supra note 302, at §§ 230.130, 230.140.
310. As a condition of approval, the Commission may require compliance reports. Id.
at § 230.130.
311. To obtain enforcement of the agreement, a party must notify the Commission in
writing. The Commission investigates, and if it finds substantial evidence of a violation of
the agreement, it must notify the parties in writing and have the city's Corporation Counsel
seek judicial enforcement of the order approving the settlement. Id. at § 230.140.
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These procedures contain some elements that contrast with procedures
that have achieved less success in participation. A mediation pilot project
at the Illinois Human Rights Commission which charges the participants a
filing fee to participate in mediation has resulted in very limited participation.312 The Department of Justice pilot project, where the charges are
dismissed before mediation, also has resulted in limited participation. 313
Under the latter procedure, respondents have limited incentive to engage in
mediation because of the removal of the threat of government action.
Additionally, the Department of Justice project has been unable to engage
in educational efforts about mediation prior to agreement to participate
because the Privacy Act restricts the agency's ability to disclose the names
and addresses of the parties to the grantor, which is prepared to engage in
such education, before they agree to participate in mediation. 314
The results of the EEOC pilot mediation project also yield useful
information. Respondents were less likely to agree to participate than
complainants. The cases included large numbers of discharge cases in
which agreements to mediate were particularly difficult to obtain. The
settlement rate of the EEOC project was similar to those of the Chicago
and District of Columbia agencies.
Finally, the Better Business Bureaus/ADA Coalition of Connecticut
(BBB/ADA CC) Center for Dispute Settlement has mediated disability
discrimination cases referred by the Connecticut Commission on Human
Rights and Opportunities (CCHRO), the state agency enforcing Connecticut
anti-discrimination laws. 315 The program was initiated in April 1994 as
a pilot program involving one CCHRO office and cases alleging only
disability discrimination. The CCHRO has recently expanded the program
to include all CCHRO offices, all types of discrimination, and a number of

312. In few cases have both parties agreed to mediation according to Professor Lamont
Stallworth, Chicago Center for Employment Dispute Resolution.
313. Meeting with Department of Justice, Public Access Section (Mar. 28, 1994).
314. Id. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994) (preventing disclosure of records without written
consent of person to whom record pertains, with limited exceptions).
315. Information regarding this program was obtained from Suzanne Ghais, Connecticut
Better Business Bureau, presentation at Collaborative Approaches: A Conference on
Disability Aging and Dispute Resolution, Washington, D. C. (Mar. 31, 1995); telephone
conversation with Paulette Hotton, President, Better Business Bureau of Connecticut; and
telephone conversation with Rick Gomez, Human Rights & Opportunities Representative,
Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities. See also BBB/ADACC
Center for Disability Dispute Settlement Mediation Agreement. The governing statute was
amended in 1994 to encourage voluntary use of alternate dispute resolution and to authorize
the Commission to use mandatory mediation. P.A. No. 94-113 (May 25, 1994); P.A. No.
94-238 (June 7, 1994).
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different ADR service providers. In addition, the BBB/ADA CC is offering
mediation in disability discrimination cases which have not yet been filed
with any agency.
The pilot program is similar to other programs described. The CCHRO
first screened the cases and referred those deemed appropriate to mediation. 316 If both parties agreed, the case was assigned to a volunteer
mediator trained by the Center on disability law. 317 If an agreement was
reached in mediation, it was recorded on an agreement form, containing
standard provisions for enforcement, a nonadmissions clause, and
nonretaliation provisions. The agreement was reviewed by the Center to
ensure that it was administratively correct and then forwarded to the
CCHRO for review for enforceability and systemic discrimination problems.
Upon approval by the CCHRO, the case was closed, with the CCHRO
retaining the right to reopen the complaint or sue for enforcement based on
noncompliance with the agreement. 318
Because of the scope of the state law, the cases referred for mediation
were employment discrimination cases. In the first year of the program,
there were five meditations, three of which resulted in settlement. As
noted, the satisfaction of the agencies involved and the parties has led to
expansion of the program. Also educational efforts have been expanded to
increase participation in the program. The expanded program is similar to
the pilot program in process, but includes additional ADR service providers
trained and certified by the CCHRO. The parties may choose a service
provider from the CCHRO list or any other provider. The ADR program
is combined with an early assessment program which classifies cases for
investigative purposes. Unlike the pilot program, the expanded program
gives the agency the option to mandate the use of ADR in cases deemed
appropriate. Future assessment of the effectiveness of this program may
316. The agency withheld from mediation cases that appeared to raise issues with
precedential impact or affect large groups of individuals. This determination and a postsettlement review help preserve the Jaw development function and the enforcement role for
systemic litigation.
317. If the complainant agreed to mediate, the charge was sent to the respondent, along
with information regarding mediation. If the respondent agreed, then the CCHRO sent a
joint request for mediation to the BBB/ADA CC Center. The Center then contacted the
parties and provided additional information regarding the mediation process. The parties
were charged a $60.00 fee for mediation, with financial aid available to parties unable to pay
the full fee.
318. If no agreement was reached, the case was returned to the CCHRO for
investigation and did not lose its investigation priority by virtue of referral to mediation.
The mediation process was confidential and nothing that occurred in mediation is admissible
in any subsequent litigation.
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provide useful information for designers of the recommended ADA
mediation program.

3. An ADA Mediation Proposal
The review of these existing programs and mediation research supports
the use of mediation by the ADA enforcement agencies. Mediation of
ADA cases offers the potential to reduce the backlog of cases, reach
satisfactory results for the parties, and effectuate the purposes of the statute.
Successful mediation at the administrative level also may reduce the
number of cases judicially litigated. Furthermore, in mediation the parties
take responsibility for resolving their own dispute, reducing reliance on
government enforcement. A mediation program should be designed
carefully, however, to minimize the disadvantages of mediation discussed
above and to ensure active participation. Ideally, the mediation program
should strive for a high settlement rate, a high compliance rate, and party
satisfaction. The program cannot lose sight of the statutory goals as well
and it is particularly important to maintain the focus on protection of the
rights of individuals with disabilities.
Initially, the concern that mediation will interfere with the law development function must be addressed. While judicial development of the law
recently enacted statute, the mediation
is particularly important with
program proposed will not interfere with that function. The proposed
program is voluntary, so many cases will not be mediated. 319 Of those
cases mediated, many will not settle. 320 Accordingly, there will be many
cases available for judicial litigation. In addition, the program proposes
that the cases be screened on intake and at that point, the agencies can
identify cases raising issues that the agency has targeted for law development, investigating those cases for litigation purposes while referring other
cases to mediation. 321 Thus, the law development function will be
preserved, at the same time that quicker resolution is available for many

a

319. In the EEOC pilot project, 87% of charging parties and only 43% of respondents
offered mediation agreed to mediate, which would leave well over half of the cases in which
mediation is offered for litigation. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note
102, at 3.
320. Only 52% of the mediated cases in the EEOC Pilot Program settled, again leaving
a large percentage of cases for litigation. See id.
321. See Letter from Richard T. Seymour, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law, to FrancesM. Hart, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, regarding Comments
on Alternative Dispute Resolution (Sept. 20, 1993) 5-6 (hereinafter Lawyers Committee
Comments) (on file with author).
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parties through mediation. The program design set forth below is
calculated to minimize other disadvantages of mediation and they will be
discussed further in the course of the program analysis.
This Article makes a series of broad recommendations regarding program
design. 322 An extremely important element of designing the program,
however, is input from those who will be potential users of the system. 323
In the course of this study, many representatives of various groups have
been consulted. 324 Further, more extensive consultation will provide
significant benefits. To be effective the program must meet the needs of
the parties to ADA disputes. 325 In addition, disputants are more likely to
use the procedures if they are involved in their design. 326 Involvement of
leaders of organizations representative of those likely to utilize the
procedures in the design will enable them to educate and motivate their
constituents to participate in mediation, enhancing the likelihood of success
of the project. 327
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)328 provides a mechanism
for incorporating the input of representatives of potential disputes in the
design of the mediation program. FACA permits establishment of an
advisory committee where the head of the agency involved determines that
it is in the public interest in connection with the performance of the
agency's duties. 329 FACA governs the procedure for establishment and
operation of the committees. 330 Use of an advisory committee pursuant

322. For useful information regarding program design, see Administrative Conference
of the United States, Systems Design Work Group, The Dispute Systems Design Pre-Design
OrganizationalChecklist (June 30, 1993) (hereinafter Pre-DesignChecklist);Administrative
Conference of the United States, Dispute Systems Design Working Group, Operational
Aspects of Designing Dispute Resolution Systems (Feb. 1994) (hereinafter Designing
Systems).
323. Examples of such groups are the various groups that represent individuals with
disabilities, the Better Business Bureau, the Equal Employment Advisory Council, the
Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and labor organizations.
In employment cases where the employees are represented by a union, unique issues arise
which must be taken into account in program design and settlement. See infra note 350.
Accordingly, the involvement of labor organizations is important to the process.
324. While the report owes much to the ideas and information from the various people
consulted, the recommendations herein are solely those of the author.
325. See WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BRETT, AND STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, GETTING
DISPUTES RESOLVED 65 ( 1988).
326. See id.; Designing Systems, supra note 322, section I, at 4.
327. URY, BREIT & GOLDBERG, supra note 325, at 76.
328. 5 U.S.C. app. II (1994).
329. 5 U.S.C. app. II, § 9(a){2) (1994).
330. 5 U.S.C. app. II,§§ 7-13 (1994).

1066

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:1007

to FACA will insure effective input into the design process through the
exchange of ideas among representatives of various groups participating on
the committee. The communication and commitment inherent in the
advisory committee process provide advantages over mere solicitation of
written comments, which should enhance both the development of the
mediation project and subsequent participation in the process.
The successes and failures of prior projects as well as mediation research
should guide the design of the system. As in the consideration of an ALJ
system, an initial question is whether a common mediation system should
be established. For the reasons discussed in connection with an ALJ
system, use of a common mediation system is a sensible approach.
Although the agencies lose some control, the development and use of
expertise on disabilities in general, and the ADA, in particular, is a
significant benefit of a common system. Furthermore, a common system
will coordinate the enforcement efforts of the diverse agencies involved in
ADA enforcement. The enforcement agencies should establish a joint
committee composed of representatives from each agency to design a
mediation program that will be effective in cases under all titles of the
ADA. 331 The following discussion addresses significant issues that must
be determined in designing the program.

a.

"Voluntary or Mandatory Mediation

A significant question to be addressed is whether mediation should be
voluntary or mandatory. The ADA authorizes voluntary mediation. 332
Neither the ADA nor the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act clearly
authorizes mandatory mediation, however. The legislative history of the

331. The primary enforcement agencies which should be involved in the design of the
program include the EEOC, the Department of Justice, the Department of Transportation,
and the Federal Communications Commission. The Title II investigative agencies also can
provide input into the design of the process, in addition to referring cases to the program and
participating in the educational effort. These agencies include the Departments of
Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development,
Interior and Labor. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.190 (1995).
The EEOC's recent endorsement of ADR and prospective adoption of mediation is
consistent with this proposal. Indeed, the program proposed by the EEOC appears to
incorporate many of the elements suggested infra. See supra notes 124-39 and
accompanying text.
332. See42U.S.C. § 12212(Supp. V 1993). Thissection,section513,encouragesADR
where appropriate and authorized by law. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act also
authorizes agencies to use voluntary dispute resolution proceedings. See 5 U.S.C. § 572
(1994).
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ADA indicates that the encouragement of alternative dispute resolution was
not intended "to preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise be
available to persons with disabilities."333 The conference report on the
ADA states that "it is the intent of the conferees that the use of ...
alternative dispute resolution is completely voluntary."334 This legislative
history strongly supports the conclusion that ADR should be voluntary.
Mediation does not preclude any rights and remedies, however, for if no
agreement is reached in mediation, all other rights and remedies are still
available. In addition, both congressional statements reference arbitration,
directly or indirectly, suggesting congressional concern about compulsory
arbitration rather than mediation. Accordingly, it might be argued that
mandatory mediation is permissible.
Nevertheless, the lack of any exhaustion requirement under Titles II and
III suggests that plaintiffs could not be compelled to mediate cases under
those titles. Since there is no requirement to file an administrative
complaint or to wait for administrative action, the plaintiff could not be
compelled to delay judicial action pending mediation. Title II complaints,
where investigation is required, could not be dismissed for failure to
mediate. In addition, dismissal of a Title III complaint for failure to
mediate may affect the remedies available since only the Department of
Justice can sue for damages under Title III. With respect to cases under
Titles I and IV, which involve mandated agency procedures, mandated
mediation may be an option. The EEOC's Rapid Charge Processing system
implemented under Title VII required participation in a mediation
conference. 335 Since Title I adopts Title VII procedures, and nothing in
the ADA expressly precludes mandatory mediation, it may remain an option
for the EEOC.
Even where mandatory mediation is permissible, a determination must
be made as to whether it is appropriate in ADA cases. The case for
mandatory mediation is based on a belief in the value of the process.
Parties that would not voluntarily mediate may settle in mandatory

333. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PuBLIC LAW 101-336, THE AMERICANS WITII
DISABILITIES ACT, VOL. l 516-17 (Comm. Print 1990); H.R. REP. No. 485 III, lOlst Cong.,
2d Sess. 513 (1990). Congress notes agreement with the Supreme Court's decision in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59 (1974), (holding that arbitration award
did not preclude judicial litigation of Title VII claim).
334. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 596, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1990), quoted in Stephen L.
Hayford, The Coming Third Era of Labor Arbitration, 48 ARB. J. 8, 16 (1993).
335. See PEER Study, supra note 247, at 150.

1068

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:1007

mediation and be satisfied with the process. 336 Mandatory mediation may
increase the mediation's efficiency impact. 337
Nevertheless several
concerns arise in connection with mandated mediation. If settlement is not
reached or would have been reached without mediation, mediation may
simply increase the parties' costs. 338 In addition, if individuals with
disabilities are disadvantaged in mediation, 339 then compulsion to mediate
should be avoided. 340 A large scale mediation program may become so
routinized that the benefits of mediation are lost. 341 Given the risks, and
the probable need for legislative change to compel mediation of claims
under Titles II and IIl, 342 the first effort should be voluntary media-

336. See Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Mandated Participation and
SettlementCoercion: Dispute Resolution as it Relates to the Courts 12-13 ( 1991) (hereinafter
SPIDR Report). Reluctance to mediate may result from lack of knowledge about the process
or fear of appearing weak. Id. If the parties truly have no interest in settlement, however,
mandatory mediation wastes the time and resources of the parties, the mediator, and the
agency. Some of the difficulties that existing mediation projects have had in obtaining
participation suggest consideration of mandatory mediation.
337. See id. at 2, 12-13. (noting that larger scale program may achieve more benefits
more efficiently).
338. See id. at 1, 13 (noting that mandated processes add costs where either trial or
settlement is inevitable). The emotional costs to the parties may also be increased. See id.
at I.
339. See supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text (noting that less powerful parties
may be disadvantaged by less formal dispute resolution methods).
340. See PEER Study, supra note 247, at 151 (noting that mediation makes greater
demands of time, expertise and emotion on complainant than traditional investigation);
SPIDR Report, supra note 336, at 1-2 (mandatory dispute resolution must serve interests of
parties, judicial system and public, and program should not harm historically disadvantaged
groups).
341. See SPIDR Report, supra note 336 at 13-14 (bureacracy may routinize mediation
causing loss of high quality and flexibility through rigid procedures and brief mediation
sessions).
342. Legislative change would also be necessary to authorize agencies to impose
effective penalties for respondents' failure to participate, such as payment for the mediator
or payment of plaintiffs' attorneys fees. The ADA does not currently authorize the
enforcement agencies to impose penalties for noncompliance, but Congress could authorize
agency imposition of monetary penalties with appropriate safeguards. See Atlas Roofing Co.
v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm 'n, 430 U.S. 442, 446 (1977) (holding that
it is constitutional for Congress to authorize federal agency to impose monetary penalties
with contests heard by administrative agency); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)
(holding it constitutionally permissible for administrative body to hear and decide claims for
compensation with appropriate safeguards).
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tion. 343 Ongoing assessment of the voluntary mediation efforts should
reveal whether mandatory mediation might be effective. 344

b.

The Timing of Mediation

Another important issue is the timing of the mediation. If mediation
takes place early in the investigative process, before positions harden,
settlement may be more Iikely. 345 On the other hand, at that point, the
parties may be insufficiently aware of the strengths and weaknesses of both
their own position and that of the other party to be motivated to settle. 346
The systems discussed above used both models with some success. So long
as mediation is not used as a delaying tactic or to impose costs on a party
with fewer resources, there seems to be little reason to limit access to
mediation. A combination of early intervention techniques and use of
mediation could reduce the backlog and speed case processing, providing
benefits to the parties as well as the govemment. 347

343. Another reason to implement voluntary mediation initially is the additional cost of
a mandatory mediation project.
344. Should mandatory mediation be considered, the SPIDR Report's criteria for
mandatory mediation should be followed. See SPIDR Report, supra note 336 at 2-3. These
criteria are: I) funding comparable to litigation; 2) absence of coercion to settle in the form
of reports to the trier of fact and financial disincentives to trial; and 3) availability ofa high
quality program that is readily accessible, permits party and attorney participation and
provides clear procedures. Id. The program should be created with input from all
stakeholders and monitored for quality. Id. Case assessment by a person knowledgeable
about dispute resolution procedures, procedures for motions for exclusion and clearly defined
requirements for participation and sanctions for noncompliance are also essential features.
Id.

345. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS 57 (1986) (early
intervention by mediator may prevent polarization and limit hostility).
346. Id. at 57-58. This may create particular problems for complainants who may have
insufficient access to information to evaluate the strength of their cases. For this reason, the
Lawyers Committee suggests that some investigation take place before referral to ADR. See
Lawyers Committee Comments, supra note 321, at 2. The proposal here contemplates only
preliminary intake information, carefully collected to increase the likelihood of correct
identification of issues. Such limited investigation may prove insufficient to facilitate
effective mediation. A requirement of more extensive investigation, however, would utilize
more agency resources, thus raising the cost of mediation. This issue should be addressed
in the evaluation of the program. The design of mediation program should be altered if
necessary to increase the fairness of the process and the probability of settlement.
347. This approach has just been adopted by the EEOC. See supra notes 124-39 and
accompanying text. The Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities also
has implemented such a system. See supra notes 315-18 and accompanying text. The
mediation system and early intervention program each could be implemented alone as well.
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Such a system could operate as follows. 348 When complaints are filed,
investigators or intake officers should be trained to ask questions that would
enable the agency to classify the case in several ways. 349 This interview,
whether done in person or by telephone, should reveal the nature of the
dispute; whether it turns primarily on factual issues, legal issues or both;
whether it involves novel legal questions; whether technical expertise such
as engineers, architects, medical or vocational experts might be useful;
whether systemic problems may exist; and whether the case appears
frivolous or unsupported by any evidence. 350 When the interview reveals

348. Each agency handling ADA cases would have to adapt this proposed process to its
particular needs and staffing patterns. This Article attempts to sketch out broad outlines of
how such a process might work.
349. Training particular employees to perform this function, rather than having it done
by the investigator or intake officer assigned to the case, has certain benefits. More
intensive training of fewer people will make the system function more efficiently than
limited training of all staff. As noted, infra, relatively accurate assessment of cases at this
stage is crucial to the success of this endeavor. The relative accuracy of the assessments
should be a part of the employees' evaluation to insure accountability. If the employees
who made the assessment also investigated the cases, they might have an incentive to ignore
information that cast doubt on the accuracy of their initial assessment. Also, investigators
might be reluctant to refer for mediation cases that they thought would settle, desiring to
retain credit for the settlement. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note I 02,
at 7. Of course, if the ultimate goal is settlement of those cases that can be settled fairly to
all parties, the matter of credit for the settlement is irrelevant. If the mediation process is
a better vehicle for achieving a fair settlement which is satisfactory to the parties, however,
then referral to mediation should be encouraged.
350. At this stage, the agency should attempt to determine whether there are class or
systemic issues involved. If such issues are apparent, the agency should consider whether
referral to mediation is appropriate. While systemic issues are not per se inappropriate for
mediation, it is essential that the plaintiff class be adequately represented in mediation and
that the mediation deal with the systemic issues rather than allowing an individual to settle
for individual relief, leaving the class issues unremedied. Thus, mediation might be
appropriate where there is counsel, a disability rights organization or a labor organization
to represent the group and deal with the systemic issues. Where no such representative is
available, the agency should consider continuing the investigation and leaving any settlement
negotiations until the agency has taken the case as an advocate. For discussion of class
issues and agency mediation, see PEER Study, supra note 247, at 126-34.
Another significant issue that should be considered at this point is whether the
complainant can effectively participate in mediation. This is particularly important in cases
involving individuals with cognitive impairments, some of whom may not have the capacity
to participate in mediation. See Targeting Disability Needs, supra note I I 7, at 35-36.
Agencies should be extremely cautious in determining that an individual does not have the
capacity to participate in mediation, however, to avoid falling into the very stereotypes that
the ADA was designed to eliminate. See Targeting Disability Needs, supra note I I 7, at 3536. The agency should explore ways to mediate effectively with the individual before
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issues that the agency has decided have priority for purposes of development of the law, the case can be diverted from the mediation track and
litigated by the agency, thereby preserving the law development function
of the agency and the courts. Great care should be taken in developing the
questions to be asked and in training the investigators to ensure that cases
are correctly classified initially. 351 The importance of this task cannot be
overestimated because it will determine the success of the system.
Nevertheless, the initial classification should not be determinative if a later
investigation reveals additional information.
Like the Washington Field Office system at the EEOC, the classification
should then determine the additional resources expended on the case by the
agency. At this stage, mediation should be offered to the parties. The time
period for mediation should be limited352 and, absent settlement, the case
should be returned to its place in the investigation queue. 353 Initially,
mediation should be offered in all cases, except those targeted for litigation

concluding that mediation will not be effective. See Targeting Disability Needs, supra note
117, at 35-36.
In employment cases, the presence of a union representative should be ascertained at
this point as well. Union representation, with the accompanying collective bargaining
agreement, raises unique issues for settlement. For consideration of these issues, see Nancy
Segal, The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution to Resolve ADA Issues in the Unionized
Workplace, presented to the 21st Annual Conference of the Society of Professionals in
Dispute Resolution; and Ann C. Hodges, The ADA in the Unionized Workplace, 48 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 567 (1994).
351. Investigators must take particular care with unsophisticated or inarticulate
complainants who may themselves be unaware of the evidence relevant to establishing a
violation of the law. Each agency should develop appropriate questions, investigation
techniques and guidelines for classification for the sections of the ADA under its
jurisdiction.
352. Time limits will discourage the parties from using mediation for delay purposes, and
further the goal of speedy case processing. The time period for mediation, however, must
be adequate to allow for scheduling the mediation and thoroughly exploring settlement
possibilities with the mediator. The EEOC pilot project used a sixty day time period, which
seems appropriate if resources permit.
353. To insure that agency employees do not discourage mediation, they should not be
penalized for any additional time that the investigation takes as a result of the "time out" for
mediation. The mediated case should be given the same priority that it had before the
parties opted to try mediation to avoid discouraging the parties. In addition, to encourage
participation in mediation, the classification for further investigation purposes should not be
revealed to the parties. The agencies should not deny mediation based on the agency's view
of the merits upon the intake interview. This issue, however, should be addressed in
evaluation of the project. The results of the evaluation should assist in a determination of
whether charges that appear meritless and/or charges that appear to be clear violations should
be withheld from mediation. See Lawyers' Committee Comments, supra note 321, at 2.
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for law development purposes. Should analysis of initial results of
mediation suggest that some cases are more amenable to mediated
settlements, 354 the agencies should consider special efforts to convince
parties in those cases to try mediation. For example, cases involving
reasonable accommodation in employment and access to facilities and
services under Titles II and III seem particularly appropriate for mediation. 355 In most such cases there are a range of options to resolve the
dispute, precisely the kind of case where mediation works well. The
mediator can explore the various options with the parties, searching for a
solution which is satisfactory to all.
Cases involving issues such as discharge from employment or disability
of an individual present more difficulties. These cases are susceptible to
mediated solutions, however, and should not be excluded. 356 An employer
who adamantly refuses to reemploy a discharged individual might be
willing to pay back pay and provide a positive reference to avoid
litigation. 357 Similarly, a dispute over whether an individual is disabled
could be resolved by settling the underlying issue, providing accommodation in employment for example, without determining whether a statutory
disability exists. Mediation also offers potential to settle large cases such
Use of negotiated
as those involving transportation systems. 358

354. Initially, the program should mediate a range of cases, enabling analysis of
effectiveness in various types of disputes.
355. These cases involve fact-based and case specific application of standards and,
therefore, are particularly appropriate for alternative dispute resolution. See Administrative
Conference of the United States, Recommendation 86-3, Agencies' Use of Alternative Means
of Dispute Resolution, 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1995), reprinted in Administrative Conference
of the United States, Agency Arbitration, Studies in Administrative Law and Procedure 88-1,
at 77 (stating that arbitration is appropriate where legal norms have been established);
President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, ADR Workgroup, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the ADA, submitted in response to EEOC's Request for
Comments, at 3-4 (noting whether disagreement is factual or legal and whether relationships
of parties changes as result of dispute resolution are important factors in determining
appropriateness of dispute for ADR).
356. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 102, at 6(of135 mediated
settlement agreements, 99 were in discharge cases).
357. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 102, at 4 (in pilot program
51 % of cases included monetary relief, 17% included reinstatement or change in
employment status, and 37% included references).
358. Disputes regarding the ADA's transportation provisions may be less susceptible to
mediation for reasons other than size of the dispute and number of interested parties. Many
of the statutory transportation requirements are quite specific, leaving less room for the
flexibility of mediated solutions. See, e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 12162 (Supp. V 1993) (discrimination to purchase new rail passenger cars unless one per train is accessible to individuals with
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rulemaking and mediation in environmental disputes has demonstrated that
even large, multi-party disputes can be resolved through alternative
processes. 359
To ensure that a voluntary mediation system is utilized, the parties must
be motivated to participate. First, the charges must be retained by the
agencies pending mediation. 360 Second, written material describing the
process, along with its advantages and disadvantages should be prepared for
distribution to the parties. 361 Education is essential to convince the parties
to disputes to use mediation and to ensure satisfaction with the process by
creating realistic expectations about the process and potential results. 362
This education must be undertaken by the agencies involved and their

disabilities). However, these disputes should not be precluded from mediation. Even where
the statutory requirements have not been complied with, a mediated solution with a timetable
for compliance may be preferable to litigation. The Federal Transit Administration has
taken a similar approach in negotiating compliance agreements for ADA requirements
relating to complementary paratransit and key station accessibility. See Federal Transit
Administration, Office of Civil Rights, Informal Compliance Process ( 1993). The legality
of agency approval of a mediation agreement that conflicts with specific statutory
requirements is questionable, however.
For the same reasons, Title IV cases may be less susceptible to mediation. See 47
U.S.C. §§ 225(c),(d) (Supp. V 1993); 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.603, 64.604 (1995) (discussing
telephone and voice relay services).
359. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (1994); Administrative Conference of the United States,NegotiatedRulemakingSourcebook( 1990); GOLDBERG,
SANDER & ROGERS, supra note 288, at 345-56 (discussing use of negotiated rulemaking by
federal agencies); LINDA R. SINGER, SETILING DISPUTES 140-50 (1990) (describing
successful mediation of complex environmental disputes and negotiated rulemaking).
360. Retention of the charges is necessary to provide the threat of agency litigation,
which in turn provides an incentive for respondents to participate in the process. In
addition, it facilitates review of the settlement agreement and enforcement if necessary.
361. The Department of Justice is initiating this process with its grant for mediator
training, which includes production of a consumer guide to mediation services.
362. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 102, at 5 (recommending
development of appropriate informational materials about process to enable parties to make
informed decisions and have realistic expectations); PEER Study, supra note 24 7, at 152-53;
see also Designing Systems, supra note 322, Section III at 1. La Verne Fletcher of the D.
C. Department of Human Rights suggests that the mediation process begins when the
complaint is filed. The mediator must sell mediation to the parties. Other alternative
dispute resolution professionals consulted in the course of this study support the importance
of education in convincing parties to participate effectively in the process. See also Lee
Russell, Center for Dispute Resolution, San Diego, California (telphone conversation,
October 8, 1994) (noting that education, which begins with first contact with parties,
increases comfort level in uncomfortable situation-conflict, thus, improving likelihood of
productive participation); see also BROWN & MARRIOIT, supra note 279, at 121-23.
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personnel, who must have a clear understanding of the process and a
commitment to its use. 363
In addition to educating the parties to particular disputes, the agencies
can make potential users of the process aware of its benefits by making
presentations to groups such as disability organizations, employer
organizations, government agencies, and business groups. 364 Persons who
have successfully used the procedure may become proponents to others. 365
Successful mediations should be publicized to the extent possible to
encourage others to utilize the process. 366 The process of dispute settlement also is likely to be more effective if the users are trained. 367
Training of potential disputants through the use of technical assistance
grants, such as the joint training undertaken by the EEOC and the

363. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note l 02, at 4, 5 (uneven training
of EEOC staff may have adversely impacted ability to obtain agreements to mediate);
Designing Systems, supra note 322, section III, at I, 4. The Department of Justice Pilot
Project has had limited success in obtaining agreements to mediate which may be due, in
part, to the failure to undertake an educational effort. See supra note 314 and accompanying
text. The EEOC project, which included an educational effort, was more successful at
obtaining agreements to mediate, although it also experienced some difficulty which required
extending the project to reach the targeted number of mediations. EEOC Report on ADR
Pilot Program, supra note l 02, at 2-3. Use of agency personnel for education will avoid the
Privacy Act problems that created difficulties in the DOJ Pilot Project.
If external mediators are used, they too could be a part of the educational process.
See MOORE, supra note 345, at 53-54 (education by mediator about process enhances
probability of successful mediation).
364. The D. C. Department of Human Rights has utilized educational presentations to
increase participation in mediation. The presentations might even include simulated
mediations or other demonstrations of the procedure. See URY, BREIT & GOLDBERG, supra
note 325, at 76 (recommending real or simulated demonstrations to overcome skepticism of
potential participants). The Federal Trade Commission has used radio public service
announcements to publicize the benefits of dispute resolution to consumers. Information
from ACUS.
365. See URY, BRETT & GOLDBERG, supra note 325, at 76 (suggesting that designers or
users of system are its most effective proponents). For example, businesses successfully
involved in mediation might be willing to speak about their experience to business
organizations. A potential source of support is the Better Business Bureau, which has been
a leader in establishing ADR programs and has been working in ADA education.
366. URY, BRETT & GOLDBERG, supra note 325, at 77. Because of privacy protections
and confidentiality, permission of the parties to publicize particular disputes would be
necessary. Yet, statistical data could also be used for publicity purposes.
367. URY, BRETT & GOLDBERG, supra note 325, at 78-79 (participants need skills to use
new procedures effectively).
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Department of Justice, will serve the dual purpose of training potential
users and creating advocates of the system. 368
Early mediation serves the goal of speedier resolution, which should help
reduce the backlog. Because of the investigation backlogs in most
agencies, mediation should not cause delays in the process if cases are
simply referred for mediation and, if no settlement is reached, inserted back
in their rightful place in the investigation queue. Those who decline
mediation at an early stage should not be precluded from choosing
mediation later, should they decide to do so. Agency investigators and
attorneys should be alert to the possibility of later mediation, even after a
cause finding. Cases not ripe for early settlement might be excellent
candidates for later mediation as the facts develop and the parties become
more aware of the evidence.

c.

The Source of Mediators

The next crucial question is the source of the mediators. Since there is
no charge to parties for the investigation process, any charge for mediation
would discourage its use. 369 Thus, the option should be cost free to the
parties. 37° Cost to the agency, training, and availability for timely
mediation are essential factors to be considered in determining the best
source of mediators.
First, agency
There are several potential sources of mediators.
employees could be trained in mediation. If agency employees are used,
the mediation could be separate from the investigative process, 371 or a part
of the process. 372 The second possible source of mediators is employees

368. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text (describing EEOC and Department
of Justice training in ADA and ADR). These and future trainees might also serve as
advocates for individual disputants, helping balance the power in the process. See infra
notes 423-25 and accompanying text (noting that technical assistance grants could be source
for training individuals to serve as advocates).
369. Of course, the parties pay their own costs, such as attorneys fees, in either process.
Should the case be litigated, attorneys' fees for mediation should be recoverable to the same
extent as attorneys' fees for the other aspects of the administrative process. New York
Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 61 (1980).
370. The cost to the parties for mandatory mediation, if adopted, should also be
equivalent to regular case processing. SPIDR Report, supra note 336, at 16.
371. See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text (describing D.C. Department of
Human Rights mediation process).
372. See supra notes 301-311 and accompanying text (describing Chicago Commission
on Human Relations mediation process).
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from other agencies who are trained in mediation. 373 Third, the process
could use mediators from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,
which currently mediates labor disputes and cases under the Age Discrimination Act. 374 The final alternative is outside mediators. 375 There are
advantages and disadvantages to each system. Regardless of the source of
mediators, efforts should be made to include mediators with disabilities in
the process.
One advantage of using agency employees to mediate is their familiarity
with the law and with the resulting remedies if the case was litigated.
Moreover, the agency would retain more control over the process if the
mediators were agency employees. Most agency employees are not trained
in mediation, however, and some may not be well-suited for such a role.
Furthermore, employees at most agencies are stretched to the limit, and
imposition of additional duties will require additional personnel. Some
parties may prefer mediators unconnected with the agency, fearing
disclosure of information that might facilitate settlement to an agency with
statutory investigative responsibilities. 376 Thus, use of agency mediators
may result in lower settlement rates or settlements without full information.

373. See Inter-agency Pilot Project on Sharing Neutrals, a paper describing the project
of the Administrative Conference of the United States and a number of federal agencies.
(hereinafter Inter-agency Pilot Project) (on file with author). For further discussion of the
project, see infra notes 378-83 and accompanying text.
374. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 172, 173 (1994) (discussing creation and organization ofFMCS
and its responsibility for mediating labor disputes); 34 C.F.R. § 110.32 (1995) (referring age
discrimination complaints to FMCS for mediation); 5 U.S.C. § 7119 (1994) (providing that
FCMS will assistfederal agencies and their employee representatives in resolving negotiation
impasses); Linda R. Singer & Ronald A. Schechter, Mediating Civil Rights: The Age
Discrimination Act (1986) (evaluating the Age Discrimination Act Mediation program);
Jerome T. Barrett & Lucretia Dewey Tanner, The FMCS Role in Age Discrimination
Complaints: New Uses of Mediation, 32 LAB. L. J. 745 (1981) (describing FMCS role in
mediating age discrimination compliants); information from representatives of the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service.
375. Both the EEOC and Department of Justice pilot projects used outside mediatiors.
See supra notes 105, 149 and accompanying text.
376. For example, see the comments of the Equal Employment Advisory Counsel, an
association of major corporations, suggesting that respondents would have a disincentive to
be candid with agency officials who might ultimately sue the respondent. See Letter from
Jeffrey A. Norris to Frances M. Hart (Sept. 6, 1993) at 3 (in Comments of Equal Employment Advisory Council in Response to EEOC's Request for Comments on Alternative
Dispute Resolution) (on file with author).
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This concern is greater where the mediation is part of the investigatory
process than where mediation is separate and confidential. 377
An alternative is to use employees from other agencies to mediate cases.
This system would use a common corps of mediators for all titles as
suggested above. The Administrative Conference and a number of federal
agencies have begun a pilot project to promote sharing of mediators among
federal agencies. 378 The mediators in the project are federal employees
trained in mediation who will mediate cases for their own or other agencies
on a collateral duty basis. 379 These mediators are available for external
as well as internal disputes. 380 Agencies who use mediators must also
contribute mediators or other resources to the project. 381 One advantage
of using these mediators is the low cost. In addition, the mediators are
trained and experienced. 382 There are two significant limitations to the
use of these or similar mediators. The mediators are located in the
Washington metropolitan area only, 383 and they are not specifically trained
in the ADA. The latter concern is remediable. The former, however, is

377. Even where mediation is confidential, however, the parties may not be convinced
that the information disclosed in mediation will not be revealed to agency investigators
and/or attorneys. An additional drawback of using agency employees is that the employees
with ADA expertise at many of the agencies are located in Washington, D.C., while the
disputes that must be mediated are not limited to Washington. While the EEOC has
investigators at various regional offices, the employees handling ADA cases at other
agencies are primarily, if not exclusively, in Washington. Thus, the mediators or the parties
would have to travel, adding to the costs, unless mediation can be done by telephone. Telephone mediation is possible, but probably less effective. See PEER Study, supra note 247,
at 157 (mediating in a conference setting is often more efficient). A review of the various
mediation techniques in MOORE, supra note 345, and FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 289,
reveals that effectiveness may depend on face to face meetings.
378. See Inter-agency Pilot Project, supra note 373, at I (describing pilot project).
379. Id.
380. Interagency ADR Working Groups, Pilot Project on Sharing Neutrals, ADR
NETWORK, Vol. II, No. I, at I, 12 (June 1994).
381. Inter-agency Pilot Project, supra note 373, at I, n. l.
382. See Inter-agency Pilot Project, supra note 373, at 2 (describing qualifications
required for mediator participation). Because the mediators are expected to mediate internal
EEO complaints, their experience will be somewhat relevant to ADA disputes. See Pilot
Project on Sharing Neutrals, supra note 380, at 12 (agencies are increasingly using
mediation in EEO disputes). The project anticipates expanding the corps of available
neutrals by using less experienced mediators as co-mediators, enabling them to gain
experience to mediate alone. See Inter-agency Pilot Project, supra note 373, at 2
(describing use of co-mediators).
383. Inter-agency Pilot Project, supra note 373, at I. The mediators will work within
a sixty mile radius of Washington, D.C. Id.
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problematic and, as in the case of agency employees, the mediator or the
parties would have to travel for a face to face mediation.
The agencies might use mediators from the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service (FMCS), an experienced mediation agency. 384 FMCS
mediators are stationed around the country, avoiding the geographical
problems of using employees located in Washington. There is some debate
among mediation scholars, however, as to whether the approach to
mediation used successfully in labor disputes is appropriate in civil rights
disputes. 385 In labor disputes, the mediated settlement (as well as the nonmediated settlement) reflects the power of the parties. A labor contract
negotiation is, in essence, a power contest. By way of contrast, mediation
of a civil rights dispute involves the external standards of the statute. On
that basis some might argue that FMCS mediators are inappropriate for the
task of rights-based mediation, at least without some assurance that the
mediators could make the transition in mediation approach. 386 FMCS
mediators do have some experience in mediation of cases involving
statutory civil rights under the Age Discrimination Act. 387 A study of the
mediation program found it difficult to evaluate, however, because of the
unavailability of data. 388 FMCS mediators would require ADA training.
A second concern about use of FMCS mediators is their availability.
Currently, the first priority of the FMCS is mediation of labor disputes.
Absent contrary congressional direction, these disputes are likely to
continue as first priority because of the number of people impacted by such
disputes, their immediacy, 389 and the inclinations of the mediators who

384. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 172, 173 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 6103 (1988); 34 C.F.R. § 110.32
(1995); 5 u.s.c. § 7ll9 (1994).
385. See Moore, supra note 345, at 40-42 (discussing this debate in general terms).
Moore characterizes the debate as a distinction between focus on process, rather than
substance. As Moore notes, however, not all labor mediators are of the process school.
Some scholars, as well as FMCS representatives, believe that mediation techniques transcend
subject matter.
386. This Article does not attempt to take a position on the debate among mediation
scholars on this issue, but merely raises the question. It is important, however, to insure that
the statutory rights are not sacrificed to mediation in a general sense. One way to deal with
the concern about mediation approach would be in the assignment of mediators to ADA
cases. Information from FMCS.
387. 42 U.S.C. § 6103 (1988); 34 C.F.R. § 110.32 (1995).
388. See Singer & Schechter, supra note 374, at 11, 16, 19 (noting that conclusions of
study are tenative and general because of restrictions on access to necessary data). Cf
Barrett & Tanner, supra note 374, at 752, 754 (concluding that mediation is successful
because about half of complaints are resolved).
389. Telephone Interview with Pete Swanson, ADR Mediator, FMCS (Jan. 12, 1995).
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presumably joined the agency with a goal of mediating such disputes and
are experienced at doing so. Accordingly, without a significant infusion of
additional mediators, mediation of ADA cases in a timely manner might be
difficult, if not impossible.
The final option is the use of outside mediators. The two pilot projects
have trained a group of mediators in ADA issues and the recent Department
of Justice grant contemplates training an additional ninety mediators.
Because of these three projects, a group of mediators trained in both
mediation and the ADA exists and will soon increase in size. Use of
outside mediators would minimize training costs390 and avoid the need to
increase government employment. In addition, the group is not limited to
Washington, D.C., although at present it is not nationwide. There are
mediators in many areas of the country, however, that might be trained to
mediate ADA cases. 391 The use of outside mediators relinquishes some
governmental control over the process and requires agency monitoring of
nonemployees to ensure quality work. While the controls that exist for
employees, such as evaluation which may impact pay and promotion, are
not present for outside mediators, the desire to continue to mediate may
provide a substantial incentive to comply with quality standards. Use of
outside mediators from the private sector furthers the goal of minimizing
government bureaucracy.
Unless a sufficient number of mediators are willing to work pro bono,
these mediators must be paid with government funds. Because local civil
rights agencies have had some success using pro bono mediators, the

Even if the FMCS does not mediate ADA cases, the agency might be able to assist in
training mediators for the task. Id.
390. Training of additional mediators might be necessary if the volume of cases is large
or if trained mediators are not available in all relevant geographic areas. The EEOC and
DOJ Pilot Projects each were limited geographically to several large cities, but the
forthcoming training project is expected to be more national in scope.
391. See Amy Hermanek, Title Ill of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Implementation of Mediation Programs for More Effective Use of the Act, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 457, 47480 ( 1994) (recommending use of community mediation dispute resolution programs for Title
III disputes); Letter from Gene Valentini to EEOC (Sept. 17, 1993) at 1 in Comments of
South Plains Association of Governments in Response to EEOC Request for Comments
(suggesting use of mediators from federal and local government agencies as means of
handling more cases and fostering accessibility to mediation) (on file with author). These
mediators could be accessed through a contractual arrangement with one or more dispute
resolution agencies or by maintaining a roster of trained mediators. In addition, the
Administrative Conference maintains a roster of neutrals available for use in agency
disputes. See THOMAS R. COLOSI & CHRISTOPHER B. COLOSI, Administrative Conference
of the United States, Mediation: A Primer for Federal Agencies 12 (1988).
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possibility should not be overlooked. 392 Pro bono mediation of ADA
cases may assist private mediators in increasing their experience and
expanding their potential client base. This same advantage may encourage
some mediators to handle ADA cases at low cost. The agencies also could
explore using grants to existing mediation agencies. 393 These agencies
often have sources of volunteer or low cost mediators. 394 There are a
number of additional ways to fund mediation that are consistent with
government spending regulations, and limited, of course, by the agencies'
budgets. 395
Use of each source of mediators will require some training. 396 It goes
without saying that the mediators should be trained in mediation skills. 397
In addition, essentials of any training program for ADA mediators include
the following. The mediator must have a general understanding of various

392. The D.C. Department of Human Rights uses volunteer mediators. Community
dispute resolution centers frequently use volunteer mediators quite successfully. See Susan
J. Rogers, Ten Ways to Work More Effectively with Volunteer Mediators, 7 NEG. J. 201
(1991) (offering useful suggestions for effective use and motivation of volunteer mediators).
Professor Lamont Stallworth, a dispute resolution professional from the Chicago Center for
Employment Dispute Resolution, has suggested that neutrals may have a professional
obligation to take several cases each year pro bono. ADR Needed for Civil Rights
Enforcement, 144 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 284, 284 (November 11, 1993). Lawyers trained
in mediation might fulfill pro bono obligations by mediating cases.
393. Such grants were used for the pilot projects. Some organizations already have
initiated private mediation services for ADA cases. For example, the Trade Winds
Rehabilitation Center, Inc. in Gary, Indiana, has an ADA mediation program. See Trade
Winds Rehabilitation Center, Inc., Northwest Indiana Americans with Disabilities Act
MediationProject(l995) (describing ADA mediation program).
394. See supra note 392 (discussing sources of volunteer mediators).
395. See George D. Ruttinger, Acquiring the Services of Neutrals for Alternative Means
ofDispute Resolution and NegotiatedRulemaking, Report to the Administrative Conference
of the United States, 877-902 (Nov. 19, 1986) (discussing various methods ofacquiring and
paying neutrals for use in government ADR). The process is complicated by the fact that
a number of different agencies are involved in ADA enforcement and potentially in ADA
mediation, should a common corps of mediators be used.
396. Insuring that neutrals are qualified is particularly important when the parties do not
have a choice as to which neutral to use. See Linda Singer, SETILING DISPUTES 170 ( 1990)
(citing Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SP/DR) Commission on Qualifications, Qualifying Neutrals: The Basic Principles (1989)). The SPIDR Commission on
Qualifications emphasizes competent performance over formal qualifications such as degrees
and specialized training. Id.
397. For one listing of such skills, see Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution
(SP/DR) Commission on Qualifications, Qualifying Neutrals: The Basic Principles, 17-19
(1989) (among requisite skills are abilir; to listen actively, ability to analyze problems,
identify issues and frame issues, and sensitivity to values of the disputants).
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types of disabilities and the impact that such disabilities have on the lives
of individuals. 398 In particular, the mediator must understand the impact
of disabilities on the dispute resolution process and the ways to make the
mediation accessible to individuals with disabilities. 399 The mediator
should have an understanding of the ADA. 400 While the mediator is not
a legal advisor to the parties, the mediator must be aware of the legal
context in which the dispute arises and the standards that would be
applicable if the case were litigated. 401 The mediator must be knowledgeable about available resources in the community at the national, state and
local level which can aid in reaching a satisfactory settlement. 402 These

398. Targeting Disability Needs, supra note 117. This publication, which was written
by the American Bar Association Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law and
the Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly and published by the American
Association of Retired Persons for the National Institute for Dispute Resolution is an
excellent source for alerting mediators and mediation programs to issues relating to the ADA
and the source of many of the training recommendations herein.
399. Targeting Disability Needs, supra note 117 at 22-37 (discussing how various
disabilities affect dispute resolution and suggesting ways to make dispute resolution
accessible to individuals with disabilities).
400. See Qualifying Neutrals: The Basic Principles, supra note 397, at 19 (recommending consideration of performance criteria including knowledge of the process that will be
used to resolve dispute if no agreement is reached and awareness of legal standards that
would be applicable if cases were litigated); Lawyers Committee Comments, supra note 321
at 3 (stating that mediators without knowledge of law cannot effectively demonstrate
strengths and weaknesses of parties' positions and probable outcome of litigation).
401. Some mediation scholars suggest that subject matter expertise is irrelevant in
mediation. See Stephen B. Goldberg, A Qualified Mediator's Skills Don't Depend on
Experience, NAT'L L.J., April 11, 1994, at Cl4 (arguing that mediator does not need
expertise in subject matter of dispute). An expert mediator certainly could resolve an ADA
dispute without ADA expertise. Nevertheless, training in the ADA should be required for
several reasons. Under the proposed program, the mediated agreements will be reviewed
by the agencies for consistency with the statute. Also, the knowledgeable mediator can
assist in settlement by previewing the possible outcomes of a trial, causing the parties to
view their case more realistically. Id. Finally, because statutory rights are involved, the
mediator should be sufficiently knowledgeable to alert unsophisticated parties to statutory
issues. Thus, training in the ADA should be required, although extensive expertise should
not. See President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, ADR
Workgroup, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the ADA 6 (Dec. 2, 1992) (on file with
author) (listing training necessary for ADA dispute resolvers).
402. See Targeting Disability Needs, supra note 117, at 38-39 (discussing available
resources). Targeting Disability Needs not only lists resources, but offers suggestions on
how such resources might be used. Through the technical assistance programs, the agencies
have identified resources as well. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
A Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, Resource Directory (1992). The information should be updated on a
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resources may have ideas for solutions to accessibility or accommodation
problems or may offer services that will assist in providing solutions. Use
of such resources may make the difference between settlement or no
settlement. Furthermore, in addition to specific ADA training, mediators
of statutory civil rights cases need to be aware of mediation techniques for
dealing with power imbalances. This issue will be discussed further below.
None of the sources of mediators discussed is unquestionably superior
to the others, assuming adequate training and a sufficient number of
mediators to handle the cases in a timely fashion. Use of outside
mediators, however, may enhance the acceptability of the mediation process
to the parties, require less training, and provide necessary geographical
diversity. Furthermore, development of a cadre of experienced private
ADA mediators may encourage disputants to use mediation without filing
charges with the agency, thereby, freeing agency resources and reducing
governmental enforcement expenditures. As discussed below, however, the
agency must retain some control over the process to ensure protection of
statutory rights. The issue of protection of rights raises several other issues
which must be considered in designing a mediation program. They include
the following: 1) agency review and approval of settlements; 2) enforceability of settlements; 3) imbalances of power; 4) the role of attorneys m
mediation; 5) the need for and use of experts; and 6) confidentiality.

d.

Agency Review and Approval of Settlements

Because the issues involve statutory rights and the mediation referral
contemplated is a part of the agencies' processes, the agencies should retain
a role in the settlements. Whether or not the mediator is an agency
employee, the referring agency should review settlement agreements
reached in mediation for consistency with the statute, and approve the
agreements that meet established criteria. 403 The range of acceptable

continual basis. Local area disability rights organizations or government agencies dealing
with civil rights or disability issues might have, or be willing to compile, information about
local resources for use in mediation. Furthermore, business groups may provide such
resources. For example, a number ofnational companies have formed Project Access, which
provides information to businesses on compliance with the ADA and resources for issues
relating to employment of individuals with disabilities. See Peter David Blanck,
Communicating the Americans With Disabilities Act, Transcending Compliance: A Case
Report on Sears, Roebuck and Co. 21 (Washington, D.C.: The Annenberg Washington
Program in Communications Policy Studies of Northwestern University, 1994) (describing
Project Access) (on file with author).
403. See Lawyers Committee Comments, supra note 321, at 3 (arguing that EEOC
should be involved in each ADR proceeding to insure consistency with purposes of Civil
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agreements should be wide because the facts of cases and the strength of
cases varies widely. Nevertheless, to the extent possible, the agencies
should ensure that charging parties with strong cases are not being coerced
to settle for little because of their lack of power and money, and that
respondents are not coerced to pay significant sums to charging parties in
frivolous cases to avoid large litigation costs or bad publicity. In addition,
this review process can be used to identify repeat offenders who may have
systemic discrimination problems which are being settled with individuals.
The effective use of agency review for this purpose will help prevent
sacrificing the goal of resolution of systemic discrimination to the goal of
speedy resolution of individual disputes. Upon discovery of systemic
problems, the EEOC and the Department of Justice can utilize their
litigation authority to remedy the systemic discrimination.
While review of settlements will add to the agency workload, the
reduction in investigations should make up for the additional work. To
minimize the added burden, the agencies could create either guidelines for
settlement approval or settlement agreement forms containing required
language. 404 To avoid significant limitations on the creativity of the
parties and the mediator, however, guidelines or settlement forms should be
extremely flexible, with few rigid requirements. One useful requirement,
however, would be language regarding enforcement of the settlement. 405
Development of guidelines regarding settlement could provide other
benefits as well. These guidelines could assist the mediator and the parties
in determining what appropriate settlements might be. Such a guide would
be particularly useful for parties operating without representation in the
mediation process. 406

Rights laws). Because the agencies enforcing Titles I, II and III have the authority, on their
own or through the Justice Department, to litigate violations of the statute, they also have
the authority to approve or reject settlements of disputes. The FCC can accept settlements
as final judgments or take action to enforce the statute despite the settlement. Dubroof,
supra note 185. The EEOC signed agreements reached through the rapid charge processing
procedure. Silver, supra note 224, at 579.
404. The D.C. Department of Human Rights has used a settlement agreement form for
mediated settlements. The Federal Transit Administration has established guidelines for
voluntary compliance agreements. See Informal Compliance Process, supra note 358, at
Attachment II.
405. See discussion of enforceability infra notes 407-414.
406. To be most useful to the mediator and the parties, the guidelines should include
what a full remedy would be if the case were successfully litigated. See PEER Study, supra
note 247, at 152-53 (recommending such guidelines to inform parties in order to inject
realistic assessments into negotiations). The risk of such guidelines is that individuals with
weak cases and no legal advice might rigidly adhere to unrealistic expectations about
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Another possible approach is to require the mediator or the parties to
submit a brief statement to the agency in support of the proposed settlement
agreement. Such a statement could summarize the facts and the factual and
legal disputes, providing information that would enable the agency to
determine whether to approve the agreement. Given the confidential nature
of mediation, agreement of the parties to the statement should be required
before the statement is submitted to the agency. However, such a
requirement might hinder negotiations by requiring negotiations over the
statement in addition to the settlement agreement. It is unclear whether
agreement to such a statement would be a stumbling block in negotiations
and whether it would be valuable to the agency. Thus, the agencies should
consider experimenting with this requirement.

e.

Enforceability of Mediated Agreements

The goal of mediation is to settle cases. These settlements, however,
achieve the statutory goal only if they are enforceable. While studies of
mediation indicate that compliance with agreements is widespread, 407 a
successful mediation program should result in enforceable agreements to
help ensure such compliance. Judicial decisions in cases involving
enforcement of settlement agreements under Title VII, on which the
enforcement provisions of Title I of the ADA are based, have reached
varying results. 408 There is disagreement over whether federal courts have
jurisdiction to enforce such agreements. Recently, the Tenth Circuit held
that an action to enforce a settlement agreement in a Title VII case was an
action for breach of contract under state law, over which the federal court
had no jurisdiction. 409 Other courts have found such actions to be
enforceable under Title VIl. 41 ° Courts have split on whether exhaustion

settlement.
407. See supra note 289 and accompanying text (noting high compliance rates).
408. See cases cited infra at notes 409-12 and accompanying text.
409. See Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that federal
court had no jurisdiction over suit to enforce private settlement of Title VII claim). Unlike
the cases cited supra note 410, Morris did not involve a predetermination settlement
agreement and therefore, according to the court, did not implicate the statutory enforcement
scheme. 39 F.3d at 1111-12 n.4.
410. See, e.g., EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 714 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1204 ( 1984) (holding conciliation agreement enforceable); EEOC v. Henry
Beck Co., 729 F.2d 301, 306 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding that because contrary holding would
enable respondents to use concilation as a delaying tactic impairing enforcement ofTitle VII,
settlement agreement negotiated under rapid charge processing procedures was enforceable
by EEOC); James v. Texas Dept. of Human Serv., 818 F. Supp. 987, 990 (N.D. Tex. 1993)
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of administrative remedies is required before filing suit to enforce a
settlement agreement. 411
To ensure enforceable agreements, the ADA could be amended to make
failure to comply with a mediated settlement agreement unlawful. Barring
such amendment, the agencies should be willing to seek enforcement of
such agreements in order to make the mediation program a success. If, as
is the case in most mediation programs, noncompliance is rare, enforcement
will not be a strain on agency resources. The agencies should also support
individuals seeking judicial enforcement where requested. As the Fifth
Circuit noted in Safeway Stores, lack of enforceability would undermine the
statutory scheme, allowing respondents to use conciliation to delay and
possibly make proof of discrimination more difficult, seriously prejudicing
the complainants and the agency. 412 The ADA's encouragement of ADR
strongly supports enforceability of mediated settlement agreements. The
arguments for enforcement are compelling and should be made forcefully
by the agencies. 413

(holding action to enforce settlement agreement actionable under Title VII and therefore,
federal court has jurisdiction); Sherman v. Standard Rate Data Serv., Inc. 709 F. Supp. 1433,
1440 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding that federal court has jurisdiction over private action to
predetermination settlement agreement); Kiper v. Louisiana St. Bd. of Elementary and
Secondary Educ., 592 F. Supp. 1343, 1359 (M.D. La. 1984) (holding that federal court has
jurisdiction over action by aggrieved employee to enforce conciliation agreement). Some
courts have recognized a distinction between enforcement of conciliated agreements after a
cause finding and enforcement of agreements negotiated prior to determination. See also
EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F. 2d 605, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that EEOC
may not seek enforcement of settlement agreement without investigation and determination
of reasonable cause). Other courts have found no distinction. See Eatmon v. Bristol Steel
and Iron Works, 769 F.2d 1503, 1511 (I Ith Cir. 1985) (finding no distinction between
conciliation agreements and predetermination settlement agreements for purposes of
jurisdiction over enforcement actions). To the extent that the courts recognize a distinction,
an agreement reached in mediation as contemplated herein would be a predetermination
settlement agreement.
411. Compare Blank v. Donovan, 780 F.2d 808, 809 (9th Cir. 1986) (settlement
agreement negotiated pursuant to Title VII complaint not enforceable where Title VII
administrative requirements have not been exhausted) and Parsons v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
741 F.2d 871, 874 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff seeking to enforce settlement
agreement resulting from Title VII proceeding must exhaust administrative requirements
before filing enforcement action in court) with Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc.,
769 F.2d 1503, 1508 (I Ith Cir. 1985) (no exhaustion required prior to enforcement action
based on settlement agreement) and Sherman v. Standard Rate Data Serv ., Inc., 709 F. Supp.
1433, 1441 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (exhaustion of administrative remedies not required before
action to enforce Title VII settlement agreement).
412. 714 F.2d at 573.
413. Questions about enforceability may discourage participation in the process.
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In addition to active enforcement, the agencies have two other roles to
play in the enforcement area. First, review of the agreement should include
review for enforceability. As noted above, enforcement language could be
drafted by the agencies as a guide for the mediator and the parties. Also,
the agreement to mediate should include agreement that any settlement
reached is enforceable by the agency. 414 While such agreement would not
confer jurisdiction on the federal courts, it would at a minimum allow the
agency to seek enforcement on a contractual basis. Second, education
about mediation should include information about enforcement of mediated
agreements so that the decision about whether to mediate is an informed
one.

f

Power Imbalances

Because mediations in ADA cases often will involve an individual with
a disability and a business or government entity, concern about power
imbalances surface. The complainants may be at a disadvantage in this
informal procedure because of the historical discrimination they have
endured and their lack of resources. 415 All power imbalances cannot be
eliminated in mediation and these imbalances are also present in investigation and litigation proceedings. Nevertheless, steps can and should be taken
to ensure that power imbalances do not adversely affect either party in
ways unique to mediation. 416
The current debate in the dispute resolution community, with respect to
the role of the mediator, affects this issue. 417 One view of mediation
limits the role of the mediator to obtaining a settlement on any terms
agreeable to the parties. Under this view, the mediator should not impose
upon the parties his or her own view of the merits of the case, the merits

414. The mediated settlement agreements in the EEOC pilot project were enforceable by
the agency. R. Gaul Silberman, Susan E. Murphy, & Susan P. Adams, Alternative Dispute
Resolution of Employment Discrimination Claims, 54 LA. L. REV. 1533, 1557 (1994).
415. In a given case, however, the disadvantaged party might be the small employer
faced with a disability rights organization.
416. While prejudice certainly is not unique to mediators, the informality of mediation
may increase the chance that these prejudices have an influential impact. Delgado et al.,
supra note 295, at 1386. Mediation lacks certain protections against acting on bias that are
present in the judicial setting. Trina Grillo, The MediationAlternative:Process Dangersfor
Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1588-90 (1991).
417. For discussions of these views of mediation, see Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency
and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition?: The Mediator's Role and Ethical
Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253, 259-62 (1989); MOORE, supra note 343, at
34-35, 40-42.
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of any proposals offered, or the merits of the settlement reached. Under an
alternative view, the mediator plays a more active role in informing the
parties of the applicable law and attempting to settle the dispute in light of
the legal rights of the parties. The clear view of some people is that the
latter approach, identified as "rights-based mediation," is most appropriate
for ADA mediation. 418 A third view is that mediation is not the most
appropriate vehicle for dispute resolution, where the goal is efficiency or
protection of rights. 419 Instead, mediation is effective and should be
employed where the goal is empowennent. 420 This report does not
attempt to resolve, or even enter, this debate. As proposed here, mediation
attempts to further all three goals-efficiency, protection of rights, and
empowerment of the parties.
Mediation in the statutory rights context, however, should not be
undertaken without the parties' and the mediators' awareness of the
statutory rights involved. Accordingly, the agencies' education role should
include learning about statutory rights and remedies. 421 Such education
will alleviate much of the power disparity that results from lack of
knowledge or information. Additionally, education of the mediators about
statutory rights and disabilities will reduce their biases. Furthermore, there
are mediation techniques that can be used to deal with imbalances of power
while remaining neutral, as the mediator is required by ethical standards to
do.422
In addition to the use of adequately trained mediators, monitored to
ensure acceptable performance, the agencies can assist in balancing power
by encouraging parties to bring a representative or advocate to the
mediation. 423 One trained group of potential advocates for complainants
exists as a result of the joint EEOC/DOJ training. The training could be
repeated or expanded, and technical assistance grants could be used to

418. Targeting Disability Needs, supra note 117, at 9-10.
419. Bush, supra note 417, at 262-66.
420. Id.
421. See supra notes 361-68 and accompanying text. This education can be accomplished primarily through written materials, many of which have already been created by the
agencies' technical assistance programs. The recent Department of Justice grant for
mediator training, for example, contemplates the development of a consumer's guide to
mediation. The key is insuring party access to these materials through an organized effort
by agency personnel.
422. See Targeting Disability Needs, supra note 117, at 30-31 (discussing mediation
techniques for balancing power while remaining neutral); MOORE, supra note 345, at 280-82
(discussing mediation techniques for dealing with parties with unequal power).
423. See Targeting Disability Needs, supra note 117, at 31 (noting that advocate may
assist in balancing power).
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encourage disability and business organizations to provide such training. 424
In addition, the agencies might consider maintaining lists of organizations
providing advocacy services for the use of parties seeking representation.425 Alternatively, a staff person knowledgeable about the ADA could
serve as a resource for unrepresented parties. The staff person should be
limited to providing information, and barred from giving legal advice. 426
One or more of the individuals who do initial screening of cases could
perform this function. In addition to the efforts mentioned, the agencies

424. Some training efforts have been initiated already. For example, in February 1995
the Department of Rights of Virginians with Disabilities presented a selfadvocacy workshop
on Titles II and III of the ADA designed to teach individuals with disabilities, family
members and advocates about ADA rights and responsibilities to enable them to achieve
compliance for themselves and others with disabilities. Information from program brochure
for Access to Programs and Services: A Self Advocacy Workshop on Titles II & III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
425. See PEER Study, supra note 247, at 184. At one time, the EEOC maintained lists
of attorneys for referrals of charging parties. Where one party has an attorney and the other
does not, the party without legal representation may be at some disadvantage. In a given
dispute, either party could be disadvantaged by lack of representation. See Comments of the
Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association Concerning the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Request for Comments Regarding Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Negotiated RulemakingProcedures, (Sept. 10, 1993), at 2; CommentsofNational Federation
of Independent Business in Response to EEOC Request for Comments, Letter from John J.
Motley, III, (Sept. 22, 1993), at l (both on file with author). Some systems have limited
the role of attorneys to minimize this problem, and avoid legalization of the process. See
MOORE, supra note 345, at l 07-08; Grillo, supra note 416, at 1597; PEER Study, supra note
247, at 36. The better approach would allow attorneys, however, encouraging the unrepresented party to obtain representation or using mediation techniques to balance the power
differentials. Lawyers may serve as protectors of rights and provide a buffer between
adverse parties. Grillo, supra note 416, at 1597-1600. There is insufficient research to
indicate whether lawyers help or hinder settlement prospects. Moore, supra note 345, at
108.
The EEOC Pilot Program revealed a concern for fairness on the part of the parties
where the other party appeared with an unanticipated representative. The outside evaluator
recommended that the agency develop criteria for who may participate in a mediation
session and at what point such decisions must be made. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot
Program, supra note 102, at 5. While barring attorneys is not recommended, guidelines as
to number of representatives permitted and a time limit for notifying the mediator of such
representatives are appropriate. Each party should then be notified as to who will be
representing the other party to avoid surprises and resulting fairness concerns.
426. The staff person should be someone who will have no role to play in the mediation,
investigation, or litigation of the case, however. This function might also be performed by
technical assistance staff. Use of any agency staff for such a function might generate
accusations of agency bias, however.
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should carefully monitor settlements reached through mediation to ensure
that neither party is disadvantaged by the mediation process. 427

g.

Confidentiality

Another issue, mentioned briefly above, is whether the mediation is
confidential or whether the information revealed in mediation is available
to the agency for its investigation should mediation be unsuccessful.
Allowing the use of information from the mediation for investigative
purposes would conserve resources, as the investigator would not have to
duplicate the mediator's efforts. Balanced against this efficiency goal is the
impact of lack of confidentiality on settlement agreements. Although
candid participation in mediation increases the probability of settlement, a
party might be unwilling to disclose information that might aid in a
settlement if the information could be used in the investigation to the
party's detriment. 428 Candid participation in mediation should increase the
probability of settlement. 429 Additionally, confidentiality minimizes the
possibility that a party will participate in mediation only as a form of
discovery. 430 Also, the confidentiality of mediation may be an incentive
for the parties to choose mediation over litigation. 431
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act requires confidentiality in
dispute resolution proceedings, with limited exceptions. 432 It might be
argued that mediation in the course of investigation, like that conducted
under the rapid charge processing procedure, is not a dispute resolution
proceeding covered by the Act. Even if such an argument were to prevail,

427. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Project, supra note 102, at 5 (recommending such
monitoring).
428. See Philip J. Harter, Neither Cop nor Collection Agent: Encouraging Administrative Settlements by Ensuring Mediator Confidentiality,41 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 324 ( 1989)
(indicating that fear that disclosure may be used to party's detriment will discourage candor).
429. Moore, supra note 345, at 160 (noting that confidentiality is considered to be a
necessity in mediation); SINGER, supra note 359, at 171-72 (indicating that candid
participation allows development of satisfactory solutions). The parties need to know that
information disclosed to the mediator in caucus sessions will not be disclosed to the other
party absent authorization. See Recommendation 88-11 of the Administrative Conference
of the United States, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 357, 358 (1989) (confidential caucus sessions
encourage candor including raising sensitive and creative ideas).
430. Id.
431. See FOLBERG, & TAYLOR, supra note 289, at 35 (suggesting that unlike litigation,
matter in mediation can be discussed privately); SINGER, supra note 359, at 172.
432. See 5 U.S.C. § 574 (1994) (preventing neutrals and parties in ADR proceedings
from disclosing confidential communications with limited exceptions and barring
admissibility of improperly disclosed communcations).
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however, the rationale supporting the Act's confidentiality provisions is
persuasive, outweighing efficiency concerns, and should be followed in the
mediation process recommended here. 433 Nevertheless, confidentiality
should not bar agency review of the settlement agreement recommended
above.
h.

Technical Experts

ADA mediation may require the use of technical experts to facilitate
settlement. Engineers, architects, rehabilitation experts, and experts in
particular disabilities are among those whose expertise might be required
in a given case. Training of mediators in resource availability will aid in
bringing expertise into mediation. Selection of mediators with expertise is
another method. 434 Agencies should seek to ascertain whether mediators
have such expertise and assign cases to them on that basis. In addition,
regardless of the mediator source utilized, the agencies should encourage
individuals with the required expertise to train as mediators. Government
employees with related training, knowledge and/or experience could be
encouraged to train as mediators. Technical assistance grants or FMCS
could be used for such training. 435
Where the mediator is not the source of expertise, cost of the expert
becomes an issue. While the parties to the dispute could agree to use and
pay an expert, provision of technical assistance at no cost would facilitate
resolution of the dispute in many cases. 436 While some assistance is
available pro bono, other experts charge for their services. To facilitate
settlement, the agencies could utilize several methods of obtaining experts.
As in the case of mediators, some experts, both within and outside the
government, might provide services at little or no cost. 437 Alternatively,
the agencies could set aside funds for technical assistance on an ad hoc
basis when deemed necessary by the mediator. A third alternative is to

433. See Harter, supra note 428 (discussing confidentiality issues).
434. In labor arbitration, the parties to a dispute requiring technical expertise frequently
select an arbitrator with such expertise.
435. As a part of the training, the technical experts could serve as co-mediators,
providing their expertise while learning mediation techniques.
436. For example, the actual construction cost of making a business accessible might be
small, but an architect might be needed to determine how to access the facility most easily
and to draw up plans for doing so. Without the architect's expertise, the parties may be
unaware of the low cost option for accessibility and unwilling to pay for the architect's
services without some assurance that a resolution of the dispute will result.
43 7. The agencies could work out a worksharing arrangement with government agencies
employing individuals with relevant technical expertise.
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employ one or more trained experts to be utilized in mediation. The
problem with the latter approach is the difficulty of finding one or even
several individuals with expertise in the broad range of areas likely to be
needed in ADA disputes. Nonetheless, to the extent possible, expertise
should be available at minimal cost to the parties.

i.

Monitoring and Evaluation

The proposal for a mediation program set forth above is based on the
best current information available. The key to a successful program,
however, is continued monitoring, evaluation, and revision where necessary
to accomplish the goals of the program. 438 The broad goals of any change
in the dispute settlement process, as set forth above, include effective
enforcement of the statute and efficient resolution of disputes. The
mediation program should be evaluated against these broad goals.
To add to the information provided by the existing pilot programs, the
proposed program should be structured to enable empirical evaluation based
on specific criteria established prior to the commencement of the program. 439 These criteria should be developed with the assistance of the
recommended advisory committee. Moreover, employment of a professional evaluator, similar to the EEOC pilot program, will assist in creating an
evaluation system that will provide the data necessary to determine whether
mediation meets the statutory goals and will be cost effective on a larger
scale. 440
The evaluation process should include the parties, the mediators, and
agency personnel at all levels who have any involvement with the
process. 441 Data collected from the program results should include: the
settlement rates, both overall and by the type of case, use of party

438. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Implementing the ADR Act:
Guidance for Agency Dispute Resolution Specialists 55-58 (1992) (providing guidance in
evaluating ADR programs); Administrative Conference of the United States, Dispute
Systems Design Working Group, Performance Indicators/or ADR Program Evaluation 1
(Nov. 1993) (noting importance of program evaluation). For a useful guide for evaluation,
see ELIZABETII ROLPH & ERIK MOLLER, Evaluating Agency Alternative Dispute Resolution
Programs: A Users' Guide to Data Collection and Use (1995).
439. See Designing Systems, supra note 322, section I, at 8-9.
440. As noted in Implementing the ADR Act, supra note 438, at 58, evaluation issues
should be considered in planning the project.
441. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 102, at 5, 6 (showing that
revaluation process included parties, mediators and agency personnel); PEER Study, supra
note 24 7, at 13 (indicating that evaluation process included administrative agency personnel,
interest groups, professional associations, attorneys, complainants, and respondents).
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representatives, and use of technical expertise; party satisfaction, overall
and broken down by the type of case and representation; comparison of
mediated settlements with settlement guidelines, settlements reached
through other processes, and litigation results; 442 an assessment of
mediator quality; 443 the impact on systemic litigation; any changes in the
case backlogs; the comparative processing time of mediated cases and other
cases; the rate of compliance with the mediated agreements; agency
approval rates of mediated settlements; and the relative costs and benefits
of the mediation project. 444
Collection and analysis of this data from the program should assist in
answering the following issues: (1) whether the mediation program is
consistent with statutory goals; (2) whether the mediation program
adversely impacts systemic litigation of ADA issues; (3) whether the
mediation program reduces case processing time and the backlog; (4)
whether mediation reduces the cost of case processing for the parties and/or
the government; (5) whether at a particular point in the investigative
process mediation is most effective; (6) whether mediation is more effective
for certain types of cases; (7) whether mediation disadvantages disabled
individuals or other historically disadvantaged groups; (8) whether the
process is equally fair and effective for represented and unrepresented
parties; (9) whether the results of mediated settlements, settlements reached
through other processes, and litigation in similar cases are comparable; (10)
what are the best sources of qualified mediators; (11) whether the parties
comply with mediated settlements; (12) whether a common group of

442. This comparison will facilitate the determination of whether particular groups are
being disadvantaged by mediation.
443. For useful discussions on selection and evaluation of mediators, See generally
Christopher Honeyman, Five Elements of Mediation, 4 NEG. J. 149 (1988) (discussing
mediator selection by Wisconsin Employment Relations Commision); Christopher
Honeyman, On Evaluating Mediators, 6 NEG. J. 23 ( 1990) (discussing various methods of
evaluating mediators). See also SPIDR Commission on Qualifications Report, supra note
397 (discussing qualifications and selection of mediators).
444. These criteria should incorporate the question of whether settlements are reached
in cases in which mediators believe that discrimination occurred. See supra note 116 and
accompanying text. The mediation program should not be a means by which individuals
obtain relief they would not be entitled under the statute from respondents desirous of
avoiding litigation and bad publicity. Nor should it allow respondents who have violated
the law to settle a case cheaply to the disadvantage of the complainant. Instead, it should
provide rapid, effective relief for complainants whose rights have been violated.
Additionally, if mediation resolves only those cases that would otherwise settle in the
investigation process, then it adds little of benefit, unless early settlement saves investigation
resources at least equivalent to the resources expended in mediation.
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mediators is effective in handling disputes under the various titles of the
ADA and achieves promised efficiency; (13) whether availability of
technical expertise affects settlement; and (14) whether agency approval of
mediated settlements is effective and necessary. In addition, the program
can test some of the specific proposals set forth herein for effectiveness,
providing a basis for retaining or altering them in the future. 445
This analysis of the program, along with analyses of the other pilots, will
establish a base of knowledge that will enable design of the most effective
continuing mediation program. In addition, if the programs demonstrate
that mediation is a fair and satisfactory method of resolving disputes,
parties in the future will be encouraged to participate in mediation in
greater numbers. More participants in the mediation process may lead not
only to expansion of agency-sponsored mediation, but to the growth of
private mediation of ADA disputes, which will reduce agency caseloads
without detracting from statutory goals. A determination of whether
mediation disadvantages disabled individuals is particularly important in
ensuring that the statutory goal of elimination of discrimination is not
compromised by mediation and in encouraging complainants to participate
in mediation.
An important caveat is that the evaluation of the program and evaluations
of mediators, whether agency employees or outsiders, should avoid
overemphasis on settlement rates. The goal of statutory enforcement should
not be outweighed by the goal of settlement, which is probable if settlement
rate is the crucial factor in evaluations. Because settlement is the goal of
mediation, mediators will likely measure their own success by settlement.
The agencies should counterbalance the resulting tendency to push for
settlement at all costs by reassuring mediators that there are cases that will
not, and should not, settle, and recognizing that fact in the evaluation.
Furthermore, systematic evaluation on an ongoing basis should be
continued throughout the program. Such evaluation will provide the data
needed to alter the program as necessary for successful mediation, or to
eliminate it if it no longer meets its goals.

445. The program could use several sources of mediators and compare their effectiveness
or evaluate the impact of the educational programs on participation rates and power
imbalances. The program might vary the timing of mediation in the investigation process
and compare the effectiveness of mediation when used earlier and later in the investigation
process.
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Scope of the Program

The recommended mediation program could be initiated as a larger pilot
program than has been tried thus far, encompassing a range of ADA cases.
Such a pilot would permit the agencies to try the mediation proposal on a
limited, low cost basis. The proposed pilot would add to the information
provided by the EEOC and DOJ pilot programs in several ways. The
EEOC program analyzed all cases mediated, revealing limited information
about mediation of ADA cases. In addition, because the only issues
mediated were discharge, discipline, and terms and conditions of employment, the program excluded many ADA cases from mediation, including
reasonable accommodation cases, which would appear to have significant
potential for mediated solutions. The DOJ pilots will mediate few, if any,
Title II cases, and no mediation program has included Title IV cases.
Thus, an additional pilot would enable more accurate assessment of the
effectiveness of mediation for various types of ADA cases. As a result, any
permanent program could be targeted at those cases in which mediation is
most effective. In addition, the proposed program will test the efficacy of
using a common group of mediators for all ADA cases.
Alternatively, based on the previous pilot programs446 and other
mediation research set forth in this report, the program could be implemented on a larger scale, with careful monitoring and evaluation to allow
modification for effectiveness. Given the EEOC's forthcoming mediation
program, initiation of the joint ADA program recommended seems
appropriate.
4.

Other Uses of ADR

Adoption of a mediation program should not end ADR efforts of ADA
agencies. As noted above, the use of ADA mediation by the agencies is
likely to spur private mediation, particularly if private mediators gain
experience in ADA mediation through a government program. 447 The
agencies could continue to use technical assistance to encourage organizations such as dispute resolution centers to establish ADA mediation

446. If completed as anticipated, the prior pilots will mediate 850 ADA cases and 267
employment discrimination cases, some of which were ADA cases.
447. For an article supporting the use of private mediation in Title III cases, see
Herrnanek, supra note 391. See infra Section IV, 4a. (discussing agency review of privately
mediated settlements).
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programs. 448 Growth of private mediation will reduce dependency on
government resources for statutory enforcement.
a. Arbitration

In addition to mediation, private arbitration is growing, particularly in
the employment arena. 449 The growth in arbitration was spurred by the
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 450
In Gilmer, the Court held that an individual employee who had signed an
arbitration agreement as a part of his application for registration with the
New York Stock Exchange was bound to arbitrate a statutory claim of age
discrimination. 451 The Gilmer Court, following a recent trend of Supreme
Court's decisions favoring arbitration of statutory disputes, rejected the
argument that arbitration is procedurally and substantively inadequate to
resolve such disputes. 452
Gilmer was based on the Federal Arbitration Act, 453 which reflects a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements. 454 Commentators
on Gilmer have speculated about whether it will be applied to require
arbitration under employment agreements, because the Federal Arbitration
Act states that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. " 455 There is disagreement in

448. The Department of Justice grant is one example of how such a grant might be used.
See discussion of the grant supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
449. See Loren K. Allison & Eric H.J. Stahlhut, Arbitration and the ADA: A Budding
Partnership, 48 ARB. J. 53 ( 1993) (noting increasing use of arbitration of statutory
employment discrimination laws); see also Thomas J. Piskorski & David B. Ross, Private
Arbitration as the Exclusive Means of Resolving Employment-Related Disputes, 19 EMP.
Ra. L.J. 205, 205, 216-17 (1993) (noting that employers are increasingly considering
arbitration to resolve employment disputes).
450. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
451. Id. at 26.
452. Id. at 27-32. The Court did examine the arbitration procedures at issue, however,
finding them satisfactory. The court suggested that in the absence of certain protections,
arbitration of statutory claims might inadequately protect statutory rights. Id.
453. 9 U.S.C. § I (1994).
454. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I, 24 (1983)).
455. 9 U.S.C. § 1. For discussions of this issue, see, e.g., James A King, Jr. et al.,
Agreeing to Disagree on EEO Disputes, 9 LAB. LAW. 97, 107-14 (1993) (discussing scope
of FAA exemption for employment contracts and arguing that it should be read to exclude
only contracts of employees actively engaged in transportation); Stephen A Plass, Arbitrating, Waiving and Deferring Title VII Claims, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 779, 791, n.66, 793
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the lower federal courts about the scope of the exemption. 456 With
respect to the ADA, the legislative history supports a conclusion that an
arbitration agreement should not preclude a statutory forum. 457 Regardless

(1992) (noting court's avoidance of issue of scope of the FAA); James A. Burstein &
Kenneth D. Schwartz, Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation: The Supreme Court
Endorses Arbitration ofAge Discrimination Claims, 17 EMP. REL. L.J. 173, 181-83 (1991)
(discussing arguments for and against narrow interpretation of FAA' s exclusion for
employment contracts); Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without
Unions, 66 CHI. KENT L. REV. 753, 753-54 ( 1990) (noting that Gilmer leaves issue of scope
of exclusionary clause unresolved).
456. See, e.g., American Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 473
(11th Cir. 1987) (holding that collective bargaining agreements are contracts of employment
within meaning of FAA exemption); United Elec., Radio and Machine Workers v. Miller
Metal Prods., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954) (holding that exclusionary clause exempts
all employment contracts from FAA coverage); Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 827 F.
Supp. 76, 78 (D.C. Mass. 1993) (holding that insurance sales agent required to arbitrate
gender discrimination claim pursuant to arbitration clause in her agent contract, which is not
excluded under FAA exemption for employment contracts); Williams v. Katten, Muchin &
Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430, 1438 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that lawyer required to arbitrate
claim of race, gender and religious discrimination because agreement not excluded under
FAA exemption for employment contracts); Dancu v. Coopers& Lybrand, 778 F. Supp. 832
(E.D. Pa. 1991) (noting that FAA exemption for employment contracts excludes workers
actively involved in interstate transportation and not plaintiff who was involved in consulting
services related to state and local government), aff'd without published opinion, 972 F.2d
1330 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting narrow reading of employment contract exemption).
457. See Legislative History, supra note 333, at 516-17 (stating "the Committee believes
that the approach articulated by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
applies equally to the ADA and does not intend that the inclusion of section 513 be used to
preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise be available to persons with disabilities");
Hayford, supra note 334, at 15-17 and authorities cited therein (discussing congressional
statements indicating that use of ADR in ADA cases should be voluntary). In Alexanderv.
Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974), the Supreme Court held that an employee was
entitled to pursue an action in federal court alleging race discrimination under Title VII
despite an arbitration decision finding that he was discharged for just cause. The issue of
race discrimination had been raised before the arbitrator, but was not mentioned in the
decision. Id. at 42. The Court found that the employee was entitled to a trial de novo
because the two proceedings differed significantly. Id. at 56-58, 60. The Gilmer Court
distinguished the Gardner-Denverdecision on several grounds. 500 U.S. at 33-35. First,
the employees there, unlike Gilmer, had not agreed to arbitrate statutory claims and thus, the
arbitrator had no authority to resolve such claims. Second, the Court noted the absence of
the tension between collective and individual rights in Gilmer, which involved a nonunion
workplace. The final differentiating factor was that the Gardner-Denvercase was decided
under Title VII, not the Federal Arbitration Act. The ADA was passed before Gilmer was
decided, however. See Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and EEOC
Enforcement,23 STETSON L. REV. 53, 92 (1993) (suggesting that Gilmerdecision may have
changed congressional understanding of legal limits on arbitration between passage of ADA
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of how the courts decide the issue, the agencies will be faced with the
question of whether to investigate and litigate cases where a private ADR
proceeding has been conducted or agreed upon. The Court in Gilmer
expressly noted that Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate did not preclude his
filing of an EEOC charge or EEOC involvement in combating discrimination.458
Arbitration of employment discrimination claims has generated
substantial controversy. 459 Arbitration may be imposed on unwilling or
unknowing employees. 460 Additionally, the statutory rights and remedies
may be unavailable in arbitration. 461
For example, arbitration may
eliminate discovery462 or restrict the arbitrator's authority to award
damages. Furthermore, some arbitrators may be inclined to favor
employers, since employers are likely to be repeat customers, while
employees are not. 463 The agencies should be alert to these concerns in

and Civil Rights Act of 1991).
458. 500 U.S. at 28. It is not clear, however, what the impact of a private arbitration
award or settlement would be on the EEOC's ability to obtain individual relief. Livingston,
supra note 457, at 95-96.
459. Several members of Congress have introduced legislation to overturn the Gilmer
decision and bar employers from requiring arbitration of discrimination claims. See H.R.
4981, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.; S. 2405, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.; Legislation Bans Mandatory
EEO Arbitration, 146 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 561 (Aug. 29, 1994) (citing concern over
mandatory arbitration of discrimination claims, including particular concerns about
arbitration in securities industry, members of Congress introduced companion bills to
prohibit compulsory arbitration).
460. See Jennifer R. Dowd, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements in Age Discrimination
Suits: Gilmerv. lnterstateJohnson Lane Corp., 33 B.C.L. REV. 435, 455 (1992) (noting that
after Gilmer, employees must be careful what they sign and with whom to avoid inadvertent
waiver of judicial forum for vindication of statutory rights); Legislation Bans Mandatory
EEO Arbitration, supra note 459, at 562 (describing legislation to ban compulsory
arbitration of discrimination claims imposed by employers on employees as condition on
employment). The Court in Gilmer rejected the argument that unequal bargaining power
required a holding that employment arbitration agreements are not enforceable. 500 U.S.
at 33. The court indicated, however, that fraud or overwhelming economic power might
justify a refusal to enforce the agreement. Id.
461. See Peter M. Panken, et al., Avoiding Employment Litigation: Alternative Dispute
Resolution of Employment Disputes in the 90 's, C779 ALl-ABA 63, 72 (LEXIS) ( 1992)
(arbitrator may be less likely than jury to award significant damages).
462. See Jenifer A. Magyar, Statutory Civil Rights Claims in Arbitration: An Analysis
o/Gilmerv. lnterstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 72 B.U. L. REV. 641, 655 (1992) (arbitration
proceedings may eliminate discovery, particularly important in civil rights cases which are
often difficult to prove without discovery).
463. See Panken, supra note 461 (noting that an arbitrator must be fair to major clients
which, in nonunion context, are employers, not employees); AAA President Predicts
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deciding whether to proceed in a case where an arbitration agreement
exists. In addition, some of the same concerns exist with respect to
settlement agreements reached through private mediation. These cases
reach the agencies when the charging party, dissatisfied with the arbitration
decision, private arbitration or mediation agreement, or mediated settlement,
files a charge.
In considering the appropriate approach to these cases, the agencies
might look to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) precedent
regarding precedent to arbitration. The NLRB has a policy of deferral to
arbitration in cases where the unfair labor practice claim filed with the
NLRB overlaps with a contractual right subject to arbitration. 464 The
NLRB will defer to an arbitrator's award which meets its Spielberg
standards, which require fair and regular proceedings to which all parties
agreed to be bound, and a decision which is not repugnant to the purpose
and policies of the statute. 465 Additionally, the issue in the unfair labor
practice case must have been presented to and considered by the arbitrator,
a criterion which is met if the contractual and statutory issues are factually
parallel and the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant
to the unfair labor practice. 466 The requirement that the proceedings be
fair and regular has been interpreted to incorporate minimum due process
standards, 467 while the absence of repugnancy to the statute means not
"palpably wrong as a matter of law."468
The NLRB also defers to the arbitration proceeding where the arbitration
has not yet occurred, but retains its right to review the award under the
Spielberg standards. 469 The criteria for prearbitral deferral, first articulated in Collyer Insulated Wire, are: (1) the parties must have an established
and productive collective bargaining relationship; (2) the parties must be
willing to arbitrate the dispute; and (3) the meaning of the contract must be
Upswing in Use ofADR, Individual Employment Rights (BNA) 3, (July 20, 1993) (noting
concern for bias in favor of repeat customers). If the employer is paying the cost of the
arbitration, that fact might influence the arbitrator as well, subconsciously if not consciously.
464. See PA'JRICK HARDIN ET AL., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1016-17 (1992)
(describing the NLRB's deferral policy).
465. See Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955) (setting forth standards for
deferral to an arbitration award).
466. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
467. Hardin, supra note 464, at 1061.
468. Inland Steel Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 1091, 1091 (1982).
469. See United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984) (deferring allegation that
employee was threatened with discipline for filing grievances to grievance and arbitration
procedure, retaining jurisdiction to review the case for consistency with Spie/bergstandards
after dispute was resolved in arbitration).
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central to the dispute. 470 In addition to deferring to arbitration awards, the
NLRB has deferred to prearbitration settlements. 471 The NLRB's deferral
policy is controversial, particularly prearbitration deferral, and the agency
has expanded and contracted the cases subject to deferral over the
years. 472 Critics of the policy argue that the NLRB has abandoned its
duty to enforce statutory rights. 473 The agency's rationale for deferral
includes furthering the national labor policy favoring arbitration, requiring
the parties to use their agreed-upon method of dispute resolution, deferral
to arbitral expertise in contract interpretation, and conservation of the
agency's resources. 474
Where the statute does not mandate investigation of each charge filed,
agencies have the authority to allocate investigative resources, declining to
investigate cases where a resolution of the matter was reached in another
forum. This also applies where agency litigation is discretionary, which is
the case under Titles I, II and III. The requirement of a Title II investigation could be satisfied through the review of the arbitrator's award or
mediated settlement and any evidence the parties desired to present
supporting their claim that the resolution was inconsistent with the statute.
Such review under Title IV would also serve to determine whether the

470. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 842 (1971) (setting forth criteria for
deferral).
471. See Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union 520 v. NLRB, 955 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 61 (1992) (upholding NLRB's authority to defer to settlement
agreements where settlement was reached through collective bargaining process that was fair
and regular, parties agreed to be bound by settlement, outcome was not "palpably wrong"
in that both sides compromised to some degree, unfair labor practice and contractual issues
were factually parallel, and both parties were generally aware of relevant facts).
472. See generally Hardin, supra note 464, at 1017-68 (detailing various changes in
NLRB deferral policy). See also Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union, 520 v. NLRB, 955
F.2d at 746 (criticizing NLRB for lack of coherent rationale for its policy deferring to
prearbitral settlements).
473. See the dissents of Members Fanning and Jenkins in Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 84750 (arguing that it was inappropriate to cede jurisdiction of statutory claims to arbitrator who
may be reluctant to decide statutory issues and may provide only partial remedy for
violation).
474. See Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 839 (supporting deferral based on national labor policy
favoring arbitration, statutory policy of encouraging parties to resolve disputes by their
agreed upon methods, and skill and expertise of arbitrators in deciding issue arising under
collective bargaining relationships); UnitedTechnologies,268 N.L.R.B. at 558, 559 (citing
United Aircraft Corp., 204 N.L.R.B. 879 ( 1973), enf'd sub nom., Machinists Lodges 700,
743, 1746 v. NLRB, 525 F.2d 23 7 (2d Cir. 1975) (reemphasizing factors supporting deferral
in Collyer and adding rationale of conserving agency resources)).

1100

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:1007

statutory requirements were met and thus whether the dispute resolution
could be accepted by the agency as a final judgment in the matter. 475
Because the NLRA provides no private right of action, deferral by the
agency is a final determination of the charging party's case. By contrast,
under Titles I, II, and III of the ADA, an agency determination not to
proceed based on an arbitral award or settlement does not preclude judicial
action by the employee. 476 Nevertheless, the agencies should approach
deferral with caution. The benefits of deferral are similar to those under
the NLRA, but the balance of power may be quite different. Deferral to
a union negotiated arbitration procedure leaves the dispute to be resolved
through a procedure agreed upon by two relatively equal parties. In a
discrimination dispute, the arbitration agreement may well have been
imposed on an employee with little knowledge of the consequences and
minimal effective bargaining power. 477 In addition, there may be an
imbalance in representation of the parties. Thus in considering deferral, the
agencies should emphasize, whether on an ad hoc basis or through
regulatory guidelines, criteria that ensure fairness to all parties.478
The agencies should consider developing and publishing the criteria that
they will consider in determining whether to take action in cases where an
arbitration or mediation agreement has been executed by the parties. 479
The criteria should include the circumstances under which the agency will

475. As noted, these issues, particularly those involving agreements to arbitrate, are most
likely to arise in employment discrimination cases. In communications and transportation
cases, the statute sets forth clear minimum standards that must be met and there is little
flexibility for either a mediated or arbitrated solution. If such a proceeding took place, the
agency substantive review of the resolution would be relatively straightforward because the
statutory standards are specific.
476. If courts follow Gilmer, however, the action may be effectively precluded.
477. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 933 (9th Cir. 1994)
(refusing to enforce agreement to arbitrate on basis that plaintiff employees did not
knowingly waive their right to judicial forum). Deferral of individual discrimination cases
under the NLRA also has been more controversial than deferral of cases involving disputes
over changes in working conditions. See Hardin, supra note 464, at I 022-25 (detailing shifts
in NLRB deferral policy in individual discrimination cases and the arguments for and against
deferral).
478. These cases are most likely to arise in the employment context.
479. See Estreicher, supra note 455, at 790 (suggesting that the EEOC issue regulations
setting forth minimum procedural requirements for arbitration of Title VII and ADEA
claims). Because the issue is most likely to arise in employment cases, the development of
such guidelines should be a higher priority for the EEOC than for other enforcement
agencies. The other agencies could defer action unless and until the issue arises with some
frequency.
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defer action on the case until the dispute resolution mechanism is
completed. 480 Publication of such criteria would aid the parties in
establishing arbitration and mediation procedures that would survive agency
scrutiny. Encouraging fair procedures would promote efficiency by
increasing the number of cases in which the agencies could decline to act
on the basis of a private dispute resolution. In addition, it would serve the
goals of the statute by encouraging employers and businesses to establish
dispute resolution mechanisms that would fairly consider claims. 481
The NLRB's criteria provide a starting point. The mediation or
arbitration procedure should be voluntary, fair and regular, and provide the
rights and remedies that would be available in a statutory proceeding. 482
Procedures imposed on all employees as a condition of employment should
be suspect, but not automatically rejected. Fairness should include the
notice of the procedures, right to representation, a neutral arbitrator or
mediator chosen by both parties with equal knowledge of the backgrounds
of the candidates, a right to at least some discovery, 483 a right to compel
witnesses, and a written opinion. 484 All remedies available under the
statute should be available to the arbitrator.
In addition, like the NLRB, the agency should do a substantive review
to ensure that the discrimination issue was actually considered by the
arbitrator485 and that the decision or settlement is not inconsistent with the

480. Given the current backlogs at all agencies other than the FCC, deferral will not
cause substantial investigative delays.
481. Pursuant to its statutory authority, 15 U.S.C. § 2310, the Federal Trade Commission
has established minimum requirements for informal dispute resolution procedures which
must be exhausted by consumers prior to judicial action. See 16 C.F.R. pt. 703 (1995).
482. Many of the criteria set forth are relevant only to arbitration, where the neutral
party has the authority to impose a decision on the parties at interest.
483. If the discovery were required to be as extensive as in litigation, one of the
advantages of arbitration would be lost. Nevertheless, a party, typically the employee,
should not lose the case because of inaccessibility of necessary evidence. An example of
such evidence would be comparative data regarding treatment of similarly situated
employees to establish discrimination.
484. The final report of the Dunlop Commission encourages development of private
arbitration for employment disputes and sets forth many of these same criteria for fairness.
Dunlop Commission Final Report, supra note 99, at 25-34. The Commission recommends
that employers not be permitted to make agreement to arbitrate public law claims a condition
of employment. Id.
485. Actual consideration, rather than factual parallelism is a preferable standard and one
used by the NLRB before the Olin decision. See Suburban Motor Freight, 247 NLRB 146,
147 (1980) (requiring that unfair labor practice issue be presented to and considered by
arbitrator as condition of deferral).
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statute. 486 Finally, the agency should ensure that the case does not
involve systemic issues which were ignored or not adequately treated in the
arbitration or mediation. Where the award or settlement meets these
criteria, the agency should decline to proceed further with the investigation
and should not litigate the case. If the award or settlement does not meet
the criteria, then the agency might still decline to proceed further based on
other adequate grounds. 487 This procedure will encourage private dispute
resolution and conserve resources without diminution of protection of
statutory rights.

b.

Other Forms of ADR

The agencies should remain alert to other opportunities to use ADR.
Litigation of ADA cases may provide opportunities for other ADR methods
such as summary jury trials 488 or early neutral evaluation. 489 Agencies

486. Consistency should require application of appropriate legal standards, but mere
recitation of the proper standard should not be sufficient for deferral. Many arbitrators have
little or no expertise in statutory discrimination. In a 1975 survey of members of the
National Academy of Arbitrators, only half of respondents indicated that they stayed abreast
of Title VII law and only 14% believed that they could accurately define basic employment
discrimination terms. Harry Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases:
An Empirical Study, 28 PROCEEDINGS OF TIIE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 59
(1976), cited in LAURA J. COOPER & DENNIS R. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION: A
COURSEBOOK 75 (1994). Nevertheless, 72% of respondents felt competent to decide legal
issues in discrimination cases. Id. Furthermore, arbitrators in employment discrimination
cases do not have the political or personal accountability of judges and therefore, caution
should be exercised in deferring the their interpretations of the law. Malin & Ladenson,
supra note 278, at 1230-38. Careful review of conclusions oflaw still preserves the benefits
of deferral as many cases turn on factual issues, where deference will be greater.
The suggestion of the Dunlop Commission that the EEOC implement a training
program and adopt standard training requirements for arbitrators hearing discrimination cases
is valuable and would go far in addressing this problem and insuring that cases would
survive a substantive review by the agency. See Dunlop Commission Final Report, supra
note 99, at n.13.
487. For example, the Department of Justice might decline to litigate because the case
did not involve a pattern or practice of discrimination or an issue of general public
importance.
488. A summary jury trial involves abbreviated presentation of the case to a nonbinding
jury. Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial: An Effective Aid to Settlement, 77
JUDICATURE 6 (1993).
489. Early neutral evaluation involves a neutral assessmentofthe merits of the claim and
is designed to narrow and define issues as well as to facilitate settlement. BROWN &
MARRIOTT, supra note 278, at 20. Implementing the ADR Act, supra note 438, at 30-31
suggests factors to be considered in determining the appropriate form of ADR, such as "the
relationships among the disputants, their need for control over the process, the utility of an
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should also consider that ADR may be used creatively in settlement of large
systemic cases. For example, if a settlement requires ongoing action by the
defendant, the agreement could include use of ADR to resolve disputes that
arise over the course of implementation of the settlement. 490 The potential
for ADR is limited only by lack of creativity in its use and consistency with
statutory goals.
CONCLUSION

The ADA enforcement agencies are working to achieve effective dispute
resolution under the statute. With the exception of Title IV, agency
enforcement is marked by large investigative backlogs and long delays.
The significant resource investment required to establish an administrative
adjudication solely for ADA cases does not promise sufficient benefit in
resolving these problems. Additional resources would be better allocated
to systemic litigation and establishment of an alternative dispute resolution
system for ADA cases. A joint voluntary mediation program should be
established by the agencies, after consultation with an advisory committee
of representatives of potential disputants, to provide an alternative for
parties to ADA disputes. This mediation program could operate effectively
as part of an early intervention program, which identifies in the intake
process cases appropriate for various types of investigation, ADR, and
litigation.
Mediation promises quicker resolution of disputes with high satisfaction
levels and empowerment of the parties, reducing the governmental
enforcement burden. The proposed mediation program should be carefully
monitored, evaluated, and modified as necessary, to ensure that the program
is achieving the promised benefits, improving enforcement of the statute
and moving the nation forward in its goal of eliminating discrimination
against individuals with disabilities. In addition, the agencies should look
for other opportunities to use ADR creatively to achieve enforcement goals.

independent analysis of the merits, the urgency to resolve the dispute and the desire for
privacy." Id. at 30.
490. For an example of this type of use of ADR, see Peter David Blanck, On Integrating
Persons with Mental Retardation: The ADA and ADR, 22 N.M. L.REv. 260 (1992)
(illustrating use of ADR in settlement of class action against state of Wyoming by class of
plaintiffs with mental retardation seeking improvement of conditions at state training school
and establishment of framework for integration into community).

